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This project identifies a puzzle in how academics and policymakers have 
described international politics: the phrase ‘Great Power rights and responsibilities’ is 
widely-used and has been for centuries, but there exists no widely-shared understanding 
of what this term means, what it signifies theoretically about the casual relationships 
among states, and even from where the concepts underlying it historically came. It then 
posits answers to these questions, identifying these origins in the practices of feudal 
Europe and tracing their development into a complex of Great Power rights and 
responsibilities as feudal order gave way to an early modern states-system. Though 
formally anarchical, this system was actually ordered by a sophisticated social 
arrangement of Great Power relationships based on mutually-comprehensible rights and 
duties expressed through a shared identity as well as a number of differentiated roles 
unique to individual Powers. The material abilities of its Powers were understood in light 
of their moral commitments to their peers, to the political community around them, and to 
their own self-understandings. These encouraged certain behaviors, discouraged others, 
and kept European international activity rooted in a shared political culture. The project 
then examines how, over time, this arrangement was institutionalized to the point that the 
internal identity of a Great Power became a reified social status, while the roles of rights 
and duties expressed by the individual Powers came to exert legitimatized ordering 
authority across regions and issue areas. However, the behavioral routines and cognitive 
patterns of the complex did not evolve as the moral and material contexts of the 19th 
century went through their own profound transformations. This incongruity made an 





expressing more authority claims of rights and duties, and this would necessarily multiply 
areas of tension and points of potential conflict in a system with greater violence potential 
than ever before. This project concludes by demonstrating how periodic moments of role 
overlap between pairs of Powers led to the July Crisis of 1914 and, ultimately, to the 
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For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required: and to whom men have 
committed much, of him they will ask the more. 
              - Jesus of Nazareth 
 
No nation can claim rights without acknowledging the duties that go with the rights. . . . 
During the seven and a half years that I was President . . . [the United States] never failed 
to treat both strong and weak with courtesy and justice; and against the weak when they 
misbehaved we were slower to assert our rights than we were against the strong. . . . My 
endeavor [in international affairs] was not only to assert these rights, but frankly and fully 
to acknowledge the duties that went with the rights. 
-Theodore Roosevelt 
 
We have tried to emphasize that because of China’s extraordinary development over the last 
two decades, that with expanding power and prosperity also comes increased 
responsibilities. 
- Barack Obama1 
 
Capacity, right, and responsibility are frequently spoken of as though they are linked 
together in the organization of social and political life. However, the diversity of the 
discourse surrounding them conceals an often-unrecognized diversity of meaning. This is 
the problem academic international relations (IR) faces when it turns to how these 
concepts manifest themselves in world politics: a veneer of rhetorical similarity conceals 
real dissonance in how they are understood. Though these concepts are seemingly 
familiar, there is a actually counterintuitive absence of sustained, rigorous theorizing 
about them as a tripartite topic. To offer a remedy, this study will develop a conceptual 
framework within which material capacity, right, and responsibility are understood as an 
interwoven unity shaping world politics: a complex of ‘Great Power rights and 
responsibilities’.   
                                                             
1 Luke 12:48 (King James Version); Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1922), 502, 505; Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Vice President Xi Jinping of China, 





The following six chapters will disentangle the many conceptual and historical 
components surrounding these concepts. This introduction explores the strengths and 
weaknesses of existing scholarship, articulating a new understanding of the right- and 
responsibility-complex as a key point of material-moral juncture influencing international 
norms and mediating international anarchy. Subsequent chapters each examine a discrete 
historical and conceptual facet of how this came to be. Chapter Two explores the theory 
linking together capacity, right, and duty within international politics, tracing the 
antecedents of the complex to feudal norms. Chapter Three examines the sociology of a 
‘textbook’ Great Power system in the 18th century, exposing the macro-level operation of 
the identity and role mechanisms that demarcated its attitudes and determined its 
characteristic behaviors. Chapter Four addresses how this complex mediated and shaped 
historical cases of international change by referencing unit-level case studies of rising 
Powers. The consequences of this mediation are addressed in Chapter Five, which 
explains how the ability of the complex to successfully reproduce Great Power politics 
ultimately contributed to its own destruction. Finally, a concluding chapter summarizes 
the continuing influence of the components of the complex on contemporary international 
practice, capping off the argument made throughout that rights and duties correlated to 
material capacity exert causal force over international behavior. 
I. Between Slogan and Substance: Great Power Rights and Duties in IR Literature 
Just as the intermixture of rights, duties, and capacities forms the basis of 
citizenship within polities, among polities these same concepts shape the normative 
conduct of their social relations. Of course, these topics appear so frequently in IR 





them. There is even a conventional vocabulary by which they are often identified: the 
quasi-theoretic moniker of ‘Great Power’ describes materially-endowed states, while the 
norms and rules associated with them are given the quasi-mystical designation ‘rights and 
responsibilities’. These terms and the deeper material and moral linkages at which they 
gesture are found in almost every corner of the field. No less a realist than John 
Mearsheimer focused his efforts around ‘Great Powers’,2 while Kenneth Waltz even 
prescribed Great Power as the starting point for all IR systems theory.3 Similarly, Hedley 
Bull and the moderate constructivists of the English School accepted as a cornerstone of 
their posited international society a system of Great Power managerial rights 
corresponding to a responsibility for the promotion of certain legitimate collective 
goods.4 As Jackson noted, 
Great power brings greater responsibility: great powers can justifiably be called 
upon to maintain or restore international peace and security or to uphold or repair 
the world economy. Great power also obviously brings greater privilege: great 
powers can justifiably expect other states to recognize their special status and 
respond to their legitimate claims and demands.5 
 
Liberal institutionalists echo this emphasis on responsibility and power, often examining 
the key role that the most powerful states play in the construction of international 
                                                             
2 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2003), 5. 
3 “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an 
era. . . . In international politics, as in any self-help system, the units of greatest capability set the scene of 
action for others as well as for themselves. . . . A general theory of international politics is necessarily 
based on the great powers.” Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random 
House, 1979), 72-3. 
4 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003), 13, 71, 195-201.  
5 Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 139-40. This expresses Bull’s foundational understanding, defined by Vincent as 
“the minimalist endorsement of the doctrine that authority must reside somewhere if order is to obtain 
anywhere. The great powers were burdened by responsibility as much as benefited by power, and theirs 
was a role that had to be played.” See R. J. Vincent, “Order in International Politics,” in Order and 
Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations, eds. J. D. B. Miller and R. J. Vincent (Oxford: 





institutions as well as the burdens they must carry to ensure that these instruments of 
order function legitimately.6 Many critical theorists and cosmopolitans even make 
responsibility a transitive property, the key to the formulation of state policy and the 
exercise of force in an era of human rights; “responsibility talk” related to human rights, 
climate change, and economic inequality saturates this discourse.7 Two foreign policy 
experts dubbed this widely-felt mood “the Spiderman Doctrine: With great power comes 
great responsibility.”8 This litany enlivens IR scholarship past and present, but it also 
belies a problem that goes oddly unproblematized: these authors and schools do not really 
agree about what their shared vocabulary signifies. Instead, they study materially-capable 
states, rights, and responsibilities in diverse and often incompatible ways, regularly 
foreclosing their study as a unified complex.  
Every major IR paradigm has its peculiar bias when exploring these ideas. 
Realists, being theorists of power, focus on how different levels of quantitative material 
capability influence state behavior. Their Powers are ‘great’ by virtue of their material 
capacity to behave differently—not because their behavior is shaped by their adoption of 
norms linked to rights and duties.9 Determinative force rests with the natural given of 
material distribution within anarchy and its operative mechanism, the balance of power. 
                                                             
6 See unipolar ‘strategic restraint’ in G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic 
Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 4. 
A discussion of how international position translates into domestic duty is in Charles A. Kupchan, The End 
of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2003), 333. 
7 Mlada Bukovansky, Ian Clark, Robyn Eckersley, Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit, and 
Nicholas J. Wheeler, Special Responsibilities: Global Problems and American Power (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1. 
8 Gary J. Schmitt and Patrick Keller, "Germany and the Spider-Man Doctrine," Wall Street 
Journal, February 7, 2014, Europe. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1495379372.  
9 For realist definitions of Great Power focused around material capability, see Waltz, 131; Jack 






A parsimonious focus on these elements detaches material ability from moral meaning, 
degrading our ability to comprehend the human antecedents of Great Power behavior. In 
contrast, liberals and English School theorists—groups interested in how material and 
moral orders intersect—look for what makes a Great Power in the degree and scope of a 
state’s engagement with international society, particularly in the adoption of common 
norms and the acceptance of common duties.10 When influenced by the constructivist 
reading of anarchy as a mutable feature of international life, this understanding tends 
toward the study of how informal regimes of norms can be subsumed within formal, 
cosmopolitan institutions of global governance and transnational ‘thickening’.11 The 
recognition of both power and principle found in these paradigms forms a more complete 
picture than a monocausal approach, but they tend to view international affairs in 
teleological terms, as though it inevitably leads to something higher or better as it 
progresses through time. While right- and responsibility-complexes can abate some of the 
violence and uncertainty of an anarchical self-help system, they moderate that system 
rather than to promote its wholesale transformation into either authoritarian hierarchy or 
cosmopolitan or liberal global authority. Such transformation is also the concern of a 
final group: critical theorists and international legists. They focus on how ethical notions 
of responsibility and right should operate in international politics, often singling out 
                                                             
10 This behavioral approach (in contrast to the material capability approach of realism) is seen in 
the literature discussing the so-called ‘rising’ powers of China, Brazil, India, and South Africa. It posits that 
these states will only be ‘powers’ when they accept ‘responsibility’ for the promotion of the norms of 
international society. See Amrita Narlikar, “Is India a Responsible Great Power?” Third World Quarterly 
32, no. 9 (2011): 1607-1608.  
11 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 1; Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social 





Great Power and its privileges as a big part of the problem.12 Though normative theory of 
this type is an important component of contemporary IR, its outside-looking-in stance has 
its handicaps; where statespeople are guided by their own ethical imperatives and power-
political objectives, a detached, philosophical view often sees only a number of ethical 
quandaries and moral imperatives that translate into duties.13 This differs from the 
practice of international politics, where responsibility is not easily uncoupled from self-
interested prerogative and practical material capability. Since these latter two elements 
play an important part in shaping the moral understandings of states, prescriptive theory 
ignores them at its peril.14 
In sum, the tendency of different schools to focus their attentions on one or two of 
these components at the expense of the others has produced a severely fragmented 
understanding of how Great Power rights and duties affect international politics. Though 
there may be theories of state capacity and of international responsibility and even of 
international social systems involving Great Powers, there is no IR theory of material 
capacity, right, and responsibility per se as a causal force equally-dependent upon its 
                                                             
12 The debate essentially focuses around whether international law “is to be the servant or the 
master of the state”—i.e., whether the primacy of politics or the primacy of principles will guide 
international progress. See James Mayall, World Politics: Progress and its Limits (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2000), 140. See also the discussion of international law’s “transformative” ability to “give voice to those 
who are otherwise routinely excluded” through the language of rights and duties in Martti Koskenniemi, 
The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 316-17. 
13 For an interesting thought experiment along these lines from a realist, see Stanley Hoffmann, 
Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International Politics (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1981). 
14 That international duties fall especially upon those states with the wealth and willingness 
necessary to fulfill them is actually a tacit reincorporation of Great Powers into such theories, as recent 
cases studies of the Responsibility to Protect illustrate. See the collected works in Ramesh Thakur and 
William Maley, eds., Theorising the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015). See also the progression from the duties and reciprocal responsibilities of all states to a directorate 
of the powerful in Paul Fauchille, Traité de Droit International Public, ed. Henry Bonfils, 8th ed. (Paris: 





three components. Because there is so little agreement on how these three crucial 
concepts fit together, we lack a shared basis for understanding what Great Powers are, 
what rights and duties accompany their station, and what conceptual and historical 
sources account for their special norms. This dissonance produces a cacophony of 
incompatible and rhetorically decorative usages. ‘Great Power’ can mean anything—and 
often nothing—at all. ‘Responsibility talk’ is cheap, often articulated unclearly even 
when sincerely felt. Worse still, there has been no serious effort to formulate an 
understanding that has any hope of bridging paradigms. Most IR theorists tacitly concede 
this point by skirting the rigorous exploration of these words whenever possible: “in IR 
there is a willingness to duck the task of defining great power.”15  
Figure 1.1: Ideal-typical Distribution of Emphasis among IR Paradigms 
 
This is true even in monographs enshrining ‘Great Powers’ in their very titles. 
Some of these usages are really little more than rhetoric—cases in which ‘Great Power’ 
simply signifies any state important enough to be coded as a part of the study.16 Others 
aim for a more structural and integral role for Great Powers in their theories but likewise 
                                                             
15 Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 58. 
16 For a recent example, note the absence of any definition of or meaningful theoretic role for 
‘great powers’ in Sebastian Rosato, “The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers,” International Security 
39, no. 3 (2014/15): 48-88. 
NR Neorealism 
MR Moderate Realism 
ESP English School (Pluralist) 
L Liberal Institutionalism 
ESC English School (Cosmopolitan) 
IL International Law 





sidestep the issue of term’s deeper meaning.17 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, for 
example, deploys only a single sentence to define its Great Powers.18 Similarly, The 
Great Powers and the International System, a recent winner of the International Studies 
Association’s Annual Best Book prize, gives only a cursory definition buried 80 pages 
deep into the book.19 Even within the English School, the subject is increasingly avoided. 
Bull’s international society centered on the fundamentally contradictory nature of right- 
and duty-bearing Great Powers: the actualization of hierarchy embedded in equality and 
of normative, moral force embedded in the capacity for violence.20 Yet his successors 
have been less comfortable with this mixed material-ideational and hierarchical-
anarchical framing, often omitting the Great Power institution entirely or eliding it with 
other concepts. For example, Legitimacy in International Society mentions the term 
‘Great Powers’ only twice outside discussions of the Vienna and Versailles treaties, in 
both cases asserting that Great Power was a category applicable only to a narrow century 
of time.21 That this omission is found in a study devoted to international legitimacy 
                                                             
17 Polarity theorists often use ‘Great Power’ to mean ‘any state functioning as a pole in a polarized 
system’. This vocabulary gestures at something deeper, but the casual force in their arguments lies firmly 
with the imperatives of polarity rather than with the interplay of norms of right and duty. See Christopher 
Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security 17, no. 4 (1993): 
5-51. 
18 The term’s origin, significance, and relationship to other usages is not explored; there is only a 
lone footnote directing the reader to an obscure text from two decades prior. Mearsheimer, 6. 
19 Bear F. Braumoeller, The Great Powers and the International System (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 79-80. 
20 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 196-201, 221. 
21 Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). The view that 
‘Great Power’ is applicable only between the Vienna and Versailles settlements was pioneered in Harold 
Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1946), 137. A recent exponent is Andreas Osiander, The States-system of Europe, 1640-1990: 
Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 88, 168, 233-
4, 322-4. This position is dependent upon a certain narrow understanding of ‘international system’, as noted 
in Heinz Duchhardt, “Introduction” in “The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848”: Episode or 
Model in Modern History?, eds. Peter Krüger and Paul W. Schröder (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002), 26-7. For early evidence of the turn away from a focus on Great Power norms, see the offhand 





would certainly have surprised founding figures such as Martin Wight and Bull.22 Others 
have simply replaced the study of Great Powers with a more generalized study of 
hierarchy.23 Indeed, this volte-face within the School now includes full-throated 
prescriptive arguments against a Great Power system.24  
When even the English School disengages from the study of Great Powers and 
their rights and duties, there is a wider trend afoot. Today, it is common for IR scholars to 
use these terms without seriously exploring their full implications or to avoid them 
entirely, thus discouraging the study of how international capacity, right, and duty are 
linked together.25 This has severely hampered the ability of these terms to be taken 
seriously alongside monocausal approaches that pull them apart and study them in 
isolation. There is scant room for the idea that these three components are operationally 
inseparable—a collective, causal force in international affairs worthy of unified study. 
This is a missed opportunity. As the historical case studies presented in subsequent 
chapters will suggest, capacity and norms do not exist independently of one another in 
international politics as it is practiced by statespeople. Instead, they have historically been 
linked within a complex of rights and responsibilities shaping how the possibilities and 
limitations of that field are understood in human terms. This study will explore the 
                                                             
Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of Sates: Reform and Resistance in the International Order (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4. 
22 Clark did concede the importance that founding figures such as Bull and Wight attached to 
Great Powers as the foundation of international society, but pursued the concept no further. Clark, 
Legitimacy in International Society, 21, 58, 70. 
23 William Clapton, Risk and Hierarchy in International Society: Liberal Interventionism in the 
Post-Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 19; Clark, The Hierarchy of States. 
24 See Nick Bisley, Great Powers in the Changing International Order (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2012). 
25 Prozorov’s critique of ‘world politics’ applies to ‘Great Power rights and responsibilities’, 
which often amounts to either “a presupposition that is so self-evident as not to merit a conceptual 
explication [or] a problematic phantasm only accessible to thought in the form of a hegemonic pretension.” 
Sergei Prozorov, “What is the ‘world’ in world politics? Heidegger, Badiou and void universalism,” 





origins of the concepts and practices comprising this posited complex, the abstract 
function fulfilled by their union, and their practical significance for the conduct of world 
affairs. To frame this discussion, these chapters address a longstanding IR puzzle: why 
does the behavior of those most materially-capable of states, the Great Powers, so often 
seem to involve behaviors and outcomes contrary to the expectations of a purely rational, 
materially-determined international system? 
II. Norms, Purpose, and Power 
 
 a. Rights, duties, and semi-archy 
 
What follows will take up this task, arguing that the right- and duty-claims 
advanced separately and collectively by a group of Great Powers comprise a complex of 
historically-developed, socially-conditioned behaviors and practices that regulate the 
intercourse of the powerful and provide it with purposive direction.26 This right- and 
responsibility-complex defines the operation of the international system in two ways. 
First, it promotes common customs, practices, and normative attitudes among a special 
group of states called the Great Powers.27 These Powers are distinguished by their 
superior capacities for organized violence as well as by their collective understanding of 
one another as social and power-political analogs.28 Because they are the key players 
                                                             
26 This is to say that rights- and responsibilities-complexes are neither wholly cause nor wholly 
effect of international politics. It is not that they create the international system; that is simply the result of 
a plurality of power centers interacting within a formal anarchy. Nor are they the primordial prime mover 
of that system’s politics; that is anarchy’s companion, the risk of war. Instead, they hint at how statespeople 
give them meaning and render them comprehensible in human terms. See the approach in Raymond Aron, 
Paix et guerre entre les nations (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1962), 28. 
27 The title itself is at least as old as the mid-18th century, though as Chapter 2 will demonstrate 
the function it expresses is at least as old as the European states-system. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. 
George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 3. For an early example of the typologizing of Powers, see [Jakob Friedrich] Bielfeld, 
Institutions Politiques (The Hague: Pierre Gosse, 1760), 84.  
28 This definition is both material and social in that a state must be both powerful and be 
understood and recognized as such by others in order to be considered a Great Power. The social element is 





within their international system, the normative ‘rules of the game’ they adopt and 
internalize stand a chance of enduring within a formal international anarchy and shaping 
its practical consequences.29 As subsequent chapters will demonstrate, this complex has 
generally promoted regularized, isomorphic behaviors and attitudes among the Powers 
that defy the expectations of an ideal-typical anarchy. At its most developed level, such a 
complex can even serve as a basic governance mechanism for the system as a whole, 
organizing the units of the system into a loose ‘semi-archy’30 that is neither formally 
                                                             
79; Bull, The Anarchical Society, 196. For definitions of Great Powers, rising Powers, and simply states, 
see Appendix I: Glossary. 
29 “Whether a normative system is functional depends on the socialization and internalization of 
norms by the relevant actors. Educational content, discourse, and compliance with norms are indicators of 
internalization.” Matthias Schulz, “Did Norms Matter in Nineteenth-Century International Relations? 
Progress and Decline in the ‘Culture of Peace’ before World War I” in An Improbable War: The Outbreak 
of World War I and European Political Culture before 1914, eds. Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 59fn46. For differing degrees and rates of norm internalization and its 
consequences, see Wendt, 250-312 and Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of 
Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 44-7. In the 
historical case of European international society, the norms incorporated within a complex of Great Power 
rights and responsibilities have derived from both the institutionalization of conventional international 
behavior and from the efforts of specific Powers to promote certain norms. On ‘norm entrepreneurship’, the 
‘invisible hand’, and norm development, see Justin Morris, “Normative Innovation and the Great Powers” 
in International Society and its Critics, Alex J. Bellamy, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 267-
281.  
30 The concept nearest semi-archy in contemporary IR scholarship is Daniel Deudney’s negarchy. 
Both concepts share an “arrangement of institutions necessary to prevent simultaneously the emergence of 
hierarchy and anarchy.” But there are important differences, the primary being that negarchy is “the 
antithesis to hierarchy and anarchy” while semi-archy is rather a messy intermixture of parts of both. 
Another important difference between semi-archy as elaborated here and negarchy is that the former lacks 
the latter’s focus on union among units through co-binding. Rather, semi-archical arrangements do not 
require union but rather only cross-cutting relationships to differentiate the system from anarchy. A semi-
archical system can, like negarchy, be value-focused around restraint and even around the ‘thickening’ of 
international governance relationships; but it can also be profoundly individualistic and unpredictable (as 
Chapter Two will demonstrate through its feudal origins) provided these elements are carried out so as not 
to replace the informal ordering of normal behaviors with either the formal ordering of hierarchy or the 
collapse of order writ large. Negarchy is thus a ‘higher’ concept both owing to its greater normative 
institutionalization (Deudney’s primary example is the early American federal republic) and its more 
conscious triangulation between two extremes. Semi-archy, in contrast, embraces the contradiction at its 
core: the simultaneity of hierarchical differentiation joined with anarchical equality and expressed through 
a variety of normative relationships, some healthy and bounded, others dangerous and assertive. See Daniel 
H. Deudney, “The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the 





hierarchical nor operationally anarchical (see Figure 1.2).31 Though the material and 
social inequality of the units within this semi-archy helps to lift the system out of 
anarchy, this is not a unidimensional hierarchical ordering based on any single factor. 
Rather, the presence of multiple, overlapping relationships of rights and responsibilities 
ensures a multivariate ordering in which the particular position of any single unit is 
dependent upon how it materially and socially engages with its fellow units.  
 
Semi-archy is distinguished by its dynamism. It is founded on the frequent 
redistribution of relationships within a common normative framework making such shifts 
possible without constant upheaval—thus allowing the ‘game’ of semi-archical 
international politics, a cooperative competition governed by norms and purposes worked 
out among and frequently renegotiated by the players themselves, to be played. 
Consequently, international order is inherently relational and uneven because the position 
                                                             
31 See the early scholarship of Richard Rosecrance for its understanding of “regulative 
mechanisms” adopted by the Powers. Richard Rosecrance, International Relations: Peace or War? (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 88-90. An informative critique is found in Andrew P. Dunne, International 





of a unit within a complex of material and social ties influences its own self-
understanding—and thus the meaning of its own material capacity.32 In contrast, anarchy 
has no ordering principle; a command-based ‘pure’ hierarchy would be based on only a 
single principle (i.e., who has the most guns), and a ‘tiered hierarchy’ of the sort 
commonly postulated to describe the international system would be determined by two 
interlocking principles (i.e., the most guns qualified by the ability to deploy those guns 
across geographic space, thus establishing different hierarchical tiers based on states of 
similar absolute capacity in different spaces). As Chapters Four and Five will 
demonstrate, an ordering of international politics based on uneven and shifting right- and 
duty-based understandings of ‘self’ and ‘other’ is always in danger from two sources: the 
tendency of the relationships comprising it to either fall apart amidst the constant churn 
of shifting moral and material distributions or, alternatively, their tendency to ossify into 
semi-permanent, quasi-hierarchical arrangements. Such arrangements are prone to all the 
weaknesses and worst tendencies of the interpersonal relations they reflect; this is a 
consequence of semi-archy’s mixed moral and material nature, as well as of its reliance 
on human beings to adopt the attitudes and enact the behaviors necessary for its 
reproduction. 
This leads to the second point: the actualization of a complex of norms linked to 
capacity helps ensure that an otherwise stark competition for simple survival is endowed 
                                                             
32 Self-understanding is a concept of particular importance. When developed to particularly 
sophisticated levels, the relationships, routines, and cognitive patterns undergirding a semi-archical system 
can actually become pillars of the ontological security of the state as understood by statespeople and even 
national populaces. Ontological security, a concept used across multiple academic disciplines, can be 
briefly defined as “security not of the body but of the self, the subjective sense of who one is, which 
enables and motivates action and choice.” It will figure prominently below in the July 1914 denouement of 
the Great Power system. Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the 





with a more nuanced spectrum of purposes. This is because it provides a conceptual point 
of intersection among a state’s material capability, its moral self-understanding, and the 
international system. Because understandings of what a state can do are bound up with 
the moral judgments it formulates about what it should do, a Great Power’s ambitions 
and purposes often manifest themselves through claims of right and duty. These claims 
express a multiplicity of goals beyond simple survival or conquest and provide a common 
vocabulary within which the practices of international affairs may be framed in normative 
terms. Thus, a complex of rights and responsibilities facilitates how Great Powers make 
sense of the international system and their place in it, both as individual players 
disclosing different international goals as well as a collective social class disclosing 
fundamental functional similarities.  
Just as humans have created maps to aid their comprehension and navigation, so 
has a complex joining capacity with right and duty lent definition and meaning to an 
anarchic international system, ordering it into a semi-archy. The following sections will 
elucidate this complex in greater detail, explaining why it is an important component of 
international politics and why it makes for a compelling research topic. They then model 
how it influences state behavior, identifying two mechanisms involved in translating unit-
level imperatives and systemic impulses into a systemic complex: the general Great 
Power identity and the parochial Great Power role.  
b. Why rights and duties? A synthesis of system and soul 
At its most abstract level, the right- and responsibility-complex is concerned with 
the reconciliation of the material/moral dichotomy at the heart of international politics. 





among scholars over which is dominant. The theoretical role articulated for it here aims 
at a different target, instead arguing that it is not the resolution of this debate in favor of a 
primarily material or a primarily social understanding of international politics that is of 
interest; instead, it is the unending process of resolution that captures the essence of 
Great Power right and responsibility, a complex holding these elements together in a 
perpetual state of tension.  
To frame this understanding in theoretic terms, three propositions about the nature 
of international relations logically lead to this complex. The first is that the human 
elements of international life—those rooted not in the mechanistic calculation of material 
forces but rather in the human capacity for moral, normative, and justificatory 
reasoning—do indeed exist. Second, since the material elements of international life 
guide the development of these moral elements without fully controlling them, human 
understandings fall out of pace with the political reality established by the material 
distribution of power. Moral visions of all types—from nationalistic visions of 
Mitteleuropa to cosmopolitan hopes for a responsibility to protect—thus exert a 
normative pull on how international politics is conducted. Third, the consequence of this 
unstable moral-material intermixture is international uncertainty. States may well wish to 
embrace the relative certainty of a parsimonious balance based upon the mutual 
acceptance of inescapable material realities, but they cannot. Instead, they must cope with 
a plethora of objectives, judgments, and attitudes that cannot be reliably calculated or 
predicted. This uncertainty engenders a right- and responsibility-complex, the method by 
which the most dangerous members of this society abate their insecurity by yoking 





normative, isomorphic behaviors—collectively routinizing how they act and how they 
think about international politics and their place within it—yet allows them sufficient 
space for the realization of individual national missions. The result is an imperfect system 
that curbs the worst excesses of an anarchic system while disclaiming any possibility of 
perfecting it, a loose semi-archy. 
The initial point is that international relations is about more than just power and 
calculation—rather, it has an “essential normative element.”33 History does not evidence 
such a thing as a purely material state, a state without an ideology or a moral self-
conception; such an entity would be more akin to a premodern barbarian horde, held 
together by and existing for the sake of violence and—crucially—needing no normative 
justification beyond this fact. States, in contrast to hordes, constantly articulate 
justifications for their existence and their actions. This is because an important 
component in how they formulate their policies is the exercise of the human faculty of 
reason, itself bound up with the moral sense of the statespeople involved.34 Policy 
                                                             
33 Jackson, 46. 
34 There is an inescapable dilemma whenever scholars talk about ‘states’. Though state policies are 
made by actual human beings, specifically identifying each person involved in the complex process of 
policy formation can be time- and space-prohibitive. For the sake of convenience and to achieve a 
simplification of historical contingencies conducive to clearer theorizing, it is thus common to personify the 
complex policymaking structures of states into unitary, national actors—i.e., ‘France decided to invade’. 
This grants us narrative simplicity, but elides the lines of causality within and without the state that led to 
this policy. Consider three additional statements: ‘France decided to invade when the rider with the treaty 
was delayed on the road from Vienna’; ‘Richelieu decided to invade over the objections of the duke’; and 
‘France decided to invade Burgundy after it was occupied by the Emperor’. All four statements can refer to 
the same event, but each can lead to different conclusions about how international politics worked in this 
particular historical case; in turn, different conclusions can lead to different theories, and different theories 
to different fundamental understandings of IR. There is no getting around this problem. To abate it as much 
as possible, this narrative will employ the personified usage (treating Great Powers as unitary personae 
fictae) when the historical consequences and sources of a policy or action justify this approach. When 
dealing with instances of a significantly divided policymaking structure—especially in later chapters where 
popular pressures play a greater role in shaping the self-understandings and policies of Powers—specific 
forces and statespeople will be cited as necessary to clarify where policies are coming from, and who (or 
what) is making them within the state. This an imperfect solution, and readers are encouraged to consult the 
wealth of secondary sources cited; these provide greater detail on the construction of policy according to 





formation thus demands justification by reference to higher principles embracing a 
greater range of purposes than simple survival.35 Realists would object, as Wight noted, 
because “the sophisticated Machiavellian may in a sense admit of the existence of moral 
values, but will see them as epiphenomenal.”36 In place of moral judgments in the policy 
process, they are apt to substitute the relatively modern invention of ‘the objective 
national interest’. However, despite its popular reputation for dispassionate calculation, 
even it discloses a special, philosophically-grounded “ethics of statecraft.”37 States, being 
mechanisms operated by very human statespeople, can never fully shed the biases (and 
consciences) of the men and women who operate them.38 
The second point is a consequence of the first. Since the state can never wholly 
escape its human moral patrimony, there is a material/moral dichotomy in world politics 
that allows for a wide variety of state behaviors.39 Because the moral judgments of 
statespeople are not entirely derived from the material position of their states, ideas exist 
as semi-independent causal factors in world politics. Institutions, regimes, ideologies, and 
norms interpose themselves between the logic of brutal competition and the practical 
operation of the international system. Constrained and empowered by both the physically 
possible and the morally imaginable, each state is forced to formulate its own conception 
                                                             
35 “The practical activity of international politics cannot be undertaken outside of moral and legal 
referents which constitute the normative framework of such activity.” This subject is dealt with in detail in 
Jackson, 6-10 [quote at 6]. See also Friedrich Kratochwil, “The Protagorean Quest: Community, Justice, 
and the 'Oughts' and 'Musts' of International Politics,” International Journal 43, no. 2 (1988): 207.  
36 Martin Wight, Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, and 
Mazzini, eds. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 16. 
37 Jackson, 19-22. 
38 All regime types struggle to “develop procedures for expressing their corporate personality and 
[to resolve] conflicts between their individual interests and a putative national interest.” Mayall, 30. 





of self-flourishing.40 State behaviors are born in the shadow of this purposive struggle 
between the material and moral possibilities of international life.41 The diversity of 
purposes this struggle discloses necessitate in turn a wider range of international 
behaviors and attitudes than would be necessary within a parsimonious balance of power.  
But more important than the particular goal of any particular state at any 
particular time is the fact that this wide range of purposes creates uncertainty, the third 
point. Because states cannot be relied upon to calculate accurately and yield their policies 
to the cold logic of pure materialism, international relations is a field full of surprises.42 
“Folly,” as one author put it, is built “into the warp and woof of international politics.”43 
Because states aren’t much better at prediction under these uncertain conditions than 
scholars, they find themselves in need of some technique to manage the risk inherent to 
living with one another in an anarchy. How can diverse and often mutually-exclusive 
understandings of unit-level flourishing be pursued within the framework of a society 
built upon the shadow of war? Those arguing from ideal-typical positions might posit that 
either the grim acceptance of cyclical power-political realities or the progressive 
advancement of liberatory cosmopolitanism are the only answers—and that the long 
history of either escalating human conflict or escalating human cooperation proves their 
theorized teleology. In other words, the only way to solve the problem of international 
                                                             
40 Such flourishing has been defined diversely as service to a deity, the defense of territory, the 
genocidal annihilation of an outgroup, the accumulation of glory and prestige, etc. See the case study of 
prestige in Steve Wood, “Prestige in world politics: History, theory, expression,” International Politics 50, 
no. 3 (2013): 387-411. 
41 Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 331. 
42 Aron, Paix et guerre, 22. 
43 Stephen Van Evera, “Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Nonself-Evaluation by States and 






uncertainty is to somehow eliminate the international political sphere through the 
acceptance of mechanistic material hierarchy or revolutionary, post-international order. 
In the end, they may well be right. But states, unlike scholars, are closely linked 
to their routine moral notions and material realities—they must pursue pragmatic 
solutions within the messy context of an uncertain and inconsistent world. For the most 
capable of states, the Great Powers, two essential problems—the regulation of behavior 
and the establishment of purposive direction—have been resolved by reference to a 
complex of mutually-comprehensible rights and duties. This has provided a vessel within 
which moral/material tensions are contained and adjudicated, but never permanently 
configured in a way that might definitively resolve the ‘game’ of world politics and end 
the conflict it necessarily entails.44 Interposed between the moral will of the unit and the 
material realities of its system, rights and responsibilities instead promote a loose, never-
ending, and ever-shifting semi-archical order. 
Two special mechanisms facilitate this process (see Figure 1.3). The first is a 
shared Great Power identity; the second is its translation into a multitude of Great Power 
roles expressing the material and moral circumstances of the individual units.45 This 
combination of universal identity and parochial role can be discerned in the practices of 
                                                             
44 As in the case of risk societies generally, this “does not aim to achieve perfect security: from a 
risk perspective the best one can hope for is to manage or pre-empt a risk; one can never achieve perfect 
security because new risks will arise as a ‘boomerang effect’ of defeating the original risk.” Mikkel Vedby 
Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2; see also 35-37. 
45 Drawing from Wendt’s discussion of structure and agent, Kowert and Legro formulate a similar 
distinction between norms (here, the Great Power identity) as “the regulative cultural content of 
international politics” and identities (here, the Great Power roles) as “regulative accounts of actors 
themselves.” Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise” in 
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New 





the Powers themselves.46 Over centuries, this reconciliation has promoted Great Power 
co-binding based on procedural norms and social status, a regime abating the 
uncertainties disclosed by a shifting material/moral landscape.47 At the same time, it has 
allowed for variation and change within the system, legitimizing the ambitions of 
individual Powers and normalizing their competitive expression.  
Figure 1.3: The Production of Right- and Responsibility-based Great Power Politics 
 
c. Great Power Identity 
The first mechanism is a Great Power identity shared by a system’s leading states. 
It derives from three key material and social elements. The first is the formally anarchic 
status of the international system and the consequent necessity of calculation and 
vigilance.48 The second is that system’s particular distribution of material capacity; where 
                                                             
46 “[P]ractices are socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less 
competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in 
and on the material world. Practices, such as marking a linear territorial boundary, deterring with nuclear 
weapons, or finance trading, are . . . the dynamic material and ideational processes that enable structures to 
be stable or to evolve, and agents to reproduce or transform structures.” Emanuel Adler and Vincent 
Pouliot, “International Practices,” International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 4-5. 
47 This is not meant to assert that order and stability are necessarily preferable in any objective 
sense to disruption and change. If the former appear frequently in this analysis in the guise of an 
international ‘good’, it is merely because they have historically been viewed as such by certain 
statespeople.  





there is geographic and political division, some states occupy positions of material 
preeminence.49 The third is the system’s distribution of ideas about social and political 
order. Developed alongside the first two elements but distinct from them, these ideas 
shape how power is understood and determine the possibilities for the social regulation of 
international behavior.50 Together, they define the norms and behaviors characteristic of 
any Great Power.51 
The historical case of the first European Great Power identity shows how these 
three elements come together. At the beginning of early modernity, the creation of an 
interstate system out of the decay of a universal feudal order created a formal anarchy 
marked by great disparities in material capacity. However, the stubborn persistence of 
certain religious and political understandings inherited from its civilizational 
predecessors injected a high degree of socialization into that system. In particular, an 
aristocratic ethos transplanted from domestic society was mapped over of the measure of 
hierarchical order that came out of these material disparities. This transformed the states 
of roughly the ‘first-rank’ from simple power centers into Great Powers united by a 
shared identity as civilizational leaders. Animated by a feudal intellectual inheritance, 
this identity found its natural expression in the language of rights and duties. Over time, 
its precise character would change by both incremental development and systemic shock, 
but the tendency to express this combination of systemic impulses, material positions, 
                                                             
49 For European division, see Daniel H. Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory 
from the Polis to the Global Village (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 142-50. 
50 “Military systems and weapons are in turn the expression of political and social systems.” 
Raymond Aron, “What Is a Theory of International Relations?” Journal of International Affairs 21, no. 2 
(1967): 198. 
51 For norms as “systemic-level variables in both origin and effects,” see Martha Finnemore, 





and social understandings in terms of rights and responsibilities would persist as the 
foundation of a semi-archical international order. 
Functionally, a Great Power identity simultaneously empowers and restrains its 
claimants. It empowers by introducing a small measure of very loose hierarchy into what 
is otherwise a formal anarchy, facilitating the provision of system-ordering ‘club goods’ 
and creating a type of cartel.52 The creation of a meaningful Great Power ‘us’ creates an 
‘other’ (weaker states, states outside the system’s geographic or social reach, and 
nonstate actors)—which the cartel may dominate and exploit to mutually-acceptable 
ends. Because the identity is formulated in terms of special right- and duty-claims, the 
individual Powers can reap myriad benefits. Rights—normative assertions of the 
appropriateness of certain international behaviors—expand an individual Power’s range 
of moral and material possibilities.53 Responsibilities—normative expectations of 
international behavior that are internalized within a Power’s policymaking—can pay 
dividends in prestige and provide an essential element of legitimation to a Power’s 
international policies.54 Identifying as a Great Power thus hath its privileges, and most 
                                                             
52 Clark, The Hierarchy of States, 2-3. Oded Lowenheim, Predators and Parasites: Persistent 
Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2009), 6-7. 
53 This abbreviated definition aggregates a number of multital legal relations, designated in 
Holcomb’s compendium of jural correlatives as ‘right-duty, privilege-no-right, power-liability, and 
immunity-disability’. Here, ‘right’ is used primarily in the second, third, and fourth senses owing to the fact 
that the participation of the Great Powers in the direction of world affairs has traditionally (pre-1914) a 
matter of custom and informal agreement rather than international-legal prescription. However, the rights 
of the complex have been diversely expressed over their long history, and have reflected each of these 
facets at various points. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning and Other Legal Essays (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923), 65, 96-8. 
54 Power actually requires normalization by reference to moral concepts if it is to be reliably 
actualized. “The dominant person is not just anyone with power. The power relation must be stabilized for 
the dominant person to command. He must feel assured of his prerogative or of his capacity to exact 
obedience.” Raymond Aron, “Macht, Power, Puissance: Democratic Prose or Demoniac Poetry?” in 
Politics and History, trans. and ed. Miriam Bernheim Conant (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2009), 102. 
Even actions born of purely power-political motivations must be legitimated by new or existing norms. 
This does not mean that norms are simply derivative of power, but rather that power needs the support of 





states strong enough to claim this social status have been eager to do so.55 However, a 
shared Great Power identity can also encourage systemic restraint by linking the authority 
it discloses to certain behavioral conditions. This is evident in its normalization and 
normative-bounding of the very international predation that it often facilitates. Eschewing 
formal-legal prohibitions, a right- and responsibility-complex instead relies on largely 
informal norms to govern what kind of predation is acceptable. These norms are 
operationalized through “codes of crisis management” and “concert principles” that shape 
how international conflict is understood.56 Importantly, they are self-reinforcing because 
they de-legitimize deviancy and encourage mimetic behavior as a sign of social status. A 
Power that is seen as reaching too far beyond the limits of the socially-acceptable is 
likely to face a coalition angered by its departure from a common limitation, while new 
behaviors that do not trespass excessively are likely to be mimicked by the whole.57 The 
result is a cage of norms related to Great Power predation. It is sometimes a relatively 
permissive and sometimes a relatively prohibitive cage within which the Powers agree to 
be placed, but it is a cage nonetheless. Its outright breaking often results in armed 
conflict.  
Though this mimesis favors continuity, normative understandings can change as 
attitudes evolve. This can happen slowly, as did historically with the gradual expansion 
                                                             
55 Of course, there are exceptions to this rule—“states possessing the elements of great power 
refus[ing] to play the role their power entitles them to play.” As the case studies below demonstrate, 
recusancy among the most powerful states can be either a sign of individual decline or of a more serious 
disruption in principles at the systemic level. See Robert W. Tucker, The Purposes of American Power: An 
Essay on National Security (New York: Praeger, 1981), 186-7. 
56 Clark, The Hierarchy of States, 38. 
57 An example of the former was the Crimean War, in which Russian attempts to claim rights 
within the Ottoman Empire that surpassed international custom were met with an almost-universal coalition 
against it. An example of the latter was the Great Power practice of claiming rights to territorial 





of norms against territorial conquest and state death.58 However, it can also happen more 
rapidly, as when the Berlin Conference of 1884 formalized the group application of 
paternalist norms within Africa with the explicit expectation of managing a sudden wave 
of European expansion to forestall conflict.59 At whatever speed, consensus-based norms-
change alters the dimensions of the Great Power normative cage from within, allowing 
for change in how predation may be acceptably conducted while preserving the 
continuity of a collective Great Power identity. However, the identity can also be altered 
suddenly and disruptively by the rise or fall of specific Great Powers, especially after a 
general war.  
In sum, a coherent Great Power identity subscribed to by the actors with the 
greatest potential for disruption encourages a convergence in normative practices and 
attitudes by incentivizing mimetic behavior. This reduces the instability naturally 
resulting from an international realm of diverse aims and means, encouraging the Powers 
to think and act within similar, mutually-comprehensible moral contexts. It lends 
substance to the notion of a separate class of states, and makes possible an academic 
discourse about ‘Great Powers’ that is cogent and reflective of real-world practice. 
d. Great Power Role 
A shared identity can attach social meaning to an individual Power’s 
understanding of its own material capacity. This identity can guide what statespeople 
understand to be within the realm of the materially and morally possible, but it is not 
sufficient in itself to the formulation of international policy. Too much motive force 
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resides within the state in the minds of its statespeople, the character of its geography and 
technology, and the sentiment of its populace.60 Thus, while a shared Great Power 
identity can promote semi-archy by regularizing and socializing state behavior, it cannot 
perfectly harmonize international life.61 Within a right- and responsibility-complex, 
however, a partial corrective to these disruptive human tendencies is found in the 
affirmation of different Great Power roles through which the rights, duties, and 
routinization provided by the systemic Great Power identity are reconciled with the 
material and ideological idiosyncrasies of the individual units. 
This is the point at which the geopolitical and social circumstances peculiar to the 
individual key actors—their unique ‘national interests’ as they are locally understood—
make themselves known.62 Each of the Powers must adapt the general Great Power 
identity (and the opportunities and restraints it discloses) to the material and moral 
circumstances unique to them. Though the identity does not itself provide direct, 
purposive motivation for state policy, its adaptation to serve diverse unit-level interests 
calls forth a host of Great Power roles. Through them, actual state policy is reconciled 
with the international socialization entailed with Great Power status as states claim 
unique rights and duties.63  
A well-known example is Britain’s role as the holder of the European balance. 
Prior to its assumption of Great Power status, British foreign policy was inconsistent and 
confined to mostly local theaters and issues related to its commerce. After it shook off 
                                                             
60 Waltz famously critiqued this inductive understanding in the works of Rosecrance, Aron, and 
Hoffmann; see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 41-9 
61 Jackson, 201-3. 
62 For the objectives of states, see Aron, Paix et guerre, 81-102. 





French clientage, however, it absorbed the Great Power identity of the day focused 
around the accumulation of prestige, the persistent conduct of limited warfare, and the 
participation in a fluid, pan-European system of alliances. When combined with a number 
of national ingredients (the geographic isolation of the British Isles; the economic 
necessity of access to European and overseas markets; a cultural exceptionalism of 
aloofness), this cemented a role for Britain as a global economic and military force 
responsible for the maintenance and management of the alliance blocs. Once isolationist 
and mercenary, Britain became the hinge of European diplomacy and broadly construed 
its interests. In this capacity, it would fight both with and against almost all the Powers in 
major conflicts before the century was out, adjusting its policies to serve that role as the 
need arose. It internalized its balancing role to such an extent that it was even prepared to 
backstab allies and forgo the fruits of its victories out of fear of excessively weakening its 
enemies. However, its own conviction about the necessity of its role led it to claim 
extraordinary rights over the other Powers; this overreach contributed to the formation of 
a European balance against the balancer and ultimately doomed its first overseas empire. 
Importantly, these mechanisms do not aim at the resolution of anarchy by 
transforming it into hierarchy. Rather, they harness the very instincts that drive interstate 
competition, guiding and channeling them into right- and duty-based roles that loosely 
order the system into a semi-archy. The very act of rendering these instincts in the 
language of rights and duties is important because it situates parochial objectives within a 
systemic moral framework; when Great Powers understand themselves as socialized 
entities sharing deep conceptual commonalities, they formulate their policies in terms, 





this can impel a powerful state to engage its fellows in ‘thicker’ and more meaningful 
social relationships that mitigate the temptations of anarchical society toward predation 
and isolationism. Yet, at the same time, the promotion of a Great Power role based on 
exceptional rights and duties can enhance and magnify those tendencies, producing 
overreach and blowback. As the same British case demonstrates, any role can be 
overplayed, leading to hubris and precisely the sort of hegemonic behavior its role as 
balancer was supposed to counteract. 
Thus, the collective Great Power identity constitutes the specific character of the 
international system—its normative limits and behavioral best practices—while the 
parochial Great Power role is that constitutive principle made manifest within the 
individual international actors. The interplay between identity and role has historically 
been crucial, structuring international politics based on how Great Powers are alike, how 
they are different, and how their understandings of their mutual position lead to conflict 
and cooperation. 
e. Conclusion: The consequences of rights and responsibilities  
Great Power right- and responsibility-complexes bridge the moral and material 
elements of international politics, unite systemic pressures and unit-level imperatives, and 
shape state behavior through a semi-archical ordering of international politics. They abate 
the uncertainty that necessarily arises from a sphere characterized by moral and material 
diversity by routinizing how states act and think, particularly among the actors possessing 
the greatest potential for harm by yoking them together within a socially-equal cartel at 





individual ambitions of each Power through the affirmation of special rights and 
responsibilities within unique Great Power roles.  
Russia’s rise to Great Power status in the 18th century is illustrative. More than 
any other state to that point, the theory, history, and international practice of Russia were 
all formed within the context of rights and duties. The ‘westernizing’ Tsars sought not 
just territory but the implementation of a particular theory of Russia-in-the-world derived 
from the theories operative among the Powers. Integrating itself into their society through 
its language and methods, Russia became the most skilled manipulator of treaty 
guarantees and spheres-of-influence—special Great Power practices—in European 
history, actualizing a Russian Great Power role focused on its right to securitized 
hinterlands and its duty of cultural protection and advancement. Embedded within this 
mission was (and is) a moral coloring endowing Russia with a politico-theological 
distinctiveness that not only sets it apart from the other Powers but actually gives it 
special rights and corresponding obligations to foster its unique purposes in the wider 
world—a specifically Russian Great Power role.64 At different times, the fulfillment of 
this role led it to foster peace and stability, overreach and war. But in both cases, the act 
of being a Great Power deeply influenced not only Russia’s abstract, moral self-
understanding but also its concrete, material international policies. 
In this way, a right- and responsibility-complex both shapes and reflects how the 
most powerful states understand international politics. It links them together, keeping 
them socially and politically engaged with one another in a way that transcends the 
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simple calculations of a purely dispassionate international system. This carries us from 
the theoretical generality of ‘fear-and-interest-within-anarchy’ to the empirical operation 
of an international system in which norms, standards, and customs are vital elements—
and in which major actors pursue not just national interests springing directly from the 
imperative of survival but express identities that couple such interests to a sense of social 
position and normative purpose.  
III. The Many Facets of Great Power Rights and Responsibilities 
 
The subsequent five chapters show how this complex arose and changed over 
time by examining it at different conceptual levels: as a moral and political theory, as a 
sociological pattern of behaviors aimed at reconciling contentious tendencies within 
international society, as a causal historical force in the making of international change, 
and as an ongoing praxeological puzzle reflecting a significant realignment of right and 
responsibility principles.65 Chapter Two operates primarily at the level of theory and 
concept; it is the story of how a particular understanding of rights and responsibilities 
became essential to European politics, colored the operation of the proto-international 
system of the Middle Ages, and sewed consequences for international politics that persist 
to this day. Beginning with the role of rights and duties in the mediation of feudal 
anarchy, it traces how these principles were elaborated upward to organize the nascent 
international sphere and how they survived the upheavals that accompanied the 
breakdown of the order that gave them birth. Chapter Three is sociological in nature, 
showing how, as medieval politics gave way to the politics of the post-Westphalia 
international system, stability was achieved by situating new power-political realities 
                                                             





within the social framework of a rights and duties. This mediated competition by 
preserving older, creedal notions of right and duty and embedding them at the heart of a 
dense collection of societal relationships among monarchical Great Powers.  
The next two chapters are historical in focus and apply the macro-level insights of 
the previous two to specific case studies. Chapter Four examines the relationship between 
forces of change in the 19th century and the right- and responsibility-complex. It begins 
by explaining how the Vienna settlement concretized the Great Power identity into an 
ideal-typical social status and transformed the various Great Power roles into 
authoritative mechanisms for global governance. It then looks at particular historical 
examples of how rising Powers shaped and were shaped by the norms and practices of 
this European Concert, demonstrating in the process both the potential of and the limits to 
the ability of rights and duties to guide the consequences of the material distribution. 
Case studies of the French Second Republic, Imperial Germany, and Japan and the 
United States will all illustrate how identities and roles based on rights and duties helped 
to shape how change was understood. Chapter Five continues this narrative by explaining 
how this mediation of change in the mid-19th century contributed to the origins of the 
First World War. As material space (land) and moral space (arenas for the authoritative 
expression of national roles) grew increasingly scarce in a world of more and more 
Powers, the flexibility of the former complex was gradually lost. Instead, the complex 
ossified as Powers became locked in dyadic role relationships, competitive and 
cooperative, that sapped it of its former fluidity and vitality. At the same time, the 
transfer of sovereignty from princes to peoples nationalized Great Power roles amidst the 





expressed explicitly national self-understandings that were less easily modified than in 
previous centuries because they were linked to the ontological security of the state itself. 
Thus, overlapping relationships based on right- and duty-claims, formerly a source of 
contingent international governance based on mutual recognition and restraint, underwent 
a significant change as a combination of creeping international hierarchy and geopolitical 
crowding-out reshaped Great Power politics; ultimately, they became subject to 
increasingly zero-sum competition as Powers resorted to brinksmanship to maintain the 
behavioral routines and cognitive patterns of their roles. When a crisis brought to a head 
the ontological security incompatibility of two antagonistic Powers, a cascade of 
dilemmas spread outward, creating the First World War. 
The final chapter explains the consequences of this upheaval: the shattering of the 
traditional right- and responsibility-complex and the redistribution of its components into 
new, consciously-created programs of international order. It provides a series of short 
reflections on the development of ‘civilian powers’, the contemporary problem of 
international managerial burden-sharing, and the continued resort among some states to 
interventionist policies expressing a sense of role but lacking the peer legitimation and 
normative bounding of a Great Power society. Together, these developments illustrate 
how, even though the traditional complex of Great Power rights and responsibilities has 
been significantly reconfigured in contemporary international politics, its constituent 
components nevertheless remain drawn to one another logically and emotionally. Their 








FEUDAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE EARLY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
 
Unlike scientific estimations, which are corrected after each experiment according to 
rigorous rules of calculation, the anticipations of the habitus, practical hypotheses based on 
past experience, give disproportionate weight to early experiences. 
-Pierre Bourdieu 
 
In few periods of human history did individuals cling as tenaciously and believe as devoutly 
in their liberties and privileges as in the Middle Ages. The feudal world encouraged them 
to think of the world as a set of obligations and prerogatives. 
- Kenneth Pennington 
 
The rights and wrongs of the political life of modern Europe are rooted in the medieval 
history of Europe. . . . Medieval wars are, as a rule, wars of rights. . . . [It was] not that men 
loved law, but that they did so far respect it as to wish to seem to have it always on their 
side. They did not attack their neighbors . . . [without alleging] a legal claim or a legal 
grievance; and in the majority of cases really legal claims and really legal grievances. Of 
course, if law had been supreme, the wrong-doer would have yielded at once. . . . But I make 
no such claim for those ages; I only say that, when a man coveted his neighbours’ vineyard, 
he went as it were to law for it, and did not simply take it by force. 
- William Stubbs66 
 
I. Norms, Inheritance, and Habitus 
A common criticism of norms-based IR studies is that they fail to specify where their 
norms really come from.67 This chapter aims to do just that, illustrating how a theory 
most commonly associated with domestic society—relationships built on rights and 
duties—came to form the foundation of Great Power politics. It does so by looking 
outside the traditional territory of academic IR and into the society of premodern Europe. 
Though there is a significant literature on the formation and influence of norms, IR 
scholars have been hesitant to extend their gazes temporally beyond the Westphalian 
‘birthdate’ of international politics and conceptually beyond the comforting familiarities 
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of the nation-state.68 This aversion to the past has even been called “one of the defining 
peculiarities of the discipline.”69 Older elements are often treated as either beyond the 
pale of the ‘international’ or as mere processes of decay and “erosion” which gradually 
wore away the marble of the premodern to reveal the statue of the modern.70 The feudal 
period in particular, roughly seven centuries of European history, has been marked out as 
“a different basis for international order” compared to modernity’s international system.71 
This it was, but the recognition of this difference has too often led scholars to 
hermetically seal off feudal from modern, foreclosing the possibility of meaningful 
continuity from the former to the latter. The result is analogous to sealing off the study of 
childhood development from that of adolescence, hiding the longer arc of causal forces 
that recur and endure.  
This chapter is founded on a traditional understanding of how anarchy and 
violence condition the systems and societies humans build. It traces the origin of a 
premodern theory through its transmission to and reproduction within modernity, positing 
that the medieval world faced a number of security problems at both the micro- and 
macro-social levels that were ultimately mediated through the conditioning effects of a 
habitus of rights and duties—a self-reproducing complex of regulative and purposive 
                                                             
68 When IR scholars do cross this boundary, it is usually to find evidence corroborating 
contemporary theoretic paradigms rather than to approach feudal thought and practice on its own terms. For 
a much-criticized neorealist example, see Markus Fischer, “Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal 
Discourse and Conflictual Practices,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 427-466; for a less 
problematic example situating the medieval past in contemporary theoretic terms, see Michael C. Horowitz, 
“Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading,” International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 162-
193. 
69 Benno Teschke, “Debating ‘The Myth of 1648’: State Formation, the Interstate System and the 
Emergence of Capitalism in Europe — A Rejoinder,” International Politics 46, no. 5 (2006): 531. 
70 Osiander, 316. 





understandings conditioning how actors understand their field.72 This habitus would 
outlast the feudal society that gave it birth, ultimately forming the constitutive principle 
of a right- and responsibility-based international system.73 An examination of its 
development and enduring influence demonstrates how ideas can function as exogenous 
givens, persisting even in the face of bracing shifts in material context as an inherited 
habitus conditions how actors respond to the world around them.74 This is a story of how 
“norms, identities, and ideas become inscribed into the practices of actors such that they 
enable and constrain future patterns of action.”75 Specifically, rights and duties became 
inscribed into power, enabling the future development of a Great Power right and 
responsibility complex.  
The structure of this chapter is designed to reveal these distant origins, uncovering 
how the character of modern international politics derives from feudal theories about 
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interpersonal capacity, extralegal violence, and societal purpose. Section II explains how 
the need to mediate medieval anarchy brought forth a semi-archical distribution of 
authority underwritten by a societal emphasis on contractual rights and duties. Through a 
significant social innovation—the relationship of vassalage—medieval society came to 
embrace a system of overlapping and interlocking norms, a superstructure of rights and 
duties normatively bounding the conduct of proto-international high politics. Section III 
traces the three stages of the decline of this feudal semi-archy and the translation of its 
principles into a modern international system. In the first stage of this process, nascent 
states agglomerated unto themselves the material capacity and the social capacity (rights 
and duties) that medieval constitutionalism had kept dispersed all around them. Though a 
significant derogation from past practice, the deep connection that had been formed 
among these elements within the medieval habitus ensured that they would be inherited 
and re-deposited into the emerging notions of territorial state and unitary monarchy. The 
second stage emerged as the possibilities disclosed by this reorganization of feudal 
principles led to normative upheaval and internecine conflict at the international level. 
This period of violent experimentation produced two contrasting models of material-
moral development. One embraced a post-medieval understanding of international power 
based on the prescriptive, amoral balancing of forces; the other attempted to renew and 
renovate its feudal inheritance. The third and final stage resulted from the failure of either 
of these models to control the proliferating international violence of the 16th and 17th 
centuries. In response to this challenge, the international system that took shape 
ultimately united the regulative feudal norms of rights and duties with the prescriptive 





actor, the Great Power.76 The society of these Great Powers would embrace the 
fundamental disunity of post-feudal power politics by making the balancing of forces its 
characteristic activity, but would bound this activity by rendering the particulars of this 
‘new’ international realm—territory, legitimacy, and diplomacy—as rights and duties. 
II. The Feudal Production of Order, 800-1400 
The understandings of right, duty, and capacity undergirding the modern right- 
and responsibility-complex originated in early medieval anarchy. Charlemagne’s 
successors had proved unequal to the task of upholding royal and imperial authority; as 
their domains and titles fractured, their ability to control violence faltered. Following 
their collapse—“the swift and tragic defeat of a little group of men who, despite many 
archaisms and miscalculations but with the best of intentions, had tried to preserve some 
of the values of an ordered and civilized life”—European politics came to resemble the 
ideal-typical ‘thick’ international anarchy posited by IR scholars.77 For a time, there was 
an absence of authoritative, hierarchical, and institutionalized checks on violence, and 
authorities claiming monopolies on the legitimate use of force were weak or nonexistent. 
Absent effective macro-level governance, warlordism proliferated as those who held the 
tools of violence—horses, weapons, and fortified places—preyed upon the weak:  
The richest man in a particular area . . . [was] as a direct result the most 
powerful militarily, with the largest retinue; he is at once army leader and 
ruler. The relationship between one estate owner and another in that 
society was analogous to that between states today, the acquisition of new 
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land by one neighbor represented a direct or indirect threat to the others. . . 
. Every small estate is under its own rule, a ‘state’ in itself, every small 
knight its independent lord and master. . . . There is not much to constrain 
members of this ruling stratum to control their affects in any continuous 
way.78  
 
Out of this this anarchy “came a long and troubled period which was at the same 
time a period of gestation” as Medieval Europe successfully turned to an order-producing 
system of interlocking and overlapping rights and duties largely outside the institutions of 
formal government.79 Known today as feudalism, it brought a measure of unity to a 
politically-fragmented medieval world by loosely ordering medieval politics into a semi-
archy characterized by intersecting relationships of rights and duties at every level of 
social life. Within it, material capacity was institutionally linked to norms giving it 
meaning and purpose. Over time, this would lastingly embed purposive understandings 
within the concepts that would later define the ‘international’: organized violence, 
territory, and diplomacy. This section explains how this happened, starting with its 
microsocial beginnings in interpersonal vassalage, an institution that mediated the 
uncertainty of medieval anarchy. It then traces vassalage’s elaboration upward into 
progressively wider social spheres to satisfy cognate security needs and, ultimately, its 
apotheosis as the defining habitus of medieval high politics. Three case studies elucidate 
this process: the role of rights and duties in accommodating violent change within a 
durable framework of norms, their converse role in retarding and mediating political 
change through veto points built into the structure of feudal political life, and their 
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implantation into the principle of dynasticism. Though the order that feudalism raised up 
against the dangers of anarchical violence contained inbuilt disintegrative forces, the 
rights and duties of the feudal habitus would bridge the divide between old and new and 
impart an enduring medieval inheritance to international politics. 
a. The Feudal Theory of Order 
The rampant insecurity and proliferating violence of the early medieval anarchy 
began to abate around the 8th century with the growth of vassalage, a particularly 
sophisticated form of interpersonal patronage. This was a complex arrangement of 
norms—some explicit and some implicit—endowing each party with certain rights and 
duties in relation to the other.80 Importantly, earlier forms of interpersonal patronage were 
akin to slavery, but vassalage was a formal contractual relationship, usually verbal,81 
entered into by two free men both of whom would remain free.82 Over time, the 
expansion of this interpersonal, extra-governmental relationship of extraordinary nuance 
ensured that obligations and duties came to dominate medieval thinking about law and 
politics.83  
Relationships of personal and corporate rights—a high political habitus linking 
material capacity and its sources with shared understandings of its purposes and praxis—
filled the gap left by the struggling state, moderating violence while deeply intermixing 
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public and private.84 This process began when the high nobility connected vassalage to 
military capacity by settling on their vassals the benefice (lands and wealth) necessary to 
maintain heavy cavalry. Capacity—the ability to act—thus initially derived from the 
assumption of a role—a social understanding normatively-grounding action. Soon, 
however, the institutions of vassalage and benefice became so closely linked that the 
preexisting capacity to fulfill a role was seen as a prerequisite for the duties and rights 
bound up with the assumption of that role.85 Capacity now determined role, and vassalage 
became a mark of authority pairing a locus of material capacity with the prerogatives and 
duties granted by a role.86 The most powerful vassals became feudal lords—
institutionalized centers of prerogative and responsibility in a Europe of weak and 
weakening states.87 Their rise signaled the devolution of violence authority from states 
finding these tasks “beyond [their] physical and psychic resources.”88 The resulting 
“penetration of all social relations” by vassalage redefined social life according to the 
habitus.89 Norms—not states—now governed Europe.90 
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 b. The High Political Habitus of Feudalism 
Importantly, these norms smoothed the edges and shaped the contours of the 
anarchy around medieval society without truly vanquishing it—a situation mirrored in 
contemporary international society.91 Feudal norms instead regulated violence by 
constraining it within a theory of rights and obligations. Three particular areas illustrate 
how the habitus reconstructed high politics on the foundation of norms of right and duty: 
territorial predation, veto points to violence, and dynastic diplomacy. Its reconfiguration 
of these topics would prove lasting, their legacy essential to the growth of a Great Power 
system centuries later. 
i.  Territory as a locus of rights and duties 
Medieval attempts to normalize and bound violent predation embedded rights and 
duties within the concept of territory.92 Lacking strong states and good maps, 
geographically-uncertain medieval ‘realms’ understood territory by reference to the 
normative bonds it disclosed.93 This “social definition” of territoriality would endure, 
shaping how states would later construct the meaning of territory, predation, and 
sovereignty.94 
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To satisfy the need for a regulative principle to cope with territorial change and 
legitimately ground (and delimit) the control of lands, Europeans made the fact of 
possession conceptually dependent upon norms of right and duty. Nomadic raiders from 
the periphery illustrate how the power-political reality of control was reconfigured and 
distorted by feudal norms. As long as their goal was simple plunder, such raiders had no 
need of norms. When they began the transition from plunder to permanent conquest, 
however, they were quick to adopt the language and attitudes of feudal rights and duties. 
For example, the grand prince of a highly-successful group of Magyar raiders 
successfully legitimized not only his rule but the existence of a coherent Hungarian realm 
by converting to Christianity and reformulating the fact of territorial possession in the 
normative language of vassal rights and duties. King (later, St.) Stephen received his new 
crown from the pope himself, but the right to his realm was qualified by his duty as a 
papal vassal.95 A similar case is the invasion of Normandy by the Norse adventurer Rollo. 
Charles III of West Francia managed to halt the Viking advance but a standoff ensued; 
the alignment of the fact of possession with the conceptual essentials of feudal territory—
rights and duties—offered a solution. Charles acknowledged Rollo’s right to the profits 
of his military conquest in exchange for the latter paying formal homage and accepting 
the obligation to defend the northern frontier. Rollo, in turn, acknowledged the King’s 
right to maintain Normandy as a de iure part of the realm while conferring upon the King 
an obligation to respect its independent political existence. Though riddled with what the 
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contemporary eye might see as contradictions and dodges, this nuanced arrangement 
lasted for centuries. Understanding territory as a moral relationship allowed the 
(re)definition of social and political geographies, thus facilitating the normative 
incorporation of territorial change.96  
Rollo’s descendant William is another case of territorial conquest reified by 
norms. His invasion of England was made possible by a right-claim to inherit the throne 
confirmed by the pope.97 The fact that others contested this right led to war between the 
claimants. After his successful conquest, William reconfigured his kingdom, using rights 
and obligations to revolutionize the English systems of property and territory and making 
them mechanisms for the production of loyalty, the collecting of taxes, and the 
marshalling of violence capacity.98 Witnessing the efficacy of feudal norms in integrating 
particularistic territories, other rulers mimicked William’s use of the feudal habitus to 
bind spaces and peoples.99 From the ius ad bello to domestic governance ante bellum, 
territorial politics under feudalism was unthinkable without reference to rights and duties. 
ii.  Feudal norms as veto points to violence 
Though rights and duties could facilitate medieval conquest, they also bounded it 
through veto points to the marshaling and deployment of violence. Thus, the same feudal 
concepts that empowered William to claim and integrate territory embedded the 
international affairs of the later Angevin empire within a restrictive web of norms. This 
web pervaded every aspect of medieval politico-strategic undertakings, adding layers of 
uncertainty that hindered efficient empire building. In William’s case, he first had to 
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assert a right to a territory by normatively linking his cause with a relevant source of 
conceptual legitimacy (the pope, past custom or feudal contract, or inheritance).100 
William went out of his way to secure two of these elements, yet the legitimacy of his 
invasion was still doubted. Second, his immediate vassals had to be summoned according 
to their obligations to form an army; since William’s vassals thought his plan dubious, he 
had to supplement his forces with hordes of mercenaries anticipating rich rewards. 
Finally, having successfully asserted his right (through a rare quick victory in pitched 
battle), the conqueror had to shore up his vulnerable legitimacy in the wake of the 
changes he had wrought. William faced rebellion in Normandy, multiple rebellions in 
England, invasion from Scotland, and a truculent heir who, in his assertion of his right to 
succeed as duke, came close to killing William in battle. All these episodes had to be 
resolved before William could be secure in the rightful possession of his royal-ducal 
realm—a possession still held, of course, in the shadow of the obligations he owed his 
French suzerain.  
At each of these points, the feudal habitus intruded itself into the very nature of 
political violence, directing its flow and conditioning its meaning. Since derogations from 
this regime of internal and external legitimacy would threaten both the conceptual basis 
of feudal authority and the practical basis of feudal power projection, it proved to be self-
reproducing. Once established as a matter of custom, the successful conqueror had to 
work within this regulative system of norms precisely because the stakes, the tools, and 
the behaviors of conquest became unthinkable outside of the solution to the problem of 
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collective action provided by shared, purposive understandings about rights and duties.101 
This need to have recourse to right in order to conquer mediated medieval anarchy, 
driving high-political competition in another, less violent direction: the accumulation of 
titles, lands, and prerogatives by means of inheritance.  
iii.  Plurality and dynasticism: Interconnection and incoherence 
Instead of outright conquest, the characteristic feudal empire was built through the 
accumulation of regulative, norms-based relationships such as rights and duties linked to 
land and people. Two key mechanisms, plurality and dynastic marriage, translated this 
accumulation into the production of great dynastic holdings, but they also contained the 
seed of feudalism’s decay: the replication of overlapping relationships of incompatible 
rights and duties to the point that medieval high politics was threatened with incoherence.  
Plurality, a state in which a vassal held obligations to multiple lords, was a vital 
determinant of medieval foreign affairs. A Janus-faced phenomenon, it confused 
medieval politics while simultaneously interconnecting Europe in new and potentially 
transformative ways. As vassals began to enter into multiple, often incompatible 
relationships of rights and duties, the meaning of these relationships became confused. 
These multiple, incompatible oaths promoted dissonance and illogic, threatening the 
coherence of the entire system of feudal obligations governing European politics. Though 
these contradictions were recognized at the time, little was done to abate the practice; the 
chance to harvest greater power and wealth from the possession of more titles and lands 
tended to trump the dictates of conscience.102 Plurality first appeared in the church, where 
a weak suzerain authority (the pope) found that his formal vassals (the bishops) were 
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receiving lands, titles, and even extra bishoprics from the hands of temporal lords.103 This 
plurality spread into high politics writ large as vassals grew stronger. Famously, the 
Normans utilized plural oaths to entice Flanders away from its French suzerain; 
motivated by the promise of wealth, the Flemings paid homage to England-Normandy 
right alongside their preexisting homage to France, somehow allying themselves with 
both parties in the event of a war between them.104 This situation made the reliable 
calculation of forces impossible, retarding the growth of a modern international 
system.105  
At the same time, plurality also made possible a proliferation of cosmopolitan 
international relationships; the hyper-dynasticization of medieval high politics through 
the marriage of dynastic heiresses greatly intensified the accumulation of titles and 
territories.106 Originally, the inheritance of a feudal relationship was open only to males 
because the rights and duties such relationships carried were intimately concerned with 
the ability to fulfill a given, gendered role. At first, the problem of female titleholders was 
circumvented by the feudal norm by which the lord or overlord arranged her marriage; 
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the heiress’s new husband would fulfill the duties owed to her suzerain.107 Over time, 
however, weakened monarchs proved unable to keep their more powerful heiresses from 
marrying other powerful feudal figures from outside the kingdom. The heir resulting 
from such a marriage would inherit the property of both parents, alienating territory as 
lands passed from the ownership of the heiress and into the hands of the newly-
amalgamated feudal entity.108  
Dynasticism grew rapidly into the grundnorm of the feudal habitus. The capacity 
it created for change in the ‘international’ elements of medieval life—particularly in the 
possession of the rights and duties of territories—drastically altered the focus of political 
competition. In essence, “high politics [became] dynastic politics, that is, the structure of 
political life at its highest level was the same as that of family life.”109 Problematically, 
dynastic marriages also promoted unsustainable situations of plurality since the heir 
would inherit two separate arrangements of rights and duties to two (or more) separate 
masters. This only led to further political competition by multiplying the available 
justifications for armed conflict. Together, these two problems—the practical alienation 
of territory and the conceptual alienation of rights and duties—spurred the development 
of a post-feudal international politics.  
The Angevin experience illustrates these complex consequences. After the 
Norman Conquest, the creation of an Anglo-Norman-Breton baronial elite with properties 
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and titles spread across northern Europe inaugurated an unprecedented level of 
interpenetration: “a touch on the web [of property and power] in Norfolk or Paris could 
set it vibrating on the borders of Brittany.” 110 The marriage of William’s grandson (the 
future Henry II) to Duchess Eleanor of Aquitaine (Queen Eleanor of France before her 
annulment) expanded this interconnected web even wider, stretching it from Scotland to 
the Mediterranean. The many titles that Henry bore illustrate how territory was 
understood as a system of overlapping prerogatives and obligations reproduced and 
sustained through marriage and dynastic inheritance.111 These plural relationships were 
reflected even by the non-dynastic pillars of the normative order, the Papacy and the 
Empire. When Pope Adrian IV took the unusual step of declaring Ireland a papal fief and 
granting the rights and duties of its benefice to Henry, no one quite knew what this meant 
since the island was not under Angevin control.112 Henry’s relationship with the Empire 
was similarly complicated. Even though his lands were far from traditional imperial 
borders, he took the extraordinary step of formally submitting his realm to jurisdiction of 
the Emperor: “We place our kingdom and everything subject to our rule anywhere at your 
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disposal and entrust it to your power so that all things shall be arranged at your nod and 
that the will of your command (imperium) shall be done in everything.”113  
These were the fruits of plurality, confusing and unstainable even to 
contemporaries.114 Though feudalism’s high political habitus originally ordered political 
life by rendering its subjects and objects in normative terms, as early as the late 11th 
century but universally by the 13th century the proliferation of malleable rights and 
duties was proving corrosive. Lines of authority—formerly delineated by regulative, 
contractual, and non-replicable relationships of right and duty—were multiplying, 
overlapping, and blurring into incoherence. The course of European high politics itself 
was being diverted down a new and consequential path as norms uncoupled from the 
material reality they were supposed to reference. In this highly interpenetrated system—
socially ‘deeper’ with far ‘thicker’ relationships than semi-archy but with a far smaller 
measure of hierarchical coherence—rights became too easy to assert or invent and 
obligations became too easy to avoid or nullify. Authority claims proliferated, outpacing 
the capacity of their claimants to enforce them and undermining the capacity-based 
hierarchy essential needed to control violence. The central logic underpinning the game 
was being lost.  
c. Conclusion: The Habitus of Feudal High Politics 
As the formal-legal authority of the medieval state diminished, the growth of a 
universal complex of rights and duties created an ordering semi-archy that devolved over 
time into incoherence. For a long while, it embedded and legitimized violence within a 
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normative framework based on a multiplicity of free and independent authorities that 
nonetheless bore rights, duties, and roles in relation to one another, eventually taking a 
system of dynastic diplomacy that paired titles, territories, and relationships to the 
principle of inheritance as its natural carrier. Though it eventually became conceptually-
confused and disordered, this complex society bequeathed two important legacies to the 
later Great Power right- and responsibility complex. First, feudal understandings of 
interpersonal right and obligation penetrated upward into the realm of high politics. 
Essential to the normative bounding of violence, their sequential inheritance created a 
self-reproducing habitus conditioning how medieval realms understood the practice and 
theory of high politics. Second, this habitus normalized the exercise of proto-
international capacity by chaining it to notions of mutual rights, sacred obligations, and 
honor. These norms moderated how violence was employed, but did so by maintaining 
the nominal freedom of all the participants rather than by putting in place a formal 
command relationship based on a signal ruling authority. However, these concepts sat 
uneasily with the notional existence of the territorial state which, though battered and 
enfeebled, nonetheless persisted as a hierarchical alternative to the complexity of 
feudalism—and a constant reminder of its more incoherent elements. 
III. The Reconfiguration of Rights and Responsibilities, 1200-1650 
Feudalism was an attempt to produce order in the absence of a strong state by 
matching capacity to role and embedding it within a structure of norms. But the system 
became untenable when disintegrative tendencies undermined the fulfillment of key roles 
cognizant of certain obligations. Reforming efforts were unable to restore the sincerity of 





relationships of rights and duties gradually assumed “the appearance of an empty 
archaism.”115  
Two successive historical movements reveal the transition from a feudal society 
of rights and duties to an international system of rights and duties. The first began in the 
13th century when the monarchical state began to recover, laboring for the subsequent 
two centuries to reclaim that which it had lost to its temporal and spiritual vassals. Feudal 
centers of authority were morally and physically disarmed, while international politics 
was rationalized through the elimination of inconvenient norms such as the plurality of 
oaths and offices, alien property holdings, and the tolerance of small principalities. The 
result was a royal office with the duties necessary to assert its writ internally and the 
rights required for the exercise of its power externally—a feudal habitus reconfigured for 
powerful monarchs. The second movement resulted directly from the first. Since the 
reinvigoration of monarchy required its appropriation of the old order’s diffuse authority, 
there was a corresponding price to be paid in legitimacy: a normative upheaval. Over the 
period stretching from Machiavelli to Westphalia, the place of rights and duties in the 
new field of international affairs was gradually sorted out by its implantation within the 
sovereign political system of the 17th century. This arrangement combined the former 
feudal habitus of rights and duties with an international system based on the rational 
balancing of states. Its principles would constitute a special class of dynastic international 
actor known as the Great Power, the systemic bearer of rights and duties. 
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a. The agglomeration of rights, and duties to the crown, 1200-1450 
 Kingship had suffered greatly since the time of Charlemagne. Unable to control 
proliferating violence in the 9th and 10th centuries, the mechanism society innovated to 
do so—vassalage—proved erosive of the rights and duties that had once made royal 
authority authoritative. Internally, the crown had lost its ability to prevent the inheritance 
of fiefs and had devolved away much of its authority.116 Externally, its claim to be the 
final arbiter of conquest and diplomacy bore little relationship to reality.117 Even the duty 
of holy war, once the sacred obligation of kings, had been consciously reframed by the 
church as the duty of all knights.118 The constitution of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the 
supreme achievement of feudal external policy, was a product of its times: baronial 
power threatened to overawe its weak monarchy.119   
Yet, kingship—and the apparition of the unitary state that hung about it—avoided 
a killing blow. Conceptually, it retained the ability to assert wide claims of right and duty 
over major domestic services and institutions, particularly over coinage and roads as well 
as its anointed royal duty to protect the Church.120 At the same time, a few warriors 
managed to make kingdoms out of conquests, utilizing feudal concepts to integrate and 
hold their new territory; this placed the king atop a pyramid that, though built upon 
widely-diffused rights and duties, still displayed signs of verticalized hierarchy.121 Even 
in areas of weaker kingship, the crown could find consolation in the fact that the feudal 
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system removed from its shoulders “the strain of trying to preserve unviable political 
units.”122 By passing that burden onto others, the crown found new influence—
particularly by playing its vassals off of one another. Thus, the feudal system itself tended 
to reserve a grain of relevance for the kingly role.123 “Slight as was this recognition, 
however, it was its survival…that prevented the complete fragmentation” of Europe’s 
major kingdoms.124 As the dysfunctional feudal system began to gradually break down, 
kings finally reemerged as the primary drivers of high politics.125 They did so first by 
quietly but effectively exercising the rights and duties reserved to them even under feudal 
decentralization, particularly those relating to justice and the mediation of disputes.126 
With domestic command restored, their campaign culminated in the reclamation of their 
military capacity and moral authority, tools they would use to sweep away much of the 
old normative order and cement their place as the rightful regulators of realms: wielders 
of the high political habitus and plenary holders of rights and duties. 
i.  Feudal monarchy: Domestic rights and duties 
 Feudalism’s disintegrative tendencies endowed the crown with opportunities to 
reassert its intrinsic rights and duties. In two particular areas—inheritance rights and the 
provision of royal justice—monarchs began to reconfigure the moral and material 
distributions of the feudal habitus to their benefit, gathering up normative morsels left 
unclaimed amidst the widely-dispersed authority of medieval society. First, the need to 
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preserve intact estates capable of meaningful military service gave kings an impetus to 
intervene in affairs it had formally devolved. Given its original use as a method of 
military recruitment, vassalage had always been intimately concerned with the 
relationship between the capacity of the vassal’s remit and the services he was obligated 
to provide from it. However, providing for an ever-expanding stable of heirs had required 
subinfeudation (vassals creating their own vassals) on a wide scale—in most cases, the 
acquisition of new territory by conquest or marriage simply couldn’t keep up.127 Whole 
fiefs began to be carved up and distributed piecemeal, an alienation of property 
winnowing the resources produced for the lords higher up the chain. This diminution of 
capacity threatened the integrity of the entire system of rights and duties, giving both the 
barons and the king a vested interest in curtailing the wider distribution of feudal 
relationships. Since the introduction of a remedy (primogeniture succession) was a thorny 
matter of custom and politics, the barons often needed royal backing against their own 
family. Here, kings were in a position of great advantage. Sometimes, this meant 
promoting primogeniture to maintain the integrity of a crucial political and strategic unit; 
sometimes, it meant permitting the disintegration of a rival’s domains.128  
The crown also took advantage of its taxation and judicial patronage powers.129 
Even in its weakened state, kingship held an institutional advantage in that its unique writ 
in these matters notionally extended from one end of the realm to other. As Joseph 
Strayer noted, “rulers gradually began to see that justice was something more than a 
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source of revenue. It was a way of asserting the authority and increasing the power of the 
king or greater lords.”130 Kings began to encourage the hearing of cases in their courts, 
and particularly benefited from hearing appeals of baronial rulings—after all, “a lord 
whose decisions could be overruled was a lord who had lost much of his authority.”131 Of 
course, this was no easy process in a society of devolved privileges, so kings looked for 
ways to undermine baronial authority surreptitiously. In England and elsewhere, circuit 
courts and juries were important innovations that connected the crown with the people, 
bypassing the barons and sheriffs entirely.132 In France, there was less judicial innovation 
and more judicial appropriation. Though “Norman courts continued to enforce Norman 
law,” the officials executing the law were increasingly royal rather than provincial in 
allegiance.133 Similarly, French kings offered patronage and favorable tax arrangements 
to urban notables, bypassing the traditional landed elite to gain a new constituency. These 
developments, tentative at first, foreshadowed the transition from a noblesse d'épée 
possessing a plenum of prerogatives to a noblesse de robe exercising prerogatives in the 
name of their rightful possessor: the royal state.134  
ii.  Feudal monarchy: High political rights and duties  
With the crown once again in possession of a multitude of rights and duties 
oriented inward toward its subjects, it set about gathering up those oriented outward: 
within two centuries, the rights and duties that the feudal habitus had lodged within the 
concepts of territory and dynasty would be regathered into the crown. The monarch, the 
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nucleus of the developing nation-state, would now be the plenary bearer of rights and 
duties, the unitary arbiter of high politics for an entire realm.135 This new form of feudal 
monarchy was a re-visioning of society with greater emphasis on hierarchy and the king’s 
place at the summit of a right- and duty-pyramid.136 Feudalism would thus pass into early 
modernity, its key concepts relocated but not destroyed or discarded.137  
However, this pyramid would no longer overlap with those of other princes and 
realms. Two key elements of the old order had to go: the acceptance of foreign-held 
rights over lands, monasteries, and castles within the realm and the tolerance of minor 
principalities—often de iure vassals who had achieved de facto independence over 
time—bordering the royal demesne.138 First came a campaign to assert control over 
foreign feudal influences. Centuries of oaths, marriages, and donations had created an 
uneven politico-strategic landscape; castles garrisoned by foreign troops and monasteries 
sending tribute to foreign princes frustrated royal authority. In England, where Norman 
and Angevin rule had fostered cosmopolitan connections, numerous religious houses 
(‘alien priories’) owed allegiance to their ecclesiastical superiors in France. Their right to 
operate as such was sanctioned both by custom and by feudal Christianity, but their 
existence posed an inescapable problem of state: the Church’s duty to its spiritual 
suzerains was in direct conflict with the king’s right to levy taxes in his realm. Though 
early English kings respected the rights of monasteries, centuries of warfare saw the 
gradual erosion of their position until they were finally dissolved in the 15th century by an 
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ascendant, conquering monarchy.139 As royal power grew, so did royal right and duty; 
that it grew at the expense of the Church—pitting the nascent concepts of nation and state 
against it—signaled the gradual territorialization of right and duty within a unitary 
monarchical state.140 This represented the transfer of “one’s specific obligations or rights” 
from “one’s place in [a] matrix of personal ties [to] one’s location in a particular area” 
and under a particular government.141  
The modern notion of the territorial state began to coalesce around the crown as it 
gathered up these formerly diffuse rights and duties.142 A second blow to the old external 
order came as kings rationalized their borders through the absorption of smaller 
principalities, many of which had fallen away owing to appanage (the granting of estates 
to younger sons), dynastic alienation, or simple neglect. France is the classic example of 
this process. Beginning with the Capetians in the 13th century, the French crown was 
transformed through the reagglomeration of its territories to its direct control. Normandy 
and the northern English possessions fell to Philip Augustus in the 12th century (a taking 
legally justified by King John’s failure to appear before Philip, his suzerain, to answer 
charges of abducting a betrothed noblewoman in his French holdings). Major appanages 
(including Anjou and Provence) reverted to the crown through death and accession to the 
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royal office. Champagne and Burgundy, previously independent and contumacious, were 
inherited. Dauphiné was bought outright.143 Similar processes were at work in England, 
which absorbed Wales after centuries of castle-building along their shared border, and in 
Castile and Aragon, where conquest and integration were gradually unifying the 
peninsula. Though mechanisms for these absorptions varied, reference was always made 
to feudal concepts of right and obligation even in cases where the monarch was acting 
largely in contravention of the old order (and especially in cases of international 
significance involving the transfer of strategic or valuable territory).144 By the mid-15th 
century, many of the territorial oddities bordering the greater principalities had been 
gobbled up by a combination of resort to force and reference to right. Thus were born the 
“composite polities” and “dynastic agglomerations” of the early modern period. The 
important change from past practice was that king himself now carried the plenum of 
prerogatives and duties rather than his vassals.145 
 By the end of this process around 1550, the royal office had absorbed many of the 
rights and duties of feudalism that had once helped to define medieval high politics, 
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uniting them into the moral body (corpus moralis) of the state.146 Within these new 
bodies, the crown was the conceptual font of norms, binding and bound by its rights and 
duties vis. its lands and subjects.147 However, there remained the question of how 
relationships between these moral bodies—what we would call international politics—
would be normatively grounded now that the interpenetrative rights and duties of the old 
order had been regathered and vertically reorganized. The original purpose of feudal 
society—the creation and reproduction of authoritative domestic order in the absence of a 
strong state—had been superseded as the state recovered its former vitality. The next 
century would see the feudal habitus of a right- and duty-based international politics bend 
before similar winds—but, despite innovations and challenges, it would not break. 
 b. Three developmental tracks of international right and duty, 1450-1650  
The feudal order of rights and duties had been successfully turned to the service 
of the monarch, but there would be a corresponding cost to be paid for this upheaval in 
norms and practices. Over the next two centuries, the resurgence of kingship combined 
with longstanding tensions in the ideology and practice of the respublica Christiana to 
widen the existing cracks in the medieval constitution. Into these chasms seeped “the new 
power relations of the nascent modern world” as the norms-based mediation of feudal 
order broke down.148 This decay would bring both great insecurity and Great Power, but 
not before a transitional period in which innovations emerged and developmental dead-
ends ran their course. This subsection aims to delineate how two distinct ‘developmental 
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tracks’ of international rights and duties revealed themselves in the course of early 
modern European history, how they differed, and how they ultimately came together to 
establish the basis of the first pan-European international system; it will also touch upon a 
third that ultimately branched off from these developments, failing to survive the 
turbulent early modern period (see Figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1: Three Developmental Tracks of Rights and Duties 
 
i.  Three configurations of right and duty 
The late medieval period’s changing material and social context ensured that 
violence, once restrained by feudal norms and geographic division, was proliferating as 
the nation-state began to gestate.149 With material capacity everywhere more 
concentrated and norms everywhere uncertain, the configuration of international rights 
and duties began to resolve itself into three different developmental ‘tracks’ (mapped in 
Figure 2.1) emerging from the late medieval norm. The first track was the 15th century 
                                                             





Italian states-system; this is termed the innovative balancing track because the rights and 
duties characterizing it were prescriptive innovations rationally-derived from existing 
behavioral patterns based on a systemic distribution of power. The second track, in 
contrast, was an attempt to adapt the feudal habitus to the material context of early 
modernity through the construction of dynastic super-states capable of resolving 
longstanding security problems. This adaptive dynastic track took its rights and duties 
from its medieval creedal inheritance; these were empowered monarchies of the late 
feudal type that sought to preserve and expand the dynastic basis of international law and 
politics.150 A third track, the schismatic confessional, was animated by a hyper-creedal 
realignment of international allegiances in light of the splintering of the universal Church; 
borders and realms lost much of their immediate significance as rights and duties were 
radically realigned. This movement admitted little of balance, but much of violence as the 
legitimacy of the norms that had underpinned feudal order was denied to princes and 
peoples of differing faiths.  
The first two ideal-typical configurations—exemplified by the Italian system and 
the Habsburg dynastic conglomerate, respectively—each related material capacity to 
right and duty. The Italians deduced from their own systemic behavior the duty of the 
actors with the greatest capacity for harm to act with restraint in support of equilibrium, 
while the Habsburgs tried to adapt traditional feudal understandings to govern a 
composite realm of astounding material size and conceptual complexity. The third 
attempted to do away with much of the feudal superstructure of right only to replace it 
with a new one based not upon rational balance or received tradition but instead upon the 
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primacy of cultural struggle. Ultimately, the failure of this third track to unify Europe 
facilitated the development of a secular balance of power along the lines first seen in Italy 
but also its tentative unification with the rights and duties of the dynastic habitus. This 
combination would produce the classical international system. Together, the tumultuous 
development of these three tracks constructed a three-sided edifice supplanting the old 
order: the state, an international bearer of rights and duties; an international diplomacy of 
dynasticism, normatively grounding high political competition in patrimonial inheritance 
and family prestige; and an international system of balance, uniting the whole of Europe 
into a single community of fate.151   
ii.  The innovative balancing track: The Italian States-system 
As feudalism decayed, power was more concentrated in Europe than it had been 
in centuries but the norms restraining it were weakening. Italy—urban, populous, and 
distanced from feudalism by accidents of geography and history—was the first to react to 
these changes by adopting a remedy in the form a states-system. The same 
reagglomeration of rights, duties, and lands that was taking place across the Alps had its 
moment here, but with one important difference: Italy was a geographically-compact, 
urbanized peninsula characterized by intense economic, political, and cultural 
interpenetration. If a ‘touch upon the Angevin web’ in Oxford could cause vibrations in 
Bordeaux, then a mere breath upon the Italian web in Rome could cause an earthquake in 
Naples. Under such conditions, the five emerging giants of Italy—Venice, Florence, 
Milan, Rome, and Naples—became understandably interested in one another’s high-
political affairs. This engendered conflict, the destructive potential of which had 
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exponentially increased. By the early 15th century, violence interdependence—“the 
capacity of actors to do violent harm to one another”—had risen to an intolerable level.152  
To cope, Italian international politics diverged from the medieval norm and took 
on the character of an interstate system. Abandoning feudal scruples for a “separate 
political ethics” and feudalism’s norms-based approach to territoriality for a new 
understanding of civic space, the Italian states entered into a sustained power-political 
competition as each maneuvered to advance their strategic and commercial position.153 
Not for nothing did Machiavelli’s The Prince frame itself as a treatise on change, 
explicitly addressing itself to the “new monarchy” in which the praiseworthy prince 
“introduce[s] innovations into old customs.”154 This intensifying churn connected the 
whole of Italy by means of fluid geopolitical alignments based on calculations of state 
wealth and military power. Through these calculations, states became sensitive to the 
each other’s likely reactions, soon balancing their forces through temporary military 
alliances. Importantly, the peninsula’s compactness allowed its constituent parts to 
roughly intuit the imperatives built into the operation of the system—to understand how 
the actions of one member could affect the fortunes of the whole—and to derive secular 
principles of action replacing the contingent, inherited practices of the habitus. As a 
result, there arose the first balance of power self-consciously recognized among its 
constituent units.155 Though it was always shifting and never perfect, it was through this 
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balance that the Italian states began to realize that they were connected to one another in 
a new and intimate way that required political innovation to manage. With its importance 
acknowledged, they increasingly directed their policies toward its preservation. As 
Garrett Mattingly noted, 
In the 1440s there began to form in certain Italian minds a conception of 
Italy as a system of independent states, coexisting by virtue of an unstable 
equilibrium which it was the function of statesmanship to preserve. This 
conception was fostered by the peninsula-wide alliances whose even 
balance of forces had ended every way of the past twenty years in 
stalemate. It recommended itself increasingly to statesmen who had 
accepted a policy of limited objectives, and had more to fear than to hope 
from a continuance of an all-out struggle. . . . But its first practical 
expression was in the proposal of Filippo Maria Visconti, in September 
1443, for joint action by Florence, Venice, and Milan to end the war 
between the powerful condottiere, Francesco Sforza, and the pope, such 
action to be followed by a congress of the major Italian powers for 
settlement of all outstanding political questions and the exchange of 
mutual guarantees.156    
 
Thus crept into Italian thought and practice the first international duty connected 
to the possession of preeminent capacity: the notional responsibility to restrain conflict 
by the preservation of equilibrium.157 Since this equilibrium had to be fostered within the 
context of a formal international anarchy, the responsibility for its preservation had to be 
distributed amongst its constituent units rather than delegated to a single hierarchical 
authority. Importantly, the units within the system endowed with the greatest capacity to 
upset it were particularly obligated to play active roles in its preservation, especially by 
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balancing their forces. Thus, the five great Italian states became the Italian system’s 
Great Powers.158    
The Italian Great Powers are significant because they were the first occurrence of 
a phenomenon that would reoccur in every subsequent European states-system: the 
systemic-level actor possessing a prerogative interest across its breadth and bearing a 
duty to conform its behavior to a systemic standard for the sake of stability. These special 
actors were recognizable based upon certain shared characteristics that would later define 
the Great Powers of systems much wider in scope. The first identifying element was raw 
material capacity. The Italian Great Powers, unlike the ultramontane monarchies, enjoyed 
the advantages offered by compactness of territory and urbanization. Consequently, they 
were able to efficiently mobilize their internal resources earlier and more efficiently than 
their neighbors to the north, forming “city-empires” by conquering neighboring 
territories.159 Materially, their ability to mobilize men, money, and resources was far 
greater than the other states in the system, and in some cases could even match and 
exceed those of the large monarchies lurking just outside the system’s scope.160    
The second element was ideational and institutional: an isomorphic approach to 
diplomatic innovation as the sinew of the system. The systemic mechanism through 
which the Italian Great Powers operationalized their equilibrium processes, this new 
diplomacy of resident ambassadors, organized intelligence-gathering, and fluid, 
responsive alliances differed significantly from its medieval predecessor. The latter 
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emphasized formal relationships of obligation cemented by symbolic practices meant to 
establish indissoluble relationships (treaties of ‘perpetual peace’ were not uncommon 
through the mid-16th century) even if the terms of those relationships proved flexible in 
practice.161 There was no dedicated corps of negotiators and no system of resident 
ambassadors. In place of this medieval configuration, the Italians substituted permanent 
diplomatic representation by specialist emissaries charged with facilitating temporary, 
opportunistic relationships. Indeed, one of the striking features of this new system was 
the attrition rate of its less powerful members, often victims of internecine conquest.162 
Abandoning medieval fixity lent the system the dynamism it needed to cope with the 
changing material circumstances of early modernity.  
Finally, this new diplomatic path was also the genesis for the articulation of the 
first modern Great Power right. Medieval diplomacy recognized precedence as an honor 
accrued by age; the realms meriting the greatest ceremonial consideration were those of 
the greatest antiquity. However, as Italian diplomatic practices diffused throughout 
Europe, only the wealthiest states could afford a large diplomatic corps; this practical 
economic reality translated into diplomatic practice as the title ‘ambassador’ became 
reserved for the emissaries of only the wealthiest of states. Lesser powers could send 
ministers, but the chief representatives of the largest, best-funded, and best-connected 
diplomatic networks were placed ahead of the rest in both practice and in theory.163 The 
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right to accredit ambassadors would grow in importance, becoming a peculiar prerogative 
of Great Powers and occasioning much dispute over the prestige to be gained through this 
formal ranking.164  
In sum, the discontinuity between the Italian system and the medieval society is 
evident. The Great Powers of 15th century Italy were the first states to recognize their 
common identity as the most capable actors in a system of states founded on calculation 
and the balancing of forces. They were able to understand the fragility of their system, 
and thus assumed the duties of restraint and vigilance; these two imperatives impelled 
them to invent modern diplomacy. In the end, it would be their derogation that would 
destroy the system and reduce its greatest Powers to the level of pawns. When the Papal 
States and Milan made the grave error of inviting a French invasion of Naples, the 
peninsula was reduced to a battleground as France’s rivals rushed in after it. Importantly, 
this would be a struggle not so much between ‘France’ and ‘Castile-Aragon’ as between 
Habsburg and Valois—explicitly dynastic, personalized disputes firmly-rooted in 
medieval norms and practices. Ironically, the first system of rational, modern states was 
to be succeeded by over a century of decidedly pre-systemic dynastic and religious 
conflict among feudal monarchies.  
This returns the narrative of the right- and responsibility-complex to wider 
developments in Europe. Italy had taken a far more direct route to a system of Great 
Powers; rather than rationally-inducing a system of Powers, the transalpine states were 
exploring the potential disclosed by a marriage of strong monarchies to the dynastic-
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religious understanding of international rights and duties found in the habitus. The 
creation of unified realms such as Castile-Aragon and Burgundy-Austria hinted at an 
interesting double-movement in the politics of feudal relationships in Europe: at its nadir 
in Italy, the feudal understanding of international rights and responsibilities was 
simultaneously reaching its apogee beyond the Alps.  
iii.  Dynastic conglomerations and the adaptive dynastic track 
With material and social conditions far different from the Italian peninsula, the 
transalpine kingdoms could not easily abandon their feudal inheritance.165 Instead, they 
were utilizing the strengthened position of the crown—flush with the reclaimed 
prerogatives of the late medieval period—to adapt and augment the high political norms 
of feudal society. Dynasty was the element chosen to organize this new international 
politics; beginning in the early 15th century, the marriage alliances inherited from the 
medieval period were gradually transformed into tools for territorial amalgamation on an 
astonishing scale. This process of union-by-inheritance endowed early modern rulers 
with ties of prerogative and duty that stretched across Europe. Five major dynastic 
conglomerates emerged during or just after the 16th century: the Kalmar Union (Sweden-
Norway-Denmark), Castile-Aragon, Austria-Burgundy, and England (including Ireland 
and Wales)-Scotland. One additional union, the conglomeration of Emperor Charles V, 
united Castile-Aragon with Austria-Burgundy. All were established according to rights of 
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succession rather than military conquest; these were empires of right, the application of 
feudal principles to the nascent international realm.166  
This adaptive dynastic configuration of international rights and duties was based 
on feudal society’s traditions of personal and corporate right, dynastic patrimony, and 
Holy Church—all norms derived from the habitus, ex ante considerations of the 
distribution of material capacity. It extended these principles to the emerging 
international sphere, not as incidentals to the operation of a rational states-system, but as 
foundational principles that would shape the objectives of international life. Owing to the 
feudal provenance of their territorial rights, the great patriarchs of these united kingdoms 
were “bound to observe the several customs, privileges and structures of each state” in 
their possession according to feudal custom.167 Different titles begat different roles just as 
they did under feudalism, but the size and scope of these entities were unlike anything 
known in the medieval period. These were mixed regimes, empires of customary feudal 
right translated imperfectly into the formal-legal forms of early modern sovereignty. 
Consequently, “reason of dynasty, rather than contemporary notions of reasons of state, 
drove international-political competition” even as the edifice of the state was gradually 
raised up to buttress that which it would eventually replace.168  
Importantly, this stands is in stark contrast to the rationally-derived, 
instrumentally-motivated Italian model, as Mattingly noted: 
The formation of [these] new power-aggregates…illustrates a 
characteristic growth-pattern of the European monarchies. In Italy, the city 
states had devoured their neighbors by the simpler forms of aggression. 
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But the legalistic habits and traditional loyalties of five centuries of 
feudalism were so deeply ingrained in society beyond the Alps that mere 
conquests were hard to make and harder to keep, and even the greediest 
kings were eager to discover legal grounds for expansion. In the main, 
therefore, ruling dynasties laid province to province as the more successful 
landlords among their subjects laid field to field, by purchase and 
exchange and foreclosure, but chiefly by marriage and inheritance. Force 
was employed not to advance a rational interest but to support a legal 
claim.169 
 
These legal claims were of clear feudal provenance. As long as they ruled, there could be 
no modern states-system along the lines observed in Italy—only a continuation of the 
transnational society of the respublica Christiana. Indeed, the balance between social and 
material imperatives in Europe was even shifting in favor of the former thanks to the 
geographic strides accomplished by dynastic unionism. Since the principles underpinning 
such unions transferred ownership and sovereignty according to the dictates of social 
norms, the formation of composite empires like that of Charles V represented a 
significant derogation from the traditional stopping power of geographic division. For a 
brief period in the 16th century law had accomplished a feat of which force had never 
dreamed: an empire stretching from the Danube to the Rio Grande. 
Though this could not last—right could not govern Europe for long without 
reference to capacity—the importance of these dynastic empires is worth emphasizing. 
They consciously attempted to carry over the normative core of feudalism and adapt it to 
function as the organizing principle for a changing world. Each of these unions proposed 
a solution to some international security problem, be it endemic violence between 
bordering realms or the need to join forces against a common threat. All were the result 
of generations of calculated dynastic policy, and none were accomplished through the 
                                                             





force of arms. Most would collapse under their own weight, but they would leave a 
significant political residue: these composite empires would entrench the dynastic 
principle into the very fabric of modern European diplomacy. At the conclusion of this 
drama, the habitus would be combined with the same systemic tendencies observed in 
Italy to produce the first modern, pan-European states-system.  
iv.  Confessional schism 
Before this system would be inaugurated, the feudal pinnacle of the dynastic 
unions would be sundered by a transnational realignment of rights and duties along 
confessional lines. The schismatic confessional track grew naturally out of the application 
of the medieval maxim ‘faith must not be kept with heretics’ (cum haereticis fides non 
servanda) to the emerging international sphere.170 As the Reformation spread across 
borders, it carried with it the potential for a transnational realignment of rights and duties 
along confessional lines—even the hope of an “alternate world-system.”171 Though 
ultimately a dead-end, this track worked two significant changes in the high political 
habitus of feudalism: it shattered the unity of the great conglomerate states and sundered 
the grundnorm of international politics, dynastic rights and duties. 
Both changes were visible in the failure of Charles V to maintain an empire based 
on feudal catholicity and Roman Catholicism when the Reformation shook its core 
assumptions.172 His framed his fight to preserve his vast dominion in normative terms, 
both in his rights and duties as a temporal suzerain to maintain peace and punish 
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aggression as well as his religious obligations as an emperor and a Roman Catholic.173 
Thirty years of costly war and domestic strife would pass before he accepted the 
extinction of his duty to police the faith of his subjects and the rights that sprang from it. 
It was a serious blow not only to the emperor and the Catholic Church—two former 
pillars of feudal order—but to the empire itself.174 Charles finally recognized that the 
dream of universal empire had definitively passed.175 The routines and cognitive patterns 
of the rights and duties he had so deeply internalized had been shattered, and he 
acknowledged this by, in an unprecedented move, abdicating and dividing his empire 
between his son and his brother.  
This sea-change signaled the weakening of dynastic right and religious duty. As 
the new faith spread, authority was undermined as never before; uprisings and 
disturbances rocked the great unions during this period as their legitimacy began to 
falter.176 Crucially, these conflicts “exacerbated all of the problems inherent in dynastic 
states” by breaking down the early modern feudal monarchy’s “firewalls”—social 
barriers that discouraged horizontal cooperation across domains and classes that could 
undermine traditional relationship patterns.177 In many cases, religious civil war was the 
next step on this troubled path. Under such conditions, confession supplanted all other 
factors as the determinant of political alignments; as religious factions began to look to 
their foreign co-religionists for assistance, a new developmental path of international 
rights and duties emerged. This schismatic confessional track attempted to replace the 
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faltering feudal norm of dynastic legitimism with a new international alignment based on 
the religious renovation of European society. For each major confessional grouping, 
inter- and transnational organizations and movements emerged, cutting across borders in 
a way detrimental to the verticalized state.178  
In this new transnational struggle, domestic politics was internationalized with 
surprising results.179 France, once Europe’s most powerful single crown, was reduced to 
an arena as French Catholics united with their traditional enemies, the Spanish and the 
papacy, to stamp out the English-backed Huguenot faction of Protestants. The failure of 
the Valois line expanded the conflict into a three-way war for the crown among the 
moderate Catholic king, his Protestant heir presumptive, and the foreign-backed Guise 
family. England fared no better. Elizabeth I drew a papal bull requiring the faithful to 
resist her rule “on pain of anathema” and support international efforts to depose her; this 
was an exhortation cast in the language of transnational duty, requiring ordinary people 
“to obey an international authority rather than the laws of [their] own state.”180 She 
returned the favor by backing the efforts of Dutch Protestants against their Spanish 
overlords.181 Ironically, it was to this same international Catholic apparatus that later 
English royals turned for succor after Charles I’s execution by radical Protestants. 
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These struggles blurred the lines between internal and external in ways 
reminiscent of feudalism. But where feudal rights and duties subordinated all (in theory) 
before a single normative complex that bounded conflict, the primacy of religious right 
and duty during a period of schism overrode such mediation. Similarly, during this 
violent confessional reconfiguration, revolutionary belief drove politics rather than 
concerns of calculations of power or balance.182 But as the waste and bloodshed of 
Europe’s century of religious conflict drew to a close, the need for order drew the 
European monarchies down the same path trod by the isolated Italian republics much 
earlier.183 Crucially, they entered into this new era with both a feudal inheritance, the 
habitus of rights and duties embedded in territory and dynasty, as well as the tools and 
methods of the Italian states-system. The combination of the two would ultimately 
contribute to a complex of modern Great Power rights and responsibilities. 
v.  The precondition of the modern complex: A union of balance and habitus 
All that had come of a century and a half of religious war was material and moral 
exhaustion. Though it would take another major conflict to reestablish order, the signs of 
what would come were present as early as 1600. Schismatic confessionalism had lost its 
vitality, its excesses detrimental to general peace and order. The understanding of right, 
capacity, and duty found in the feudal habitus had been preserved within the dynastic 
principle, but dynasticism alone could not serve as a supra-national organizing principle. 
From these realizations came the penetration of international politics writ large by the 
same systemic consciousness first seen in Italy. The resulting union fused the rights- and 
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duties-focus of the feudal habitus with the rationally-prescribed and systemic tendencies 
of a states-system to create a new normative complex. Subsumed within it were 
regulative norms defining shared understandings about international behavior and 
prescriptive norms about the need for material balance and the good of the whole; from 
this would spring a new class of actors, the Great Powers, to serve as centers of authority 
expressing and reproducing this union of material capacity and moral direction. This final 
section will illustrate how this process began, tracing the gradual coming-together of the 
remnants of the high political habitus with the innovative practices of balance. 
The schismatic confessional alignment of rights and duties had run out of steam 
by the mid-17th century. Gradually, Europeans abandoned the primacy of religious duty 
for the self-interest of raison d’état. The religious civil war in France that had proved the 
occasion for so much transnational strife resolved itself along dynastic—not 
confessional—lines with the accession of Henry IV (a convert to Catholicism who 
proclaimed Paris “well worth a mass”) and the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes 
promising tolerance for Huguenots. In Britain, where the execution of Charles I had 
inaugurated a commonwealth, presbyterian government rapidly devolved into a military 
dictatorship more concerned with defending its commerce than advancing its creed. By 
1652, it had determined that religious affinity with its Dutch neighbors was trumped by 
the need to protect its shipping from competition, while its strident anti-Catholicism gave 
way to an alliance with France. As these former hot spots cooled, an important piece of 
evidence emerged: international politics was becoming less cognizant of denomination. 
At the same time, dynastic right was increasingly recognized to have been limited and 





against (and the assassination of) legitimate monarchs necessitated a number of practical 
compromises recognizing de facto rather than de iure conditions.184 Spain was forced to 
acknowledge the independence of Portugal, and its 80-year conflict with the rebel United 
Provinces ended with their independence. Similarly, the authority of the Empire was 
further dismembered by the Westphalia settlement, which granted the German princes the 
right to make alliances with outside powers. Abroad, longstanding Iberian right-claims to 
the possession of the Americas gave way to large-scale colonization by their competitors. 
Dynastic rights and legitimacy now counted for less. 
Since neither the duties of faith nor the rights of dynasty could alone animate a 
new, international order, a neutral principle had to be adopted. Into this gap stepped the 
innovative balancing tendencies first glimpsed in Renaissance Italy. Absent a workable 
alignment of international rights and duties based solely on faith or tradition, Europe was 
gradually forced to seek international order in the acceptance of a systemic co-
relationship among its constituent parts. Under such conditions, the survival of the state 
became the highest priority, its chief imperative the understanding and calculation of 
opposing material forces rather than the promotion of a creed or the assertion of right for 
right’s sake. Yet, this introduction of system came at an opportune moment. Just as 
Europe sought order, the dynastic and territorial rights and duties of the feudal habitus 
had been weakened just enough to make them a suitable basis for the reconstructed 
normative complex of a European international system. 
Despite over a century of internecine violence, the major states of Europe 
remained monarchical, dynastic institutions formally organized around normative 
                                                             






principles of right and duty.185 A juncture between balance and habitus could offer the 
best of both worlds: rational imperatives softened and re-visioned in moral terms. 
Moreover, such a union was necessary. As early modern sovereignty was gradually 
refined into monarchical absolutism, the crown remained a depository of domestic and 
international norms. Unlike the rulers of the Italian republics, such individuals could not 
simply gobble up territory without asserting a right cognizant of the practical bonds—
commercial, political, and religious—that tied states together.186 Since “the balance of 
power model . . . [could] only be an effective and rational policy within a framework of 
conventions with normative status,” the new, systemic order had an inbuilt legitimacy 
problem: such predation would sometimes be necessary if the maintenance of an 
equilibrium of forces was to be its prime principle.187 To recover some of the stability and 
legitimacy that its operation would erode, the material bounding of power found in the 
new states-system would have to be paired with the moral bounding of violence found in 
the habitus. 
Dynastic diplomacy, the primary carrier of the habitus, was the logical solution to 
the new European system’s very old violence problem.188 As Europe began to rebuild, 
dynastic diplomacy was a sound starting point for peace. Spain and France, emerging 
from the late 16th century with battered legitimacy and empty treasuries, signaled the 
beginning of this trend. Both desired a period of peace, but a great deal of blood and a 
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great many backstabs hindered the preservation of a fragile truce. At the pope’s 
suggestion, a solution was found by layering a double dynastic union over an uncertain 
peace settlement. Thus resulted the joint ‘Spanish marriages’ of Louis XIII of France to a 
Spanish princess and of the future Philip IV of Spain to a French princess; this union and 
the diplomacy that brought it about helped secure relatively peaceful relations between 
the bitter rivals for two decades. Both profited from the prestige, legitimacy, and peace 
the match fostered, confirming the utility of dynastic marriage diplomacy as a check on 
the unhappy enmity characteristic of the religious wars.189 The utility of dynastic 
marriages as solutions to post-confessional security problems led to their proliferation, 
including some matches that would have been impossible a few decades before.190 Thus, 
by the time the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years’ War, an institution of 
dynastic diplomacy was ready to serve as an organizing principle for a new complex of 
international rights and responsibilities. 
Rational balance had been joined to the normative guidance of dynastic habitus; 
all that remained was for the system to stabilize itself by likewise yoking together its 
chief participants as Great Powers. The full inauguration of this new complex will be 
addressed in Chapter Three, but the essential conditions for its creation were in place at 
the end of the Thirty Years War. These Powers would all be dynastic and monarchical; 
                                                             
189 J. H. Elliott, “The Political Context of the 1612-1615 Franco-Spanish Treaty” in Dynastic 
Marriages 1612/1615: A Celebration of the Habsburg and Bourbon Unions, ed. Margaret M. McGowan 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2013). 
190 Most significantly, England’s rulers began to reintegrate their monarchies into continental 
politics by marrying outside their faith. The future Charles I’s married a Bourbon Catholic in 1625. The 
future Charles II likewise married a Catholic noblewoman from newly-independent Portugal, a diplomatic 
renewal of England’s traditional alliance with Spain’s Iberian neighbor. James II, whose second marriage 
was to a Catholic daughter of the Duke of Modena, was ultimately ousted thanks in part to his wife’s 
successful efforts to convert him; his replacements were the Protestant Princess Mary and her husband, the 





through ties of blood, they would find themselves linked together, giving significant 
impetus to the promotion of common norms of right and duty that would stabilize 
international politics. Their characteristic activity would be, as in Italy, to balance and 
check one another for the good of systemic stability and the mediation of disorder. 
However, unlike in Italy, the developing Great Power states-system would be predicated 
upon more than the rational induction of rights and duties from these patterns of systemic 
behavior. Instead, it would be determined by a socialized club of dynastic states bound 
together by both material circumstances and cultural norms, particularly those of rights 
and duties grounded in the concepts of family and territory.191 This patrimonial 
grounding allowed the human beings involved in foreign affairs to easily ‘buy in’ to the 
complex of norms and relationships animating this arrangement by linking it with 
purposive language and concepts familiar from domestic life. The self-understandings of 
statespeople in the subsequent century would thus be focused on transnational ideas—
honor, prestige, duty—that could mediate international competition and give normative 
coloring to the operation of rational balance. Together, this union of balance and habitus 
facilitated a departure from the excesses of naked force and holy war, securing a measure 
of continental order and, in comparison with what had come before and would come 
later, peace.  
c. Conclusion 
The regulative norms of feudalism took form amidst anarchy and uncontrolled 
violence, ultimately becoming enshrined as the defining habitus of medieval high 
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politics. However, the restraint this habitus provided by rendering these concepts in 
normative, right- and duty-terms was gradually lost as reinvigorated states began to 
reconfigure key moral and material distributions. Challenged by the innovative 
prescriptive norm of systemic balance and the specter of schismatic confessional 
realignment, the traditional rights and duties of the habitus were placed under great 
strain. Two centuries of divisive cultural and political conflict required an 
accommodation between the old and the new in order to control violence and provide 
order. Ultimately, the incorporation of calculation and balance into a complex of norms 
correlated to capacity facilitated the rise of a “States-system,” its members “morally 
united into one community, which was only politically divided.”192  
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RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 1648 - 1789 
 
Already for a long time one could regard Christian Europe (except Russia) as a sort of great 
republic divided into several states . . . all in harmony with each other, all having the same 
substratum of religion, although divided into various sects; all possessing the same 
principles of public and political law, unknown in other parts of the world. In obedience to 
these principles the European nations do not make their prisoners slaves, they respect their 
enemies’ ambassadors, they agree as to the pre-eminence and rights of certain princes, such 
as the Emperor, kings and other lesser potentates, and, above all, they are as one on the 
wise policy of maintaining among themselves an equal balance of power. 
- Voltaire193 
 
The previous chapter explained how a habitus linking norms with material capacity 
developed into a complex of Great Power rights and responsibilities. This chapter 
examines the operation of the international society that complex anchored. The period 
between the Peace of Westphalia and the French Revolution has passed into the IR 
vernacular as the transparently self-seeking, unabashedly anarchic, and simplistically 
mechanistic international system par excellence.194 Typified by the settlements at 
Westphalia and Utretch, this narrative often understands the 18th century international 
system as a field of unending material competition punctuated by periodic ordering 
moments of alignment and realignment.195 Yet, there was much more to this century’s 
international politics: a system of balance, yes—but one paired with a multidimensional 
society of “ideas, collective mentalities, and outlooks”196 organizing international politics 
into a loose semi-archy. These norms-based relationships were embedded in a shared 
culture rendering the actions and justifications in terms of rights and duties.  
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Examining this period through the lens of a complex of Great Power rights and 
responsibilities will uncover how this culture operated, offering explanations for 
international outcomes rooted in how normative attitudes about material capacity and 
social purpose shaped the meaning and consequences of international affairs. Its structure 
proceeds through each of the inputs identified in Chapter One as involved in the 
production of Great Power politics, explaining their 18th century context and tracing their 
casual contributions. Section II explores the shared Great Power identity, the bundle of 
rights and duties attached to superior material capacity and the standard of behavior 
reflecting the possession of Great Power. Section III identifies the behaviors that sprung 
from that identity, the general right- and duty-claims of all the Powers. Each of these 
claims was a point of intersection connecting elements of international theory with 
discrete international practices; they thus form a body of clear, empirical evidence of how 
a social identity expressed through rights and responsibilities shaped international affairs. 
Section IV turns to the various Great Power roles, discrete behavioral routines by which 
the possibilities and prohibitions disclosed by the systemic Great Power identity 
conditioned and were conditioned by unit-level circumstances. These roles were the 
actualization through policy of what it meant to be one of a select few Great Powers, but 
also of what it meant to be a specific Great Power rooted in a specific place and culture. 
Together, these sections will show how rights and duties contributed to international 
outcomes in ways often overlooked by IR scholarship. 
I. Elements of Great Power Identity, 1648-1813 
A shared Great Power identity—the consensus understanding of what it means to 





material components (see Figure 3.1). Three key components were particularly influential 
in the identity operative in the years following Westphalia. First, there was the given 
imperative of the calculation of forces within an international system characterized by 
violent competition. Second, there were a number of states with disproportionate 
pluralities of the system-wide distribution of material capacity (France and Sweden 
initially, with others gaining this status as they recovered from the war). Third, there were 
two important traditions of thinking about international order: an adaptive dynastic one 
descended from feudal norms as well as an innovative balancing one based on the 
imperatives of international equilibrium. Their synthesis into a right- and responsibility-
complex helped define the international politics of the long 18th century. 
Figure 3.1: The Formation of Great Power Identity 
 
Historically, the first states to express a Westphalian Great Power identity were 
the victorious allies, France and Sweden. They anchored this particular international 
system with their overlapping spheres of material operation and social involvement.197 
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Their military alliance merged the French zone of involvement in western and southern 
Europe with the Swedish in the north and east; at the same time, they both claimed 
guarantees over the central German empire, institutionalizing their involvement there and 
creating systemic relationships stretching from the Russia to Spain. France and Sweden 
were thus the first modern Great Powers, both because of their similar material 
characteristics as well as their joint promotion of a purposive direction within the new 
international system. The scope of their interests and political action encompassed the 
system’s full territorial extent, and they together formed the key points of interconnection 
between the system’s various parts.198 Their military power was of the first rank, and they 
behaved as though a complex of special rights and duties influenced their relationships 
with the rest of Europe. Subsequent Powers would mimic this Franco-Swedish model.  
Table 3.1: Great Powers in Three Eras 
 
Era Date Great Powers 
Introductory Era 1648-1713 
France, Sweden, Spain, Austria,  
Holland (from 1673), Britain (from 1689) 
Era of the classical balance 1714-1763 
Britain, France, Russia, Prussia (from 
1740s), Austria, Spain, Holland (to 
1720s) 
Era of exhaustion 1764-1789 
Britain, France (to 1785), Russia, Prussia, 
Austria, Spain 
 
However, the full implications of Great Power status would only become apparent 
as the immediate effects of the war faded and the international system recovered a 
measure of elasticity. With this in mind, the period under examination can be divided into 
three eras (see Table 3.1). In each of these eras, four primary elements shaped the shared 
identity: dynastic governance, the assertion of systemic interests, the pursuit of prestige, 
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and the active participation in the balance of power. Of these shared elements, two—
dynastic governance and the pursuit of prestige—derived from the adaptive dynastic 
developmental path and two—the assertion of systemic interests and the active 
participation in the balance of power—from the path of innovative balancing (see Figure 
3.3). 
Figure 3.2: Genealogy of Great Power Identity Right- and Duty-claims, 1648-1813 
 
Caveats are necessary at this level of abstraction. These elements did not always 
reflect a co-equal influence over the policies and practices of all the Great Powers. 
Likewise, the complex of prerogatives and obligations they engendered was not always 
respected nor universally acknowledged. Yet, the shared Great Power identity provided a 
common conceptual basis for political action that lent normative substance to material 
preeminence. It did so through constellations of norms and practices defining the field of 
action and the behaviors appropriate to it. Like astral bodies, their position shifted with 
the seasons but ultimately remained an enduring presence throughout the century; the 
geographic location from which one gazed at them imparted a unique view and the 





interpretations. But the measure of socialization they provided to international politics 
managed to transform an anarchical material competition into a multidimensional 
arrangement of international order. Within this semi-archy, claims of right and duty were 
highly influential in conditioning self-understanding, the recognition of others, and, 
ultimately, behavior. To understand this relational order, attention must be given to how a 
shared identity fostered bi- and multilateral relationships among the Powers, holding 
them together while keeping them apart. This section will do so, showing how norms and 
behaviors common to all the Powers influenced 18th century international politics. 
a. Dynastic Governance 
Inherited from past practice, the adaptive dynastic elements of the Great Power 
identity were the foundation of the first Great Power identity. At Westphalia, dynastic 
governance was common to victor and vanquished, the principles of “loyalty, legality, 
and the inviolability of existing structures” animating a strong preference for 
legitimism.199 The importance of dynasty to the meaning of Great Power is especially 
apparent when looking at Britain and Holland, two cases which show how republicanism 
negatively correlated with Great Power status.  
Commonwealth Britain played only a confused and unsteady role in early post-
Westphalian politics. Though it could and did make cause with other states from time to 
time, its regicide government was unable to play the systemic game with fluidity and 
confidence owing to its near-pariah status. Though the restoration of the monarchy 
improved its international standing, lingering internal disputes ensured its kings remained 
                                                             





dependent on the French.200 Only a revolutionary coup would ultimately free Britain to be 
a Great Power by restoring dynastic confidence. As for the Dutch, they were an object of 
scorn in most European courts owing to their rejection of the Orange dynasty and 
consequent aloofness from continental politics.201 Rescued from Spanish domination by 
the intervention of other anti-Habsburg powers, the Netherlands was widely viewed as 
meriting nothing better than French clientage. After the Provinces had shirked their duties 
in this regard, Louis XIV declared war, eager to avenge insults to his honor and 
prestige.202 The words of his herald carried an indictment of international lèse-majesté, a 
case of a small power abrogating its duties to its Great Power patron:   
Owing to the ill opinion His Majesty has for some time past entertained of 
the conduct of the States General,” he couldn’t, “without the diminution of 
his glory . . . any longer dissemble the indignation wrought in him for their 
acting so little conformably to the great obligations, which His Majesty 
and the Kings his predecessors have so bountifully heaped upon them.”203 
 
This amounted to an expression of royal disgust with “a republic of Calvinist ‘cheese and 
herring merchants’ . . . claiming the right to act as a great power because of their 
commercial success.”204 Only after an annus horribilis of major defeats did the United 
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Provinces recant and restore the hereditary stadtholderate to William of Orange.205 From 
this point forward, William’s energetic coalition-building and dynastic politics would 
frustrate the triumphant French, raise the United Provinces to the undeniable rank of 
Great Power, contract a major dynastic marriage and use it to obtain the crown of 
England, and establish himself as the embodied holder of the European balance of power 
at the center of its dynastic-diplomatic web.206  
Thus, by both institutional inheritance and the rational requirements of 
international diplomacy, the Great Power right- and responsibility-complex of this period 
relied upon dynastic governance to buttress and reproduce its characteristic norms. Only 
monarchies or mixed, aristocratic republics capable of playing the international dynastic 
game could claim Great Power status at this point. It is no coincidence that Holland’s 
withdrawal from an active Great Power role in the mid-18th century was attended by a 
reduction in dynasty’s role in its foreign and domestic policy. Likewise, Britain’s long 
road from theocratic republic to Hanoverian empire was marked by progressively-
increasing efforts to solidify its dynastic legitimacy at home and abroad.207 Similar 
movements took place among the major newcomers of this period, Russia and Prussia; 
once militarily established, both sought to signal their social fitness by contracting 
prominent Great Power marriages uniting upstart dynasties to well-established families. 
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b. Focus on Prestige 
The Great Power identity also centered on the pursuit and maintenance of 
prestige, the esteem in which its honor, power, and culture were held by its fellow 
Powers. Prestige is a topic that IR literature has had difficulty situating—this despite (or 
perhaps because of) the frequency with which it has been historically cited as a motivator 
of state behavior. There has been a tendency, especially but not exclusively among 
realists, to see prestige as a secondary function of power. Hans J. Morgenthau understood 
“the policy of prestige”—the social, reputational reflection of power—as inseparable 
from power itself.208 Similarly, Martin Wight defined it as “the influence derived from 
power.”209 But this approach oversimplifies the situation, mistaking the ability to inspire 
international fear for the possession of international prestige. Plenty of regimes have 
great material capacity but not are prestigious because prestige is conferred only by social 
recognition. Similarly, some regimes are accorded great international prestige owing to 
non-material factors; these can magnify their influence beyond that granted by their 
material abilities alone. Prestige is simultaneously an end of power, a means to it, and a 
sigil of the normative temperature of international society.  
Historically, amour propre shaped state behavior because it was a key element of 
social standing for the Powers.210 Because these were all dynastic states, there was a deep 
ontological investment in prestige as a fundamental purpose of international life among 
the small coterie of policymakers and monarchs that were, for all intents and purposes, 
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the generators and internalizers of 18th century foreign affairs. Prestige mattered in 
statecraft because it mattered in the minds of statespeople, and it particularly mattered in 
this period because those statespeople spoke a universal language of dynastic prestige 
embedded within a shared Great Power identity. This was famously the case with the 
French doctrine of gloire, the aggrandizement of the king’s reputation to a level in 
keeping with the perceived power and influence of the realm. Under Louis XIV, this 
policy brought France to the brink of war over a conflict of precedence, justified 
aggression in the Low Countries, and magnified the costs of defeat to the point that it was 
unable to refuse battle for fear of dishonor. Of course, France was in good company; 
every Great Power considered its prestige a vital asset of state key to its self-conception 
and place in international society. Spain, trapped in a quagmire of declining material 
capacity paired with vast material and social overextension, allowed its touchiness over 
its declining prospects to be a significant and recurring impediment to the rationalization 
of its policy. Its refusal to countenance a humiliating partition during the War of the 
Spanish Succession preserved most of its territories—but only at the cost of dependence 
on its French allies. Realizing after the fact that it had consented to the loss of its prestige 
in installments rather than all at once, Spain embarked on a series of Italian wars 
motivated by pure vanity that only served to further debase its reputation and accelerate 
its decline from Great Power status. Similarly, British imperialism reflected how the 
Great Power emphasis on prestige could concretely affect international policy. Riding 
high after its triumph in the Seven Years’ War, the United Kingdom possessed the 
leading colonial empire, the world’s foremost navy to defend it, and an excellent military 





advisers were understandably proud of their international position and fearful of the 
implications of disorder in the Thirteen Colonies, so they chose the face-saving quagmire 
of a colonial war over a dishonorable compromise with contumacious colonists. Even 
after it became clear that victory would not be forthcoming, Britain continued the war, its 
efforts succeeding only in convincing the other Powers—a diverse coalition of former 
friends and historic foes—that the time had come to redress its over-mighty attitude. 
They intervened to strip Britain not so much of concrete possessions, but rather of the 
prestige that served as the lifeblood of Great Power status. Once the bearer of 
unquestioned preeminence, Britain had lost the bulk of its empire; it surprised no one that 
it immediately embarked on new colonial ventures in India to restore its former luster. 
c. Systemic Interests 
Transitioning to the innovative balancing category of identity elements, the third 
component of the Powers’ common identity was the extent and character of their 
interests. They understood themselves to be involved in the politics of Europe writ large 
rather than those of a singular region, dynasty, or issue area: their “interests [were] as 
wide as the states-system itself.”211 This meant that every Power was interested in all 
major outcomes affecting the system—that “the justifiability of a national interest claim 
[was]…tied to a systemic conception of international politics: the states' individual 
preferences have to be assessed in terms of the repercussions for all.”212 Thus, most 18th 
century wars ultimately came to involve four or more Powers because the outcome of any 
major conflict usually had too much importance to the system as a whole to permit states 
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to both hide and remain Great. Two issue areas illustrate how the systemic assertion of 
interests influenced the nature of Great Power in the long 18th century. 
i. Changes in the international system’s geographic scope and social focus 
First, as the geographic limit and social focus of the international system changed, 
so did the interests of the Powers. The first iteration of the pan-European system, the 
Introductory Era, united for the first time a north-eastern European sphere of operation 
dominated by the policies of Sweden with that of a south-western sphere centered on the 
policies of France. The Empire, straddling these two worlds, was made the lynchpin 
uniting them when its constitution was subjected to the first Great Power formal-legal 
guarantee. The Powers of this era thus embroiled themselves in conflicts on the Empire’s 
north-western and north-eastern borderlands; in the Franco-Dutch War of 1672-8, for 
example, Sweden invaded the Empire in concert with France’s attack on the Netherlands, 
while Spain joined with Austria and its old Dutch rivals to oppose the Franco-Swedish 
bloc even though its own possessions were not under immediate threat. Similarly, as 
Britain awoke from its stupor and claimed the status of a Great Power, its policies 
adapted to fit the scope of the system it sought to determine. It adopted a continental style 
of warfare at odds with its maritime focus, placed formidable armies in the Low 
Countries and Germany, and intervened in the distant conflict between Sweden and a 
rising Russia. As subsequent changes in the international system shifted the system’s 
scope to south-western Europe (the Classical Era) and overseas to the colonial world (the 
Era of Exhaustion), the Powers likewise shifted. States claiming Great Power status thus 
had to be vigilant throughout the geographic extent of the system, which led to the 





for example, Russia was reacting to faraway events in eastern North America through its 
creation of an anti-British naval league.213  
Similarly, the international system bore a particular locus of social principles that 
mirrored its geographic emphases. Great Powers had to cope thematically with changes 
in the overarching social focus of the right- and responsibility-complex just as they did 
geographically with changes in the international system’s territorial extent. In the 
Introductory Era, dynasticism was the key principle; France undertook multiple wars 
justified by dynastic right and the question of the Spanish succession sparked a global 
war when dynastic principles collided. It was subsequently clear that the resulting 
settlement would have to further dial back the dynastic principle in European politics, 
limiting it to the service of a wider principle of stability. Consequently, the Utrecht 
settlement required formal renunciations by France and Spain of any possibility of future 
union; this was guaranteed by Britain, who in turn received a guarantee from the other 
signatories of the legitimacy of the Hannoverian succession in place of the deposed (and 
ever agitating) Stuart dynasty. In the words of Lucien Bély, 
These renunciations lay at the heart of the European peace, just as the 
accords prior to dynastic marriages had been till this time. The 
commitments of 1712-13 were regarded as a foundation of the public 
good. Thus the natural order and law were reversed and denied for the 
benefit of a rational order and law of nations.214 
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This signaled a shift in the social focus of the international system away from the feudal 
rights and duties conferred by heredity and toward the rational duties of maintaining a 
fluid and continuous balance of power.  
Being a Great Power thus necessitated a certain level of mimetic engagement with 
the social and territorial trends of the international system. As social focus and territorial 
locus shifted, the Great Powers were increasingly drawn into distant conflicts in places 
long peripheral to their interests such as southern Poland and the American frontier. 
Those unwilling to play this game, such as Sweden and the Dutch, gradually withdrew 
from the prerogatives and obligations they had formerly incurred, exiting the Great 
Power game entirely. 
ii. Absence from the system and the decline and loss of Great Power status 
If the assertion of a systemic interest was a sure indicator of Great Power, the 
absence of an asserted state interest in a political issue of systemic importance was the 
surest counter-indicator. Consider three cases of a Great Power losing its status: Sweden, 
the Netherlands, and France. Sweden’s loss to Russia cost it its empire, and its parliament 
responded by scaling back its interests to the politics of the Baltic region. Its only major 
intervention in Great Power politics writ large after 1721, a failed police action against 
Prussia, was framed in terms of its Westphalian guarantee over the Empire and aimed 
only at the restoration of its territories along Pomerania’s Baltic coast; even this ancient 
Great Power formal-legal claim thus concealed a policy of regional, rather than systemic 
interests and aims. While Sweden had little choice to act as it did given its declining 
material capacity, the Dutch republic presents a different case. Even though it had won its 





diplomatic position after having “derived…an important lesson from [its] 
experience…that [it] had little to gain from participation in the contests of the greater 
powers.”215 Consequently, after the 1720s, the Dutch ceased to actively play a role in 
Great Power politics and its requirement to follow where the systemic distribution of 
power led; they had no interest in the developing conflicts of central and eastern 
Europe—nor in “pay[ing] for a great-power policy” and the large fleet it required of 
them.216 Their trade declined, their government apparatus withered, and their military 
became theoretical, resulting in “a decline in the opinion of the other powers . . . which, 
though gradual, was inevitable and of the last importance.”217 In Heeren’s judgment, the 
case of Holland revealed an important truth: “A state passes for the value it sets upon 
itself.”218 One might add, ‘and a Great Power for the scope of its interests’. 
The final case, France, may seem unlikely. After all, France would go on to claim 
hegemony over the European continent before the Westphalian international system 
would finally give way to that of Vienna. Nevertheless, after a century of economic 
profligacy and a series of long-term policy sacrifices for short-term gains, France had 
exhausted itself by the mid-1780s and had ceased to play an active role in Great Power 
politics entirely by the coming of its revolution. The reasons for this were complex and 
interconnected. At home, France had spent itself into an economic hole and invited 
significant social unrest. Its ability to draw on its reserves of material capacity to act as a 
Great Power had been seriously impaired and it abandoned the rights and duties it had 
previously asserted. With its ability to mobilize military strength hamstrung, France was 
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unable to assert its national interests on its own borders, let alone throughout the extent of 
the international system; the French had to sit idly by as their allies in a Dutch civil war 
were crushed by Prussia in 1787.219 Further afield, longtime clients of the barrier de l’est, 
Poland and Turkey, had been subdued by the Prusso-Russo-Austrian troika without any 
consideration of France’s position; those Powers had ceased to include it as a factor in 
their systemic calculations.220 Cuts in funding for the diplomatic corps came in 1788, and 
by the onset of the revolution state diplomacy had “simply withered away.”221 Its 
standing disintegrated as Great Power France finally fell to revolutionary violence. 
d. Participation in a Balance of Power 
A final element of the general Great Power identity was active participation in the 
balance of power. This was closely related to the assertion of systemic interests, but was 
made distinct by its strategic focus. In essence, a state could have a significant share of 
the distribution of material capacity and have interests from one length of the system to 
another, yet still be aloof from the balance of power and the system of fluid diplomacy 
and power-politics that defined it. Commonwealth Britain, a pariah state, is the classical 
example. Though its republican character denied it one key aspect of the Great Power 
identity of its time, it still had significant military capacity, claimed wide geographic 
interests, and formed occasional alliances. Importantly, however, it lacked another 
element of Great Power because it neither considered itself—nor behaved as though it 
was a part of—a systemic balance of power centered on the European continent. It failed 
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to play a significant role in the Thirty Years War, and its strategic ventures were simple 
predation rather than the strategic deployment of state power in support of a particular 
alignment of European forces. After all, this theocratic state saw only enemies in the 
wider world; even the Dutch were influenced by the French and harbored the court of its 
displaced monarch. Under such conditions, the Commonwealth had little incentive to join 
the European balance in support of any coherent, systemic objective, nor to conform its 
language and thinking to a complex of Great Power rights and duties.222 
The United States is a later example. The American republic certainly possessed 
several key elements of Great Power. It had the potential to mobilize a significant share 
of the distribution of material capacity that seemed poised to increase exponentially after 
the stabilization of a national government in 1787, asserted extensive commercial 
interests that would soon lead to multiple overseas interventions, and had demonstrated 
an ability to manipulate the levers of the European balance through coalition-building. Its 
form of government, a non-dynastic republic, was of course a strike against it, but not so 
black a mark as the regicide theocracy of Cromwell. Given these factors, it is not 
impossible to imagine a counterfactual in which the American republic asserted the status 
of a Great Power—had it done so, the schema presented here would take a somewhat 
different form. Yet, it steadfastly refused to be drawn into the European entanglements 
                                                             
222 The British case demonstrates how the social neglect of the balance of power system can 
reduce the effectiveness of a state’s material power. Thus, the Commonwealth’s aloofness from the balance 
of power system acted as a reverse force multiplier of its material power. Most strikingly, after recognizing 
their international isolation and inability to engage with the European balance, the Parliamentarians 
attempted to redress this deficiency by simple imperialism—first attempting to coerce the Dutch into a 
political union by treaty and, later, to destroy their trade by unilateral war. Both efforts failed. Though the 
English fleet had local superiority in the Channel and was able to win multiple victories, the Dutch simply 
rebuilt their fleets, mopped up English colonies, and waited for Cromwell to realize that he could not win 
without allies. England could not be a Great Power as long as it stood apart from the balance and embraced 





that had served as its midwife. It abrogated its treaty with the French, destroyed its own 
commerce to stay out of the Napoleonic wars, and faced the British without the 
participation of any other European Powers. Aloof, the early American republic was not a 
Great Power in fact or in theory. 
II. General Right- and Duty-Claims, 1648-1813 
 
The influence of the identity elements common to all the Powers is detectable in 
their assertion of similar right- and duty-claims (see Table 3.2). These claims and the 
practices innovated in their assertion were employed in support of diverse objectives; 
they were sometimes genuine and sometimes cynical in their application and exerted 
varying levels of normative pull. What matters about them, however, is that they 
delimited a set of normative concepts and practical mechanisms by which Great Powers 
properly conducted their international affairs a shared complex of rights and duties. This 
section explains how they were formulated, classifies them into four thematic 
categories—Dynastic, Territorial, Social-temperate, and Social-assertive—and places 
them alongside instructive examples of their purpose within and influence upon 
international politics (see Figure 3.3 and Table 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3: Developmental Typology of Right- and Duty-claims 
 
a. Dynastic rights and duties 
 
The dynastic category of rights and duties derived from feudal norms. 
Importantly, it was not that alternative means of ordering domestic and international 
politics were unavailable in the 17th and 18th centuries, but rather that the hold of tradition 
was still extraordinarily strong. Consequently, elements of systemic politics like the 
distribution of material capacity and the imperative of calculation found themselves 
poured into a dynastic mold as the old feudal norms of family and property were 
combined with and made to organize the new international system. Patriarchal legitimacy 
was made to coexist—often dissonantly—with the power-political demands of 
international competition, contributing to a semi-archical, relational order based on social 





subsection explores two general claims of this type: the right to dynastic inheritance and 
the duty of dynastic promotion. 
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i. The Right to Dynastic Inheritance 
 
The right to dynastic inheritance was the sine qua non of the 18th century 
patriarchal state. The notion of intergenerational property was tied directly to sovereign 
authority, formulating the basis by which a state defined its territorial extent and justified 
the spilling of blood in its defense. It thus shaped the meaning of Great Power patrimony 
and established the stakes of international statecraft. However, the domestic analogy this 
thinking used to frame the international sphere provided an important point of semi-
archical linkage intruding elements of domestic law into the practice of a formally 
anarchical system of states. Indeed, in the century prior to Westphalia, there was even a 
growing consensus about the inalienability of royal inheritances overriding international 
raison d’état. Legists argued that those lands and honors with which a king began his rule 





of their patrimony.223 Similarly, the idea that rights to inheritance could be renounced for 
the sake of diplomatic convenience began to lose currency during this same period.224 
Concrete, hierarchical elements of domestic law thus penetrated international practice, 
providing a foundation for semi-archical order. 
This had significant consequences for early Great Power behavior, particularly in 
how it restrained territorial change. Because inherited rights were so integral to sovereign 
authority among all the Powers, transgressions against the principle of rightful possession 
could destabilize the whole system. This common focus on the protection of rightful 
patrimony reduced the amount of territorial and titular alienation experienced by defeated 
Powers, rare compared with the drastic shifts of the late medieval and modern periods. 
The most significant examples of alienation of territory by direct conquest were 
Sweden’s loss of its empire to Russia and Austria’s loss of Silesia to Prussia; elsewhere, 
even the bitterest conflicts generally resulted only in the changing-hands of a few cities, 
or in the destruction of border fortresses.225 Instead, the territorial cost of Great Power 
conflict was shunted away from their inherited lands as overseas colonies and middle-
rank powers shouldered the costs of maintaining a semi-archical system of international 
property relations among the mighty. By accepting the derogation of the rights of others, 
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the Powers were able to keep the majority of Europe’s violence capacity—a majority 
they themselves held—bound within a rights-based system of mutual legitimacy. 
A second consequence of this period’s strong inheritance right was that it fostered 
international tensions through its very indissolubility. This had not always been the case. 
Renunciations of future succession rights had accompanied many earlier dynastic 
marriages to ensure the union wouldn’t produce rival claims to the same inheritance 
among later generations. But as the patrimonial right grew absolute, these renunciations, 
formerly a lubricant of diplomacy, became suspect. After all, a great crown was an 
essential right derived from God, who also ordained the great dynasties that transmitted 
those rights through the ages.226 Two major wars—the War of Devolution and the War of 
the Spanish Succession—resulted directly from this thorny issue of whether it was 
possible to renounce the inheritance right. Decades later, an attempt to gain international 
backing for the succession of Maria Theresa in Austria—a deviation from the normal 
course of dynastic succession—created a justificatory right for international intervention. 
The inheritance of a Great Power monarch was thus a precious matter of state disclosing 
problems and possibilities for the entire system. Too often dismissed as mere pretext, 
there was actually a significant normative core to these conflicts that exerted real 
influence. Even Philip IV of Spain, whose daughter’s French marriage would lead to 
multiple wars to the detriment of the Spanish crown, admitted that her renunciation was 
invalid because the right of succession could not be trespassed upon even by a king.227 
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ii. The Duty of Dynastic Promotion 
There was a complementary Great Power duty to assert the interests of one’s 
dynasty. This duty of dynastic promotion derived from a combination of the adaptive 
dynastic elements of Great Power identity, dynastic governance and the pursuit of 
prestige. From the former, it took its focus on blood and inheritance as the basis of 
international territorial competition. From the latter, it took the accumulation of 
patrimonial prestige as the normative coin of the international realm. Since prestige was 
directly tied to measures of both material prosperity and social authority, this created a 
conceptual juncture between the concept of royal dynasty and the fundamental material 
and moral elements of international politics. Thus, “personal gloire, dynastic prestige and 
reason of state often added up to the same thing.”228 These were the fundamental goals of 
political life as understood by early modern monarchs; placed simultaneously at the head 
of great families as well as fabulous concentrations of material capacity, rights, and 
duties, these men and women saw it as their essential purpose to glorify the former by the 
increase of the latter. This could be accomplished through absolute gains, but relative 
gains against competitor houses were preferred. Conversely, failure to obtain a territory 
up for legitimate grabs was a blow to the monarch, his or her family, and the state itself.  
The duty of dynastic promotion exerted its greatest influence during the 
Introductory Era. Ironically, the greatest dynastic victory of this era was achieved by the 
head of a nominal republic. When William III of Orange was presented with the 
opportunity of asserting the claims of his wife to the British throne, he chose to pursue it 
despite the danger that would accompany failure. Of course, his desire to prevent Britain 
                                                             





from drawing closer to France was also a powerful motivator, but the damage to his 
reputation that would have followed from failing in his duty to promote his family’s 
claims would have itself devastated his international standing.229 Unsurprisingly, the 
ultimate withdrawal of the United Provinces from the status of a Great Power was 
accompanied by a rejection of the hereditary position of the Orange dynasty and the 
repudiation of its place in the international system’s dynastic diplomacy.230 
France was the most consistent dynastic player throughout this era. Louis XIV 
eagerly promoted his family’s interests in his early wars, justifying the Devolution War 
not only through the rights of his wife to the Low Countries, but also by his duty to 
protect the rightful inheritance of the royal couple’s son and heir.231 While duty 
facilitated Louis’s ambitions in this case, it limited his freedom of action when his 
grandson inherited the Spanish throne. Though he had earlier supported the partition of 
the Spanish empire as the only irenic solution to the succession issue,232 the ultimate 
bequest of the crown to a member of his own house meant that “it was incumbent on 
[him], as head of the Bourbon dynasty, to press his family’s claim to the inheritance.”233 
This he did despite the transparency of the Spanish king’s attempt to coopt French troops 
in defense of Spanish interests. The ensuing war saw his candidate successfully claim his 
possession, but only as part of a wider peace settlement detrimental to France’s 
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exchequer and prestige.234 While the Bourbon dynasty had gained, the realm of France 
had suffered—and the recognition that the two did not always coincide was important.235 
The Utrecht settlement subsequently attempted to curtail the duty of dynastic 
promotion in the interest of political flexibility. As a part of the treaty, the formal 
separation of the French and Spanish Bourbons was confirmed and guaranteed by the 
strongest of the Powers, Britain, whose participation in the war had been partly motivated 
by the French recognition of the Stuart claimant.236 In exchange, the Powers collectively 
legitimized Britain’s Protestant succession—a significant move that severed generations 
of dynastic connections and effectively limited the potential of dynastic marriages to 
shatter the system. The promotion of family claims to foreign thrones would no longer 
occupy the imperative position in international politics, its turbulent possibilities curtailed 
by the obligations of balance.237 Nevertheless, the duty of dynastic promotion did not 
disappear entirely. Shortly after Utrecht, Spain embarked on a quixotic crusade to obtain 
Italian duchies for its queen’s progeny, sparking the War of the Quadruple Alliance. The 
resulting treaty gave much attention to dynastic issues, including new guarantees of 
collectively-backed royal legitimacy, the partial fulfillment of the Spanish Bourbon’s 
Italian ambitions, as well as a number of territorial transfers that gave the powerful and 
well-connected House of Savoy the crown of Sardinia.238 Yet, both Britain and France 
feared dynastic challengers even after Utrecht, and France’s involvement in the War of 
the Polish Succession was largely motivated by a desire to correct the “mésalliance” of 
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Louis XV by securing his father-in-law—a deposed Polish king—a throne.239 Though 
weakened at Utrecht and increasingly incorporated into the balance of power as a 
subsidiary element, the duty of advancing dynastic interests would continue to be a part 
of Great Power for some time.240 
b. Territorial Rights and Duties 
 
The second category of Great Power claims contains those related to a key 
element of the distribution of power, the control of territory. Two specific right-claims 
fell under this label: the right to isomorphic territorial aggrandizement, commonly called 
a ‘place in the sun’, and the right to assert special sway over lesser powers short of formal 
hierarchical-command relationships, generally through a sphere of influence. 
i. The Right to a ‘Place in the Sun’ 
Prestigious Great Powers were expected to control vast territories and to expand. 
Crucially, this expectation was often motivated more by the pursuit and maintenance of 
social standing than by strategic concerns; what mattered was not so much the size or 
material value of the territory a Power gained but rather that it was keeping up with its 
fellows. The most famous expression of this tendency came in the 19th century rush to 
claim markets and colonize, but its history is somewhat longer and the practices it 
encompassed more varied than simple colonial competition. Though the phrase ‘a place 
in the sun’ originated later (as detailed in Chapter Four), the reality behind it contributed 
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to the nature of Great Power from the very beginning: the right to isomorphic acquisitions 
simultaneously impelled and justified aggrandizement.  
This right was often disruptive. For a long time, it could be satisfied by the 
subjugation of technologically less-sophisticated peoples and the seizure of new colonial 
territory. Terrible as the consequences of this process were, they long remained 
peripheral to Great Power politics since the conflicts they sparked were localized. 
However, as the blank spaces on the American map were gradually filled in and land-
hungry rising powers grew in the east, the territorial prestige expected of a Great Power 
only increased.241 Prussia, the newest and least significant of the Powers, drove this trend. 
Though it had successfully absorbed a portion of Sweden’s empire at the conclusion of 
the Great Northern War and gained for itself a royal crown, its territories remained sparse 
and separated; even the monarch’s title granted by the Emperor (‘King in Prussia’) 
reflected the state’s uncertain position. This uncertainty encouraged the desire of 
Frederick II to make Prussia into a true and independent Power. His brash Silesian wars 
were motivated not by dynastic right or duty, nor by the imperatives of balance, but 
rather by the right he possessed to glorify his regime. Similarly, Russia possessed an 
internal colony in Asia but longed to further westernize its manners and territory. 
Together, Prussia and Russia formed a pincer tightening around the middle-rank power of 
Poland; their desire for empires worthy of Spain, France, and Britain doomed this 
ancient, turbulent state. Austria, worried that its own place in the sun would be eclipsed if 
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Poland was carved up without its consent, joined in despite the ethical reservations of 
Maria Theresa herself.242  
Similarly, the prestige-based roots of this right meant that revanchism, a 
preference for short-term gains, and a focus on relative standing frequently skewed 
rational calculation when a Power’s place in the sun was involved. France exemplified 
this confusion. After its German and American defeats in the Seven Year’s War, its place 
in the sun had been effectively lost. It seethed about this for two decades before an 
opportunity to avenge its defeat presented itself in the form of the American Revolution. 
It enlisted against the British to drag down its enemy’s preeminent prestige rather than to 
advance a coherent grand strategy.243 Indeed, it was sufficient for France to see Britain’s 
own American possessions stripped away at the conclusion of the peace: Britain’s 
humiliation meant more to France than the return of Canada. That this war might prove 
ruinous for the financial and social fabric of the French nation was a concern for only a 
few worried ministers; what mattered at the time was that France, a Great Power, had a 
right to a certain level of prestige that it had lost along with its colonial territory. Only by 
inflicting a similar loss on Britain could its standing be restored and its place in the sun 
confirmed. 
ii. The Right to a Sphere of Influence 
The territorial aggrandizement right was closely related to the right to a sphere of 
influence, itself emanating from three conceptual propositions: lesser powers are features 
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of the international system and therefore of material interest to the Great Powers; they 
have a position in the systemic balance of power and are therefore targets for 
manipulation and coercion; and they are often stakeholders in the same international 
dynastic system so important to the Powers. Together, these facts required the Powers to 
assert their interests within the lesser states, but to do so delicately. This was the right to a 
sphere of influence, the institutional assertion by formal or semi-formal means of a Great 
Power’s controlling interest in a territory without the extinction of the lesser partner’s 
claim to sovereignty. Spheres ordered relations between the Great and lesser powers, 
reducing the risk posed by the latter’s independence to an acceptable level.244 All Powers 
strove to establish spheres, though only a few did so successfully.  
The guarantee at Westphalia was the first attempt to establish semi-formal spheres 
of Great Power influence as a part of a peace settlement. However, Swedish weakness, 
French bellicosity, and Dutch aloofness contributed to the failure of these post-
Westphalian experiments. In contrast, the fecund dynasty of the Habsburg kingdoms was 
able to patch together a wide sphere of influence by marriage and treaty in Italy’s myriad 
duchies and republics. But Russia, unique among the Powers in that its borderland was 
populated solely by weak neighbors, made the most sophisticated use of spheres to 
magnify its power and prestige. Its Swedish rival exchanged its former glory for the 
status of a satellite when Russia acquired a guarantee of its constitution, a mechanism to 
keep the Swedish monarchy weak, humble, and reliant on St. Petersburg.245 In Poland, a 
treaty formalized Russia’s right to “preserve, to defend, and secure the integrity of the 
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republic,” thus providing numerous justifications for future interventions.246 Likewise, 
military success against the Ottomans allowed Russia to guarantee the privileges of the 
Moldavian and Wallachian vassal principalities to its south, creating a thorny issue that 
persisted into the 20th century.247 
Similarly, Tsars declared protectorates in Holstein and the Crimea to further 
Russian authority while preserving elements of local sovereignty, though the ultimate 
goal—a guarantee of the Empire’s constitution and the entrée into western politics it so 
desired—was thwarted by the ambiguous wording of a key treaty.248 But most important 
was the Treaty of Kainardji (1774) formalizing a Russian relationship with Christians 
living in the Ottoman Empire. As Sorel noted, this granted Russia both a right and an 
“obligation to mix in the internal affairs of Turkey whenever the interests of the 
Christians demand it.”249 In all of these cases, a relationship undergirded by a guarantee 
or protectorate allowed Russia to bring a state within its sphere of influence, thus 
lessening the risk posed to Russian interests by territories outside of its formal control. 
Subsequent eras would see the further formalization of the sphere of influence as a 
fundamental component of Great Power politics. 
 c. Social-Temperate Rights and Duties 
 
The rights and duties of the social-temperate category were primarily held in 
relation to the other Powers, i.e. constituted socially as instruments of the society formed 
by those Powers’ interaction. Emphasizing the fundamental likeness of the great states, 
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they were important lubricants of ‘club behavior’ and the building blocks of later 
managerialism. Two claims fall under this category: the duty to display power-political 
restraint and the right to have one’s vital interests taken into consideration. Though they 
obviously did not forestall all Great Power conflict, they nonetheless helped to moderate 
the ultimate form of that conflict by overlaying power-political competition with the 
veneer of an elite international society based on special social recognition. 
i. The Duty of Restraint 
 
As in the early Italian states-system, the Great Powers of the long 18th century 
came to understand that the sum of their interactions bound them together within a 
material and social web. Scholars refer to this web as a ‘system’, while the participants 
themselves used the concept of a European ‘republic’ to convey the same concept.250 This 
republic was a public good aiming at “the stability and mutual independence of its 
members.”251 However, the major participants understood that it was fragile. Should even 
a single Power abrogate its principles, the result could be the replacement of order by 
‘universal monarchy’ or even a return to the transnational chaos of the late 16th century. 
This possibility encouraged the Powers to develop conscious behaviors aimed at its 
preservation. While the balancing of forces was the most visible external example of this 
tendency, each Power held a common duty to restrain its international behavior, 
approaching international ambition and international change with caution.252  
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Though prone to derogation by both accident and intention, the duty of a Great 
Power to act with restraint was internalized within the self-understandings of its 
statespeople, particularly distinguishing itself through the character of the period’s 
warfare and peacemaking. As discussed above, the Great Power wars of this period were 
concluded by peace settlements that sought to preserve face on all sides and to shunt the 
territorial and political costs of the peace onto lesser powers or outside of Europe 
entirely. The Peace of Utrecht allowed Louis XIV to escape without significant territorial 
penalties at home or abroad, while his Spanish allies surrendered only their Italian 
territories as well as Minorca and Gibraltar. The Seven Years’ War peace settlements saw 
massive transfers and exchanges of colonial territories but not a single territorial 
rectification in Europe for fear of alienating the French and Austrians; the cost paid by 
the former overseas and by the latter in prestige was judged high enough in itself. 
Similarly, the treaties concluding the War of the American Revolution—a rare upper-
hand moment for Spain and France—stripped Britain of only a portion of its North 
American empire. But all of these pale in comparison to the War of the Polish 
Succession. It engulfed almost every continental power but its chief combatants, France 
and Austria, “managed the struggle so as to cause no mortal injury to either.”253 The 
war’s English-language chronicler captured this characteristic mood: 
The war had followed the old pattern of the victorious power taking his 
advantages in Italian property; the dignities of hereditary sovereigns, even 
the defeated ones, were preserved; and the side that was getting the worst 
of the military action was allowed to cut its losses and withdraw. Both 
victor and vanquished knew that another round might be played in a few 
years and the forces and alliances might be reversed, as well as the 
fortunes of war. The reverence for hereditary rights mingled with 
playacting here. Stanislas is still king (momentarily), the honor of Louis 
XV is saved, the old cardinal’s position at Versailles is secure, the 
                                                             





emperor has his Pragmatic Sanction, Count Sinzendorff maintains his 
dignity, the army commanders on both sides are dining together amicably 
as they work out details.254 
 
Only the mutual society of the Great Powers—and the duty it embodied to treat one 
another with restraint—could make possible such subtle management of the international 
system by means of minor sovereignty swaps, colonial exchanges, and border 
rectifications. This duty created a measured international politics aimed at the 
preservation of the ‘republic of Europe’. 
ii. The Right to Consideration 
 
The duty of restraint was linked to a right to special consideration based on the 
recognition of vital interests. All Powers pursued prestige, all asserted myriad national 
interests across the length and breadth of their common system, and all were expected to 
restrain their ambitions to preserve a measure of international order. Consideration grew 
from these commonalities; a measure of international empathy facilitated better 
understanding of the system and its probable sources of friction, promoting collaboration 
and conciliation. Both were vital because the distribution of material capacity was 
dynamic rather than static. Shifts in state interest often followed from shifts in capacity, 
and the mutual recognition of such interests—even where seemingly incompatible—was 
an important first step in navigating moments of international friction. As an English 
diplomat remarked during a crisis in the 1730s, the important thing was to find a solution 
that would prove “unexceptionable” to the most interested Great Power parties.255 
The Powers granted one another special consideration in the practice of day-to-
day diplomacy from the beginning—multilateralism, close ambassadorial ties, and the 
                                                             
254 Ibid., 209. 





circulation of formal notes to the Powers in advance of international action all had their 
origins in the early struggle against French hegemony and Spanish dynastic ambitions. 
As they came into closer and closer contact following the Utrecht settlement, the right to 
consideration encouraged peaceful collaboration over common security problems; this 
was notably expressed through Great Power condominiums over Poland, a state subject 
to a periodic power vacuum each time its elective throne came up for purchase. 
Recognizing the security problem inherent in such an arrangement, the three Powers 
neighboring Poland—Austria, Prussia, and Russia—agreed to cooperate on its 
disposition.256 When they eventually partitioned Poland among themselves—an example 
of “co-operative system-conforming conduct”—it was done with maximal consideration 
for their interests and a complete disregard for those of Poland.257 Thus, in the service of 
“reconciling ambitions, the rivalry between which threatened to embroil all Europe,” the 
Powers decided to manage their competition in Poland based on a recognition of their 
shared interests.258 This was only the first instance of “the great powers’ tendency to club 
together as a kind of directorate and impose their will on the states-system.”259 In 
economic terms, the Great Powers were indeed acting as a club even though they justified 
their actions as a public good for all of Europe.260 The consideration granted to one 
another—and pointedly not granted to outsiders like Poland—would prove an important 
and enduring Great Power right.  
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A similar practice derived from the right to consideration was that of awarding 
compensation—territorial and otherwise—to reconfigure the distribution of power.261 
This opened up the possibility of accommodating expansionist Powers within the 
normative structure of a right- and responsibility-complex, and is thus an example of 
restrained system management.262 As noted above, Great Powers needed both land and 
prestige—but they also needed to cloak themselves in the normative couture of the club 
they wished to join. This set up a paradox in that rising Powers had to violate the very 
norms that characterized the status to which they aspired in order to obtain the territory 
and prestige requisite for that status. To wit, for Frederick the Great to confirm the place 
of Prussia within the aristocracy of the Great Powers he had to behave as a ‘mere robber’ 
and steal from other Powers.263 To square this confounding circle, the Powers granted 
special consideration to the power-political demands of the moment by compensating the 
losers in one theatre with advantages elsewhere. This applied primarily to their 
dispossessed clients and satellites; e.g., Louis XV’s father-in-law, blocked by an Austrian 
coalition from claiming the crown of Poland, was assigned the Duchy of Lorraine 
(formerly allied with the Empire) for the span of his life.264 Such compensation set up a 
non-zero sum game among the rising or ‘hungry’ Powers, giving them space in which to 
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fulfill their expansionist desires at the expense of lesser states, while simultaneously 
preserving the principle of dynastic legitimacy through a token redistribution of titles.265  
In the beginning, this worked well: “It was a big pie, and everybody got a 
piece.”266 However, as the scramble for land wore on, the right to territorial compensation 
began to apply not to aggrieved lesser sovereigns, but to the other Great Powers 
themselves. “By the later eighteenth century there was general agreement that if one state 
was about to make territorial gains, then the other great powers should join in and 
demand equal, or equivalent shares.”267 Thus, the right to consideration gradually became 
a key element of the balance of forces. In this century, it displayed an irenic aspect; in 
later periods, it would promote international conflict. 
d. Social-Assertive Rights and Duties 
 
Where the social-temperate rights and duties emphasized the fundamental 
likeness of the Powers—and the consequent tendency for them to club together—the 
social-assertive rights and duties tended to normalize their competition. Once claimed, 
Great Power was a status that had to be constantly and consciously maintained, both by 
the preservation of a plurality share of the systemic distribution of material capacity as 
well as through the continuation of certain behavioral patterns reflecting social status. 
This basic impulse for social and material self-preservation engendered two special 
claims. One was the right to a quasi-hierarchical diplomatic precedence. The other was 
the duty to balance the distribution of forces to preclude the rise of a truly hegemonic 
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‘universal monarchy’. Together, these allowed the several Powers to cope with the 
disparities in capacity and prestige that divided them. 
 
 
i. The Right to Precedence 
 
As late medieval gave way to early modern, the traditional understanding of 
diplomatic precedence as reflecting a crown’s antiquity transitioned into to a new system 
of ranking based upon state power and prestige. As noted above, this was partly owing to 
the ability of a few wealthy states—the nascent Great Powers—to establish significant 
diplomatic networks of agents with the full ambassadorial title. Since diplomacy was thus 
linked to material capacity, the right to such networks and titles became a special 
provenance of the Powers.268 Importantly, it was a special sign of Great Power—held as 
it was over the lesser powers—as well as an elementary indicator of an ordering among 
the Powers themselves.269 Derived from the common Great Power pursuit of prestige, 
diplomatic primacy both reflected existing levels of prestige and registered changes in its 
international distribution.  
The registering of one such change in 1661 brought Spain and France to the brink 
of war. Spain, whose long near-hegemony under Charles V and his descendants had 
earned it the highest titles and largest territories, expected pride of place in most 
diplomatic courts despite its decline. Louis XIV, just exiting his minority, issued 
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instructions to his ambassadors abroad declaring that “le roi ne se contente jamais de 
l’égalité, mais doit avoir la prééminence” over the other crowns.270 When the Spanish 
ambassador and his retinue decided to assert their traditional right of precedence by force 
at a procession in London, the French resisted and a riot ensued that left dead from both 
sides on the streets and the French party in ignominious retreat. When the news reached 
Louis, he made preparations for war and severed diplomatic relations; the king of Spain 
was forced to publicly concede French preeminence before his court to avert hostilities. It 
was a significant victory for the French, and established Louis at the very outset of his 
active political life as the first monarch among the Powers.271 
Precedence is a difficult right to frame in modern terms, but it is important to 
recall that prestige was actually a goal in its own right rather than merely a means to 
some more elemental end. Though precedence would be among the first Great Power 
rights to weaken, the right to mark one’s place in the formal-legal diplomatic hierarchy of 
Europe was an important component of an 18th century Great Power’s self-understanding 
and, indeed, the fundamental ontological security of its statespeople. It is why Louis XIV 
took so many of the decisions that he did, why the electorate of Brandenburg schemed to 
claim a crown, and why Russia sought incorporation into the diplomatic system (among 
many other cases). The formalization of status through precedence was thus a method of 
concretizing not only changes in the distribution of material capacity, but the recognition 
of Great Power itself. 
ii. The Duty to Balance 
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Finally, Great Powers understood themselves to be a part of a system (or republic) 
within which no single Power could establish a hierarchical ‘universal monarchy’. This 
‘public good’ benefited all the system’s stakeholders by warding off the twin evils of 
chaotic transnational disorder and oppressive transnational order. The corollary of this 
realization was that the maintenance of division was the essential purpose of the system, 
and that its most powerful members shared the duty of balancing their forces so as to 
frustrate the ambitions of any over-mighty peer. This duty was not altruistic—Powers 
balanced not to aid their friends but to protect themselves—but its self-interestedness 
could not conceal its simultaneous status as a social tie contributing to the meaning and 
purpose of international power. 
Few subjects have been commented on with such frequency as the balance, and 
examples of it in action readily spring to the mind of any student of international affairs; 
in this era, the coalition-building of the United Provinces, the defection of Britain from 
the anti-Bourbon alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession, and the collective 
reaction of the Powers to Britain’s time of troubles in the 1780s are all salient cases. 
Importantly, the duty to balance was derived from the rational operation of the 
international system and, just as in its first iteration in 15th century Italy, it frequently 
found itself at odds with the adaptive dynastic norms of patrimonial advancement and the 
need for glory. This tension made itself known at key junctures: in the Utrecht 
settlement’s invocation of balance as a limitation to the universal principle of inheritance; 
in the ‘diplomatic revolution’ that united France and Austria in contravention of decades 
of enmity; and in the successive partitions of Poland, which placed the requirements of 





point is the tendency of the duty to balance to coopt and incorporate other Great Power 
rights and duties. As noted above, the right to consideration (and its accompanying 
practice of territorial compensation) became incorporated into the operation of the 
balance by century’s end in concert with the growth of a territorial politics of spheres of 
influence. This propensity of the balance to gather up and guide the other rights and 
duties would grow in subsequent decades. 
III. Great Power Roles 
 
Each Power adapted the right- and duty-claims of the shared identity to its own 
social and material context. This translated the rights and duties available to the Powers 
generally into a specific Great Power role cognizant of parochial aspirations and 
limitations (see Figure 3.4). While the identity derives from general pressures operating 
more or less evenly across the whole of the international system, Great Power roles begin 
with a number of parochial concerns, including a particular state’s geographic position, 
its military strength, and its domestic culture. From these myriad factors come the 
primary objectives, needs, and reasons of state—discrete ‘national interests’. In turn, 
these interests are elided with the rights and duties considered proper to all Great Powers. 
Their combination produces a number of right- and duty-claims unique to a specific 
Great Power role.  
In the long 18th century, there were three general groupings of roles. The first of 
these included those Powers whose domestic characteristics encouraged a focus on the 
accumulation of dynastic prestige. The second was comprised of those whose 
geostrategic positions encouraged a focus on the balance of power and the maintenance 





subsection will analyze these groupings comparatively, identifying the overall trends at 
work. Two general antitheses will guide a final analysis: the role’s assertive or 
preservative character and its orientation toward either balancing or traditional norms. 
 
Figure 3.4: Components of a Great Power Role 
 
a. Dynasty, Prestige, and the Perils of Social Position 
In the first grouping of roles, the domestic imperatives of states combined with 
their Great Power identity to produce an emphasis on dynastic advancement and 
territorial consolidation. France, Austria, and Spain all fell into this category, but their 
similarities did not make for identical outcomes. France pursued an active policy of 
dynastic aggrandizement that diminished only slightly over time. Spain, beginning from a 
position of weaker material strength and different geographic focus, vacillated between 
focusing on the desperate preservation of its existing empire and actively asserting itself 
as a traditional Great Power before finally settling into a strongly-preservationist siege 





legitimacy of its imperial writ; ultimately, however, it came to accept the need to set 
aside tradition in the service of Great Power consideration and balance. 
i. France: Dynastic Assertiveness and Gloire 
France was particularly committed to feudal norms of dynasty and prestige. It 
thus centered its role on the dynastic and territorial aggrandizement of the Bourbon 
patrimony. Each of the primary inputs of French state interest in this period—its military 
power, its geographic position, and its culture—either enabled or impelled France to 
adopt policies aimed at the assertion of its aspirations to primacy. Materially, France held 
a plurality of the European distribution of capacity for much of this era. Though periodic 
difficulties in extracting and mobilizing said power would plague it, its unparalleled 
reservoirs of wealth, people, and material could only be restrained in wartime by a 
coalition of other Powers. Geographically, its Spanish and Italian borders were secure, 
and its eastern and northeastern borders were populated by a number of tempting imperial 
morsels far from Vienna but close to Paris. Such a situation was permissive of 
adventurism, and the French state—“fundamentally dynastic, from the top to the 
bottom”—reflected a wider French cultural emphasis on the aggressive acquisition of 
glory and prestige for one’s family.272 The 1658 triumph over its much-envied Spanish 
rival finally erased the series of dynastic line failures, royal minorities, and freak 
accidents that—when combined with the turbulent wars of religion and aristocratic 
particularism that plagued it for almost a century—had long debased the prestige of the 
French crown and invited foreign intervention in French politics. A century had been lost 
in internal conflict, and the French state consequently had a multitude of grievances to 
                                                             





settle that were rooted in the desire to solidify its social preeminence after a long period 
in the wilderness. This was reflected in the self-consciously dynastic foreign policy 
adopted by Louis XIV in the Low Countries and Spain and by Louis XV in Poland; the 
“end goal in all of this was to strengthen the hold of the Bourbon dynasty on the realm 
and enhance its prestige on the international stage.”273   
Unsurprisingly, the addition of the rights and duties disclosed by the Great Power 
identity to this volatile combination of domestic imperatives made for a pugnacious 
French Great Power role. The Great Power rights of inheritance, dynastic promotion, and 
the accumulation of prestige provided a dynastic impetus, a formal-legal justification, and 
a social incentive to glorify family and state by rolling back the House of Habsburg’s 
territorial position. For 18th century France, being a Great Power thus meant that it had a 
special claim of right over these regions—the Low Countries by the Bourbon right of 
devolved inheritance and the Netherlands by virtue of France’s right to avenge its 
prestige upon its upstart (and republican) former client. Later, the translation of these 
Bourbon rights further afield thrust upon France the necessity of defending claims to the 
Spanish and Polish thrones. That both these prizes were bridges too far did not matter 
because a special duty claim attached itself to Great Power France: French kings had to 
bow to the dictates of a “highly traditional sense of obligation and chivalry” to avoid 
losing face, prestige, and their claim to be the ‘sun court’ around which the rest of Europe 
rotated.274 Louis XV exemplified this element of French Great Power when he returned 
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the fruits of France’s conquests at the end of the War of the Austrian Succession, 
considering it beneath his dignity to barter them as would a “merchant.”275 
Successive defeats failed to convince France to modify its role and adopt a new 
understanding of its own Great Power, but the notion of European leadership was 
difficult to cast off for a state that saw itself as “the greatest European power and the 
focus of European civilisation.”276 France did slightly relax its focus on dynastic 
legitimism and reduced its formerly high level of assertiveness in international affairs, 
reflecting the realization that its ability to mobilize its material capacity was not proving 
equal to its ambitions.277 However, this shift toward a preservationist posture 
foreshadowed the sclerosis that began to take hold of the ancien régime in the last quarter 
of the 18th century—an economic and social ennui that ultimately insulated the substance 
of France’s Great Power role from radical reform. When France intervened on the side of 
the American rebels to repay Britain for the loss in prestige it had suffered in 1763, 
prestige was the primary element it claimed at the negotiating table for the peace that 
followed. Similarly, French support of the Dutch Patriot Revolt echoed Louis XIV’s 
policy of gloire and aggrandizement despite the revolt’s political principles; in this case, 
however, France was unable to effectively intervene because it was bankrupt. This 
probably spared it a war with Prussia and Britain, but also dispelled what was left of 
France’s international reputation. Along with it vanished the role of dynastic aggrandizer 
that had guided its policy for over a century. 
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France’s special relationship with dynastic right and its fixation on the duties 
associated with being Europe’s preeminent state reveal something important: when a 
Power stands in the first rank of the first rank, there can be a troubling combination of 
power-political temptation and social pressure to exhibit certain behaviors. A powerful 
state is encouraged by the logic entailed in its social understanding of power to act in a 
certain way because to act differently would be to undermine its status.278 In France’s 
case, it was the leading dynastic, prestige-seeking state among a network of such states; 
this necessarily encouraged it to invest in policies along those lines. Eventually, 
blowback set in as it followed its natural, normative pursuit of its rights and duties 
straight into bankruptcy and decline. This shows how preeminence can be a heavy burden 
for a Power to bear. 
ii. Spain and Austria: Dynastic Preservation 
 
Spain and Austria, the other two dynastically-oriented Powers, had both emerged 
from the strife of the early 17th century chastened by the material and social shifts 
occurring around them. Consequently, the Great Power roles they adopted were aimed at 
the preservation of their respective territories and social statuses in the face of potential 
stagnation or decline. These two realms faced similar geographic and military challenges, 
including only tenuous control of their nominal dominions.279 Culturally, they shared a 
common Habsburg heritage harkening back to what were happier days for them both. 
They clung tightly to this legacy, a prideful focus on medieval traditions that would be a 
direct antecedent of the War of the Spanish Succession. Both were fiercely protective of 
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the roles and prerogatives they had inherited from former times—Spain in the Indies and 
Austria and Germany—even as those prerogatives became more and more difficult to 
assert. Similarly, both came to recognize their increasing weaknesses, and both produced 
rulers—Joseph II and Charles III—whose attempts to reform and modernize their 
monarchies to restore greatness were ahead of their time. Both adapted the general Great 
Power identity to aid in their struggle against decline, but here they diverged. Spain was 
motivated by an entirely reactionary ethos based on the inherited concepts and practices. 
In contrast, Austria’s burst of reluctant amoral assertiveness under Maria Theresa—an 
event that inaugurated the extension of Austrian territory and Austrian interests 
eastward—was a difficult, but vital, step in slowing its decline relative to the other 
Powers by renovating its role.  
Austria’s Great Power role was one of dynastic preservationism and the 
management of relative decline, first through the assertion of tradition-based rights and 
duties but later by an acceptance of new claims derived from power-political innovations. 
In the beginning, Austria was obsessed with claims derived from dynastic inheritance and 
the pursuit of prestige; indeed, the heart of its Great Power existence was its right to the 
elective imperial office.280 Similarly, its obligation to further the ancient claims of the 
House of Habsburg’s many branches led it to articulate a right to a special sphere of 
influence over the other German states. Its duty to manage the internal affairs of 
Germany by guiding its dynastic makeup occupied an enormous amount of Austria’s 
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attention and political capital, especially when Louis XIV was at the height of his 
ambitions for French royal dynastic absorption of the western imperial principalities. 
Similarly, Prussia’s own Great Power role it threatened Austria’s special German claims; 
an organized military power capable of defeating Austria was suddenly located within 
Germany itself, and it came complete with an alternative dynastic pole centered on the 
House of Hohenzollern.  
In response, Austria began to gradually alter its Great Power role.281 Where once 
it had been the bastion of European tradition and dynasticism—it now began to 
cautiously embrace the innovative rights and duties asserted by Britain, Prussia, and 
Russia.282 Its humiliation by Prussia encouraged it to undertake a ‘diplomatic revolution’ 
and ally with its ancient French enemy. After its failure to cow Prussia and retake Silesia 
in the Seven Years’ War, it resigned itself to a new balance of power within Germany 
based on the fait accompli of Prussian Great Power rather than the formal prerogatives of 
the Austrian emperor. In a particularly telling episode, Maria Theresa reluctantly 
committed Austria to a policy of collaboration with Prussia and Russia in the theft of 
Polish territory on only the flimsiest of legal pretexts. Frederick the Great’s famous quip, 
“she wept, but she still took,” aptly summarized Austria’s difficult transition from feudal 
to modern international politics.283 Her successor, Joseph II, was less hesitant than his 
mother in adopting new ideas and now power-political methods, making the reform of 
Austria’s confusing, semi-feudal government and diplomacy a primary aim of his 
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reign.284 Moving away from its former role as the defender of dynasty and traditional 
prerogatives (and its preference for traditional sources of order over modern ones), 
Austria instead began to embrace a proto-mangerialist role based on Great Power 
collaboration. By the onset of the French Revolution, it had thus arrived at “a policy half 
of legality and half of piracy,” midway between old and new.285 
Spain began just like Austria, a preservationist power content in its dynastic 
position and focused on the assertion of its traditional rights and duties.286 After the loss 
of its Belgian and Italian patrimony, it jerked toward an assertive policy of territorial and 
dynastic aggrandizement in an attempt to regain lost lands and lost prestige. By century’s 
close, however, its Great Power status was severely weakened; only in concert with 
France or Britain could Spain play the Great Power game. To the extent that a coherent 
role can be drawn from this varied history, Spain’s was focused around the recognition of 
decline and the eager desire not to manage, but to reverse it. Like Austria, it had to devote 
much of its energy in this period to the protection of a wobbly dynasty and the 
preservation of its prestigious Italian, Belgian, and American territories, areas where it 
strongly asserted a special right to regulate trade by special powers over foreign vessels. 
The other Powers generally assented to this special claim; despite a series of defeats in 
the global wars of the 18th century, the general colonial integrity of Spain would remain a 
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matter of recognized international custom that persisted even after Spain had clearly 
surrendered its Great Power positition.287 To reverse its decline, it embarked on ventures 
of dynastic conquest in Italy and gambled much on a series of ‘family compacts’ first 
with Austria and later with France. Carried along into multiple wars, Spain’s eagerness to 
act as a Great Power gradually led it down the primrose path of French clientage. 
In sum, the lesson to be drawn from the cases of Spain and Austria is that Great 
Powers experiencing relative or absolute decline face two paths. First, they can attempt to 
translate the special rights and duties they hold by virtue of their Great Power identity 
into particular claims of authority buttressing existing territorial and social arrangements. 
To an extent, this is merely the attempt to use any and all means to hold on to material 
capacity and social position. But it is also more since the declining Power will attempt to 
lend an aura of permanence and legitimacy to elements of its existence that would not 
have been so framed in more prosperous periods. A Great Power facing decline can thus 
try to embed the terms of its existence and the particularity of its role within the context 
of the system itself, justifying and legitimating its continued existence as a Power. Spain 
would ultimately repeat its claims about its colonies and the honor due it in Europe until 
the Powers finally decided that its role could be dispensed with. 
However, Powers can resist this temptation and chart a different course by 
reconstructing their role. Austria sensed the threat to its relevance in Germany posed by 
its inability to manage Prussia; unable to recover its old prerogatives, it henceforth 
determined to, in the words of Maria Theresa, “agir à la prussienne.”288 After two failed 
                                                             
287 Only after several years of de facto independence in the 1810s and 1820s would Spain’s 
American colonies gain widespread European recognition; see Fabry, 49-68. 





wars based on its hereditary right to Silesia, it reversed course and stopped talking about 
the legitimacy of its claims there. Instead, it acted to secure its future status by 
proclaiming, jointly with the young-blood Powers of Prussia and Russia, its right to a 
sphere, to consideration, and to act forcefully to secure its place in balance of power in 
tumultuous regions such as Italy, the Balkans, and Poland. It even accepted the 
dissolution of the Empire—its most ancient wellspring of rights and duties—with 
relatively good grace, securing in the process a leading position in post-Napoleonic 
Germany. Thus, the embrace of isomorphic Great Power innovation ably served even the 
most feudal of European courts.  
b. Holland, Britain, and the Duty of Balancing 
 
Britain and the United Provinces shared a role—and, in William of Orange, a 
ruler—for a significant portion of this period. Their similar geographic, military, and 
cultural circumstances conditioned them to define their Great Power experience around 
the European balance of power and their unique positions within it as coalition-builders 
and rectifiers of imbalance. In contrast to the traditional, dynastic roles asserted by 
France, Spain, and Austria, these roles were expressions of the increasing dominance of 
systemic thinking in international affairs. 
The inputs of geography, military strength, and culture united the United 
Provinces and Britain. Geographically, they were both strong naval and colonial powers, 
with a sizeable share of their prestige and power deriving from overseas trade. 
Strategically, France was the central threat. Culturally, they had both escaped French 
clientage in the late 17th century by means of domestic revolution, and they shared a 





absolutist sentiment. Militarily, they were dominant naval powers who nonetheless had 
the material capacity and extractive capability needed to field armies equal to those of 
their continental peers, and both understood that French dominance of one would threaten 
the security of the other. Consequently, with the accession of the United Provinces to the 
status of Great Power through the restoration of William III and that of Great Britain 
through the rejection of James II, both sought to contain Louis XIV by means of 
international alliances and coalition warfare. This two-decade long undertaking would 
see them develop a nascent understanding of their special duty to manage the European 
balance of power.  
Even before French power was fully contained, these maritime powers were 
spearheading initiatives to manage the seemingly imminent struggle over the Spanish 
succession, negotiating multiple partition treaties designed to ensure that the breakup of 
the Spanish empire would be balanced to preserve European stability. When these treaties 
failed to restrain the ambitions of the dynastic powers and brought about a global war, 
they likewise managed the conflict. They entered the war in support of the Austrian 
candidate to the Spanish throne, the emperor’s brother. However, when the emperor died 
in the middle of war, his position was inherited by the very brother who had claimed the 
throne of Spain. For the maritime powers, the reunion of Austria and Spain would have 
been an unacceptable reconfiguration of the balance of power. When, after a long 
struggle, “France’s capability had been reduced to that of a one-theatre power, like 
Portugal,” and their goal of containment had been accomplished, Britain and the United 
Provinces exited the war.289 By abandoning Austria and its dynastic claim to Spain (the 
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formal-legal basis of their coalition), the maritime powers chose to preference the needs 
of the systemic balance over the adaptive dynastic norms of legitimacy.290 Britain would 
further infuriate Austria by guaranteeing “ill-gotten” Prussian and Savoyard territorial 
gains after their later struggle against them in the War of the Austrian Succession.291 
Theirs was a role based on the duty of the balance, before which all other concerns—
including honor—were secondary. 
Though the Netherlands withdrew from the balance of power and abandoned its 
Great Power role, Britain continued to promote measured, preservationist interference. It 
emphasized the importance of managing change through the promotion of Great Power 
amity, but its own desire to solidify the basis of its Protestant Hanoverian dynasty and the 
security of its overseas commerce came to cloud its thinking by mid-century.292 After all, 
the Britain of 1720 had three important components that the Britain of 1690 lacked: a 
significant foothold on the continent (Hanover), Mediterranean strongholds (Gibraltar 
and Minorca), and unquestioned naval superiority. With these advantages came the 
temptation to disregard the balance in favor of British interests. It increasingly focused on 
the expansion of its trade and colonial territory and assumed, by virtue of its naval 
strength, special prerogatives over international maritime activity; in so doing, it helped 
to extend the scope of the European system across the Atlantic.293 This altered how it 
expressed its Great Power role, moving away from a focus on the systemic preservation 
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of a stable balance and toward the assertion of a very traditional prestige-focused role 
reminiscent of the heyday of Spain’s global empire. This role, based on colonial and 
imperial impulses, would be badly shaken by its losses in the American Revolution, but 
the expansion of its involvement in India shortly thereafter (under the same Charles 
Cornwallis defeated at Yorktown) expressed the continuation of this role even in the face 
of adversity. 
Thus, roles based on the maintenance of the balance of power proved unstable 
over the course of 18th century politics. Of the Powers embracing them, one exhausted 
itself and determined that it had more to lose than to gain from its role while the other 
found that the restraint and consideration necessary for the role meshed poorly with an 
increasingly-predominant share of the distribution of material capacity. These cases 
demonstrate that the managerial spirit which lay at the heart of the ‘holder of the balance’ 
role was not yet sufficiently developed to overcome two important challenges: the 
alluring idea of ‘splendid isolation’ from the troubles of the international system and the 
temptation to aggrandize one’s special rights and duties when in a position of material 
preeminence.294 
c. Russia and Prussia: Assertion, Aggrandizement, and Legitimacy 
 
The final category of roles embraces Russia and Prussia. Late-comers to Great 
Power, they shared an approach cognizant of their status as newcomers and outsiders. 
Their roles were consequently the least systemic-minded and the most parochial and self-
focused of the Powers. Russia had originated outside of the European system, and had to 
fight a series of wars to come—territorially and conceptually—into Europe. Prussia 
                                                             






gained its status by successfully challenging both its imperial overlord and the traditional 
norms governing international conquest. Militarily and geographically, they both earned 
their positions by the sword and were deeply concerned with the social and material 
precariousness of those gains. In Russia’s case, this created a security dilemma that it 
tried to solve by consistent expansion. In Prussia’s, widely scattered and non-contiguous 
holdings led it to develop a garrison-state mentality in which its very existence was 
predicated on the prestige of its arms. Consequently, their respective Great Power roles 
were shaped by the pursuit of prestige, spheres of influence, and, ultimately, a right to 
receive consideration from the older Powers.  
Russia’s Great Power role was expressed through the assertive, century-long 
project to expand its western hinterland and solidify its place in the European system 
discussed above. Initially, this was accomplished through simple conquest. But it quickly 
learned that the territories of the east were susceptible to institutionalized manipulation 
and informal control—the pen could gain it as much as the sword. Special claims to 
political and religious rights and duties actuated its policy, exemplified by the Treaty of 
Kutchuk Kainardji (1774): 
[Its] most important clauses were those in which the religious and political 
imperceptibly blended. The right to erect a “Russo-Greek Church” in the 
suburb of Galata might at first seem insignificant, but it was the first 
concession of this nature since the Turks had established their rule over 
Christian subjects, and thus became . . . a symbol in stone of the rising 
power of Russia. The right of pilgrimage to the holy places . . . had a 
similar sentimental value. But most important of all was the loosely 
worded Article VII, which pledged the Porte to protect the Christian 
religion, and allowed the Russian minister to make representations “en 
toute occasion” in favour of those serving the new Russian Church. The 
Porte was bound to receive his remarks as coming “from a neighbouring 
and sincerely friendly Power.” From this clause dates that ill-defined 
protectorate over the Orthodox Christians of the East which Russia was 





being blended of moral authority, true religious sentiment and naked 
imperialistic greed, was to survive in a new form even after the Powers 
had fought a war to end it.295 
 
From this point forward, Russia’s Great Power role would be concerned with the 
special political prerogatives it had gradually carved out in the course of its march 
westward: Russia as Orthodox protector and de facto overlord of the east. As its special 
claims to rights and prerogatives added up, its desire to have its prestige recognized by 
the powers of the west would impel it to demand recognition of its formal precedence and 
legitimacy. In the years leading up to the French Revolution, it almost succeeded in 
obtaining a guarantee of the German constitution (a right to intervene in support of the 
status quo throughout the entire Holy Roman Empire) that would have made it the arbiter 
of European politics. 
Prussia’s role focused on its quest for prestige in Germany. This had several 
components, including successful efforts at territorial aggrandizement that left it with 
widely-scattered, non-contiguous possession, eastward expansion at the expense of 
secondary states, and the maintenance of its army as the core state institution. Whatever 
lesser power paid the price, the real target in all of this was the hegemony of the 
Habsburg dynasty; as a Great Power, Prussia chafed at the formal superiority and prestige 
of Austria, and exerted every effort to attain at least practical equality in status and 
power. Its diplomacy within Germany was consequently centered on the manipulation of 
key German electorates in an effort to put together a counterbalance. To the extent that 
Prussia translated the general identity of a Great Power into unique claims of right and 
duty, it claimed a right to exist as a Great Power equal to Austria. This it did in spite of 
                                                             





feudal formalities, German law, international norms, and received wisdom.296 
Consequently, it was the most ‘rational’ and modern of the Powers, initially asserting its 
state interests as it saw fit with only the thinnest of normative veneer. As it matured, it 
began to focus on the common Great Power right to consideration, using it to draw its 
onetime enemies into collaborative relationships. Having gained a measure of 
international acceptance, Prussia gradually settled down into a more traditional role based 
on the preservation of the prestige it had acquired through non-traditional means. This 
preservation was yoked to a reactionary sense of tradition, signaling a monarchical 
reaction to growing liberalism. When Dutch Patriots imprisoned the Prussian king’s 
sister, he invaded over the objections of France and crushed the rebellion in the name of 
dynastic duty.297 Prussia had come full circle, once the disrupter of the status quo but now 
the defender of the traditional order. 
The cases of Russia and Prussia illustrate how rising powers articulate Great 
Power roles designed to secure and concretize their new position. Having seized and 
proven its share of the distribution of power on the battlefield, Russia developed a 
complex series of special rights and duties designed to enshrine its sphere of influence in 
formal-legal terms through protectorates and treaty guarantees, adopting the language and 
practices of the European states-system. Prussia’s story is much the same, though its 
turbulent rise through the middle of the 18th century was capped by somewhat less subtle 
processes of territorial predation. Once secure in its position, its policy turned toward a 
more traditional focus on the maintenance of its prestige and the legitimacy of its place 
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among the Great Powers. In both cases, the assertion of status was matched by attempts 
to concretize it through peer recognition; having successfully upset the system—Russia 
by crushing Sweden, Prussia by humiliating Austria—these Powers were quick to adapt 
their behavior to prevailing standards. Importantly, however, in doing so they emphasized 
not old feudal traditions, but the rationally-intuited needs of power politics and 
international balance. Hence, the division of the east through partitions was carried out by 
Great Powers, for Great Powers and was based on the right of these powerful states to 
behave exceptionally and in concert. This was a right that was checked not by law, but 
instead by the rights and duties they held in relation to one another. As the strong did 
what they would and the weak suffered what they must, a nascent managerialism based 
on the special norms of Great Power interaction was gradually taking shape. 
d. Conclusion: Great Power Roles Compared, 1648-1787 
The Great Power roles of the long 18th century changed over time, and 
generalizable trends can be extrapolated from their historical development. The Powers 
that particularly embraced traditional norms of dynasty and feudal prestige found those 
principles to be untenable as time wore one. All had suffered significant defeats by mid-
century, and each adjusted international behavior in recognition of the fact that hereditary 
right was being modified and partially subsumed by international balance. Austria 
underwent a significant change as it replaced force for legal argument in its approach to 
its eastern hinterland, a precursor to the later international sangfroid it would display in 
its post-Napoleonic redrawing of the European map. Spain, buoyed by the Bourbon 
accession, underwent a period of increased assertiveness in the 1720s and again in the 





sought to rebuild its domestic government and international prestige. France changed the 
least, altering its assertive and traditional international role only in response to two global 
defeats. Even then, the French policies and attitudes of the 1780s differed little from 
those of the 1710s save that dynastic legitimism counted for slightly less in the eyes of 
Louis XVI than in those of his great-grandfather. French support for rebellions against 
hereditary rulers might seem to indicate a rationalist turn, but even these were motivated 
more by an old-fashioned desire for prestige than by strategic calculation.  
The two systemic balancing powers, Britain and the United Provinces, were more 
sui generis. The Dutch were in the game primarily to fend off universal monarchy and 
would do so by means of any alliance or backstab necessary; their role underwent no 
significant change before it was dropped entirely. In contrast, Britain grew more assertive 
as time wore on; after it had cowed its French and Spanish rivals in the Seven Years’ 
War, it adopted a more imperial role that was less cognizant of the importance of balance 
than of its increasingly-preeminent status. The coalition this provoked against it, though 
successful, would not prevent this conception of the United Kingdom’s Great Power role 
from reasserting itself in later years. 
Finally, the rising Powers of Russia and Prussia were cast in a very cynical and 
calculating mold but grew conservative and traditional over time. Russia, concerned with 
establishing its respectability within Europe, strove to articulate its post-1721 westward 
expansion in western terms; this led it to establish a series of formal-legal rights, duties, 
guarantees, and protectorates through treaty. Together, these comprised a significant 
Russian sphere of influence the management of which encouraged Russian assertiveness 





its theft of Silesia, Prussia would come to focus more and more on the preservation of the 
status it had compelled Europe to recognize by force of arms. This became possible 
initially as it chose to enter into a conciliatory process of active collaboration with its 
former rivals over the territorial disposition of the east and accelerated after the death of 
Frederick the Great had removed a militant ruler famous for his brazen disregard of 
traditional norms. At the same time, Prussia lost much of its vitality, transitioning from 
the role of enfant terrible of the states-system to being a powerfully conservative force 
eager for order. 
Thus, the trend was one of convergence toward a middle-ground between 
rationally-derived, pragmatic norms and traditionally-received, inherited ones as well as 
between assertive and preservative attitudes toward system stability. By the outbreak of 
the French Revolution, the Powers had collectively abrogated many norms related to 
dynastic right and the pursuit of honorable prestige, yet they had also proven unwilling to 
abandon the old forms wholesale in favor of a pure balance of power system. Prestige 
still mattered, and the Powers still required one another’s recognition and social esteem. 
Great Power thrones still remained largely inviolable, even if colonies and, increasingly, 
provinces were not. Precedence still demarcated Great Powers from lesser powers—
especially as the right to consideration fostered Great Power collaboration against lesser 
states—even if the balance of power had on multiple occasions rendered the over-mighty 
‘preeminent’ powers ineffective pariahs. War was endemic, but the stakes still remained 
low compared to the past or to what was to come. As the system of the classical balance 
of power drew to a close with the first coalition against revolutionary France, this 





and power would give way to a much more unstable intermixture of change and 









PROGRESS WITHOUT CHANGE: 
RISING POWERS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
‘Here’s this huge [German] empire, stretching half over central Europe—an empire 
growing like wildfire. I believe, in people, and wealth, and everything. They’ve licked the 
French, and the Austrians, and are the greatest military power in Europe. I wish I knew 
more about all that, but what I’m concerned with is their sea-power. It’s a new thing with 
them, but it’s going strong, and that Emperor of theirs is running it for all it’s worth. He’s 
a splendid chap, and anyone can see he’s right. They’ve got no colonies to speak of, and 
must have them, like us. . . . I don’t blame [the Germans],’ said Davies, who for all his 
patriotism, had not a particle of racial spleen in his composition. ‘I don’t blame them. . . . 
We can’t talk about conquest and grabbing. We’ve collared a fine share of the world, and 
they’ve every right to be jealous. Let them hate us, and say so; it’ll teach us to buck up and 
that’s what really matters’. 
 
- Erskine Childers, The Riddle of the Sands (1903)298 
 
The previous chapter documented how a complex of Great Power rights and 
responsibilities contextualized power through purposive identities and roles; its ordering 
influence was evident in the relatively continuous political configurations and controlled 
patterns of violence characteristic of the 18th century. This chapter moves forward to the 
19th century to study how that complex was able to reproduce itself even in the face of 
that century’s novel forces of change. It makes two important points. First, the 
international politics of this period was based on a concretization of the Great Power 
identity into a quasi-formal social status. Because of this concretization, Great Power 
status became a visible and self-conscious component of self-understanding among both 
policymakers and, eventually, among national populaces. This greatly increased the 
importance of the public enactment of a Great Power role expressing a sense of national 
mission. Second, greater institutionalization allowed a number of rising Powers—
potentially system-shattering manifestations of this century’s forces of change—to claim 
                                                             
298 Erskine Childers, The Riddle of the Sands: A Record of Secret Service, ed. David Trotter 





this ideal-typical status by adjusting their behaviors and self-understandings rather than 
by challenging its norms and expectations. Taken together, these two movements 
demonstrate how a complex of Great Power rights and responsibilities became even more 
central to international politics by conditioning how change was understood and 
institutionally expressed. By encouraging rising Powers to render their understandings 
and aspirations in right- and duty-terms, the expectations and consequences surrounding 
international change were sublimated, while the conflicts arising from it were directed 
away from the system’s core and into the periphery.  
This was a great success, and it promoted such peace and stability within the 
European core that thoughtful observers could seriously imagine that a progressive new 
epoch in international affairs had dawned. At the unit level, the Powers responded to this 
by shaping their thoughts and self-understandings ever more tightly around the complex 
that had made it possible, gradually making their status and roles into pillars of the 
ontological security of their states and nations. At the international level, this 
simultaneously promoted an increased emphasis on systemic international managerialism 
that pushed semi-archy toward hierarchy and informal governance toward formal 
oligopoly. This consequences of these shifts will be explored in the following chapter, 
which will explain how this further institutionalization of status and role relationships 
would eventually lead to the destruction of the complex through which it was expressed. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. Section I will provide a 
brief theoretic overview of how the Vienna settlement embedded revised concepts of 
status and authority within the identity and roles of the Great Powers. As moral and 





of older concepts and practices created an ideal-typical vision of what it meant to be a 
Great Power, generally and specifically, that would be a point of reference and a source 
of governance amidst profound changes in domestic and international life. Section II will 
present case studies of rising Powers—those that benefitted from these changes—such as 
the French Second Republic and Second Empire, nationalist Germany, and Japan. Power 
transition theory would suggest that these states would be well-positioned to challenge 
existing attitudes and patterns of behavior, but the evidence presented here demonstrates 
that the lure of the status to be gained by the adoption of the existing Great Power 
identity ultimately encouraged them to formulate their behaviors and self-understandings 
in the mold of the traditional Great Powers, including through their assertion of unique 
roles expressing special authority claims. In each of these cases, the actors involved 
filtered processes of change—some gradual and pacific, others sudden and violent—
through the interpretative complex of existing rights and duties. As a result, the number 
of Powers multiplied without serious disruption—evidence in the short run of the ability 
of a complex of rights and duties to reproduce itself peacefully.  
I. Great Power after Vienna: Status and Authority 
Every iteration of the European international system has been colored by its own 
unique “set of rules or norms…defin[ing] actors and appropriate behavior.”299 The 
previous chapter documented those operative in the 18th century, a complex of Great 
Power rights and responsibilities. However, the 19th century was qualitatively different 
from the arrangements that had come before it because of the shocks that had preceded it; 
the universalism of the French Revolution and the universal monarchy of Napoleon had 
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disrupted international politics in ways reminiscent of the 17th century, threatening in the 
process a radical remaking of continental politics. With these elements forcibly repressed, 
the victorious allies made a conscious decision at the Congress of Vienna not only to 
restore the Great Power concepts and practices of the old system, but to institutionalize 
the “habit of mind” from which they sprang as it had never been before.300 Not only were 
the old key elements of Great Power—an international dynastic system, a shared focus on 
prestige, the assertion of systemic interests, and the active participation in a balance of 
power—brought back, they were reinforced and visibly enacted before the eyes of a 
Europe subject to increasing nationalist and liberal pressures. This ‘opening up’ of Great 
Power was accompanied by an emphasis on frequent conferences of the Powers to 
address disorders in Italy, Spain, and even overseas, Great Power coalitions expressing 
collective managerial authority, and the quasi-legalistic enthronement of dynastic 
legitimism as a (tentative) transnational duty principle; all of these lengthened the reach 
of Great Power politics past the antechambers of kings and into the parliaments of nations 
and even the homes of people. Thus, the consequence of this “moment of conscious 
international regime construction” at Vienna settlement was the concretization of the 
identity of Great Power—once simply a bundle of concepts, capabilities, and practices 
held internally by a select few states—into a social status recognizable by all.301 It was no 
longer an obscure code of behavior ontologically-internalized by a dynastic elite; instead, 
it was now a public standard that could be written about, problematized, debated, and 
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even legislated to order international politics. The myriad Great Power roles of the past 
now became mechanisms for the governance of geographic regions and issue areas; in 
this new ‘Concert of Europe’, roles expressed individual mandates that would together 
constitute a tighter, if still relationally-contingent and imperfect, measure of international 
governance based on active management by an oligopoly. These would express not only 
the purposes of individual Powers, but the will of a European Concert through delegated 
claims of authority.302  
In the long run, as Chapter Five will detail, this transition from shared identity to 
ideal-typical status was particularly important because it pushed the semi-archical 
ordering of international politics in the direction of hierarchical Great Power rule. As 
Max Weber noted,  
stratification by status goes hand in hand with a monopolization of ideal and 
material good or opportunities. . . . With an increased closure of the status group, 
the conventional preferential opportunities for special employment grow into a 
legal monopoly of special offices for the members. Certain goods become objects 
for monopolization by status groups . . . and frequently also the possession of . . . 
special trades. This monopolization occurs positively when the status group is 
exclusively entitled to own and to manage them.303 
 
This is reflected in the reordering of semi-archy displayed in Figure 4.1. Here, semi-archy 
α, the multidimensional and loose pyramidal ordering born of numerous unit-level 
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transactions, is transformed into semi-archy β, a tighter ordering in which an oligopolistic 
status group consciously and rationally acts to order the system through differentiated 
roles. The shaded areas reflect the expression of authority through the projection of Great 
Power roles across geographic spaces and conceptual issue areas. The darkly-shaded 
region represents where these roles overlap; as Chapter Five will detail, these areas of 
overlap can be competitive or cooperative, and can be important determinants of a 
system’s character and fate. 
 
Thus, the dynamism and flexibility offered by a semi-archical ordering based on 
constantly-shifting relationships was eventually traded for the short-term stability of the 
management of international change by a directorate of Powers. But it was between 
Vienna and the 20th century that this transformation occurred against a backdrop of 





international attitudes.304 These forces—liberalism, nationalism, industrialization, and 
globalization— would drag the Powers along in their wake while altering membership in 
the Great Power club.305 Amidst this churn, rising Powers confronted an ideal-typical 
Great Power status that could be pursued or rejected, and their choice was by no means 
certain.306 As an examination of relevant case studies in the following section reveals, 
however, that this period’s tremendous forces of change were ultimately directed into and 
sublimated within the existing the right- and responsibility-complex, an apparatus that 
encouraged new Powers to adopt the language, the practices, and even the self-
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II. Rising Powers in the 19th Century: Change and Conformity 
A wide range of IR scholarship has concluded that periods of significant change 
in the relative material standing of states are times of particular tension.307 Sudden shifts 
leaving some states newly-empowered and others dissatisfied create an environment ripe 
for the sort of system-nonconforming behavior that could lead to violent contestation.308 
The presence of strong feelings of revanchism or nationalism would logically contribute 
to this threat by both facilitating the extractive processes of the aggressive state (by 
promoting national enthusiasm and patriotism) as well as by intensifying the pressure 
placed on policymakers to resolve unsatisfactory geopolitical outcomes by force.309 By 
these standards, the 19th century was ripe for system revision as states formerly excluded 
from the identity of Great Power—post-Napoleonic France, the United States, and 
Japan—and states born of ideological ferment—Germany and Italy—began to confront a 
Great Power right- and responsibility-complex not of their making.310 Yet, the revisionist 
and revolutionary impulses of these regimes ultimately found an outlet in their embrace 
of the established Great Power right- and responsibility-complex. By now sufficiently 
institutionalized to make it an excellent mechanism for the signaling of status and the 
exertion of authority, it provided an almost irresistible impetus for the socialization of 
rising Powers.311 Case studies will illustrate that the lure of Great Power status was 
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sufficient to channel and temper the most strident forces of nationalism, guiding even 
revisionist and revolutionary entities to adopt traditional and conformist policies based in 
the articulation of socially-acceptable rights and duties. Even dissatisfied states could not 
conceive of their international programs outside of the milieu defined by the complex. 
a. France 
The revival of a revolutionary, nationalist republic in mid-19th century France 
would seem at first glance to portend the rise of a radical systems reviser, but a very 
different course would characterize its foreign policy. In attempting to actualize its 
national claim to the status of Great Power, the Second Republic and its imperial 
successor instead embraced the same shared Great Power identity that had been oriented 
toward suppressing it for decades.312  
France exemplifies how “status considerations are particularly salient when 
relative power relationships are changing.”313 Its see-sawing fortunes from the 
Revolution to the July Monarchy had left it morally and materially paralyzed by mid-
century.314 Saddled with the suspicion and enmity of its peers as well as a national 
malaise, France had fallen behind the very nations it had once led; as a corrective, it 
would become the first Great Power to definitely adopt nationalism as a guiding element 
of its role, unlocking in the process new reserves of resources and new international 
                                                             
312 The continuity of policy between the Second Republic and Second Empire challenges power 
transition theories based on regime type differentiation such as that found in Daniel M. Kliman, Fateful 
Transitions: How Democracies Manage Rising Powers, from the Eve of World War I to China’s 
Ascendance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 
313 Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth, “Status and World Order” in 
Status in World Politics, 29. 
314 For the startling decline in France’s once-preeminent population over the course of the 





ambitions.315 Would it pursue the path of its republican ancestor and bring revolution to 
Europe on the tips of its bayonets, abandoning in the process Great Power responsibilities 
for transnational commitments to nationalism and liberalism? 
There was plenty of prima facie justification for those who feared just that. When 
revolutionaries overthrew the July Monarchy and established the Second Republic, they 
were theoretically declaring war on the entire Great Power system institutionalized at 
Vienna. French republicanism was itself a threat to the dynastic legitimacy that remained 
an important component of the meaning of 19th century Great Power, while its newfound 
assertiveness confounded the multitude of Great Power roles that had as their central 
tenant the suppression of the French revolutionary threat. France seemed unabashed on 
this point, quickly promulgating a public articulation of its right to exist. In a “Manifesto 
to the Powers,” the French foreign minister repudiated the Vienna settlement and claimed 
for the republic the right to full Great Power status despite its revolution, stating 
unequivocally that the revolution was beyond the regulation of existing treaties: “The 
republican form of the new government has not changed the place of France in 
Europe.”316 Though of course it had, since France’s place in Europe had been debased 
since Napoleon’s fleeting return from exile had disrupted the proceedings at Vienna. 
Consequently, this formal repudiation of the Vienna settlement had, in Taylor’s words, 
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“put international relations on a de facto basis” by claiming an inherent place for 
republican France in the Great Power club.317 
 Dramatic though this act was, the panic it inspired would prove unwarranted. 
France’s Great Power ambitions would ensure that the new de facto relations would take 
much the same form as the old de iure. Even though its very existence abrogated those 
same rules, the Second Republic nonetheless proved eager to signal that its behavior 
would be in line with existing Great Power norms and would not revert to the radical 
revolutionary or imperial ambitions of previous regimes. Instead, it would be driven by 
classical, status-seeking behaviors designed to mitigate the fears of its peers and replace 
them with respect for the stable, conformist tack it intended to take.318 The formulation of 
its policies in right- and duty-terms provided an invaluable way to signal that its 
intentions were those of a responsible Great Power.319 In the same manifesto that 
formally disavowed the existing European order was a proclamation of France’s 
intentions not to disrupt that order, informally obligating it to respect the same duties and 
practice the same responsibilities of consultative, considerate behavior as the Vienna 
treaties had mandated for all the Powers.320  
This was not mere rhetoric, but was evident in the Republic’s early policy 
decisions. Despite its own nationalist self-justifications, the Republic proved less willing 
to actively support Polish nationalism than even its monarchical predecessor. It appointed 
an unfriendly ambassador to Berlin to discourage liberal reforms in Prussian Poland, and 
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its foreign minister publicly managed expectations in this area by declaring that, though 
the French love “all the oppressed nations,” they love France more.321 The Republic also 
renewed France’s traditional patterns of interference in the Near East when it reactivated 
the long-dormant “pre-modern juridical system” of capitulations in the Ottoman Empire 
established by the ancien régime.322 Similarly, the one genuine opportunity France had to 
assert truly revisionist Great Power principles—aiding the liberal Italian forces in the 
Austro-Sardinian War—was lost thanks to the its unwillingness to abandon the traditional 
Great Power prerogatives of spheres, aggrandizement, and compensation: “it was 
impossible for the French to aid Italy without demanding Savoy and Nice for 
themselves.”323 Nor was the Republic’s conservativism limited to self-restraint. National 
honor was an important element in its policy that led to some unexpected episodes.324 In a 
particularly bizarre turn of events, it even honored the monarchy’s assumption of a 
particular French duty to defend the Papal States against Italian nationalism; 
consequently, “the first military action of revolutionary France after thirty-four years of 
apprehension was taken against a republic led and defended by idealists, and in favour of 
the most obscurantist tyranny in Europe.”325  
It was clear within the Republic’s first year of existence that “the days of French 
idealism were over; the great revolutionary war [to remake Europe] would not be 
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launched.”326 Republican France would instead pursue the same Great Power policy as 
monarchical France, even renewing ties with its conservative nemesis, Austria, to signal 
its willingness to cooperate in the restraint of change and the pursuit of balance and 
order.327 Thus, the Great Power role the Republic envisioned for itself in practice boiled 
down to the assertion of very traditional Great Power rights—particularly in claiming 
French spheres of influence in border states under the guise of supporting liberalism and 
national self-determination—and very traditional Great Power duties—such as ensuring 
continuity with the previous regime’s international commitments. It was eager to embrace 
the prevailing understanding of Great Power rather than to use its irregular existence to 
contest and change that consensus. In response, the other Powers consented to the 
membership of a republican Great Power, altering their consensus understanding of what 
made a Great Power by admitting a degree of regime heterogeneity not before seen.328 
This was new, but the Second Republic did nothing to alter the essentials of a Great 
Power politics based on traditional rights and duties. The same day the Tsar ordered 
troops into Hungary to put down a liberal rebellion, he formally recognized the French 
Republic.329  
Even the Republic’s transition into an empire led by an unpredictable, 
adventuresome Bonaparte failed to change France’s fundamental commitment to 
traditional Great Power behaviors and attitudes. Of course, matters of precedence and 
diplomatic nicety—important components of Great Power politics-as-usual—were 
sources of particular anxiety for a monarchy of questionable legitimacy. For their part, 
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the other Powers vacillated briefly but ultimately decided to give the new Emperor an 
opportunity to conform his bearing and rhetoric to established customs. In his first 
diplomatic receiving line, almost all the gathered ambassadors carried messages from 
their sovereigns addressing Napoleon III as ‘brother’. Only Russia stood aloof, 
addressing him only as ‘friend’. Napoleon did not allow himself to become provoked; 
instead, he famously smoothed-over the tension by telling the ambassador that “God 
gives us brothers, but we choose our friends.”330 This was a clear, public signal of 
Napoleon’s willingness to make himself and his regime acceptable to their desired peer 
group. Consequently, though he had an unquestioned desire to revise the international 
system, in practice Napoleon pursued thoroughly traditional policies linked to a relatively 
conventional French Great Power role as the counterweight to the established Powers.331 
In essence, “he wished to accomplish a revolutionary foreign policy without calling on 
the spirit of revolution, and to remodel Europe without a war”—a program that could 
only be accomplished through a Great Power politics based on prestige recognition, 
compensation, and mutual consideration. Consequently, “his favourite dream was ‘a 
general Congress of the great powers of Europe’ which would settle every question” 
pacifically and with mutual respect.332 Neither hegemon nor prophet, Napoleon amounted 
to a colorful, but ultimately conventional Great Power leader. 
That said, he and the advisers surrounding him were schemers quick to gamble on 
risky contests of prestige, propose convoluted territorial exchanges, and assert French 
spheres of interest far afield. In a characteristic incident, Napoleon picked a fight with 
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Russia over the protection of Christians in the Holy Land; it was shot-through from 
beginning to end with the behaviors and cognitive patterns of an international politics 
bounded by norms of right and duty held by a select social class. Russia had secured the 
duty of protecting the Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire in an 18th century treaty, but 
Napoleon now advanced a grandiose French claim to the responsibility for the protection 
of Latin Christians in the same area—a responsibility that carried with it a right to 
intervene in the internal affairs of Turkey. In partnering with Britain to send a naval 
squadron to the Levant to ostensibly advance a special Great Power duty-claim (but 
moreover to advance a right-claim to a sphere of influence), France was employing one 
of the century’s most common Great Power practices, the naval demonstration as a signal 
of material superiority. It did so in pursuit of one of the century’s most essential elements 
of Great Power, prestige.333 This was to be achieved not just by successfully asserting a 
right to influence in Turkish affairs, but ultimately by achieving a long-elusive objective 
for many Great Powers: the humiliation of Russia, whose power and ambitions had long 
been feared, but whose dynastic connections and prestige had long subverted attempts to 
balance against it.334 A humbled Russia would—in Napoleon’s thinking—then be open to 
“a dramatic act of French mediation” (yet another Great Power practice); this would 
secure Russian support for a consensual redrawing of the European map through 
territorial exchanges (a characteristic Great Power practice, compensation) to be carried 
out by all the Powers acting in Concert (one of that complex’s key principles, 
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consideration).335 If this dizzying sequence of events was to somehow foster international 
progress, it surely would have been progress without change. 
Of course, French mediation would not come to pass and the resulting war would 
be seen by Napoleon and his even more traditional advisers as an opportunity for glory 
and aggrandizement. The Crimean War was a return to 18th century form in that French 
war aims consisted of the capture and demilitarization of a key fortress, Sebastopol. Its 
reduction was considered essential to French prestige, and any thought of ending the war 
victoriously was scuttled by French intransigence on this point.336 As the war dragged on 
and it became clear that Napoleon’s hopes for a new ordering moment to replace Vienna 
would not be forthcoming, he became obsessed with the city, even threatening to take 
personal command of the army if it was not captured. He needed a great victory so that he 
could make a prestigious peace. A later scholar summed up what distinguished Napoleon, 
the revolutionary emperor, from other Great Power monarchs of this period: “What, then, 
remained of the rêve napoléonienne? Apparently only two things, a predilection for the 
conference table and a determination that the table should be installed at Paris”—in other 
words, matters of French prestige.337 Napoleon secured his Congress of Paris, but 
abandoned his dream of building a new Europe using old tools.  
For the remainder of his reign, these old tools would suffice. In subsequent years, 
French attempts to outmaneuver Austria would spur a flurry of proposals and counter-
proposals for territorial swaps, balance of power reorientations, and sphere of influence 
revisions taken right out of the 18th century Great Power playbook.338 Aiming more at 
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prestige than strategic gain, a series of French officials plotted to annex Belgium and 
Luxembourg in exchange for a complicated series of compensations for the other Powers 
in Venetia and Rumania.339 A vacillating Napoleon withdrew French troops from their 
long occupation of Rome as part of a territorial exchange with Italy, but then returned 
them to guard French prestige with nationalist revolutionaries threatened to capture the 
city.340 Most shockingly, the emperor made a grandiloquent (and uninvited) 
announcement during the Austro-Prussia war of 1866 that Austria had ceded its disputed 
Italian holdings to France and invited its formal mediation of the conflict; that Vienna 
had made no such offer was of secondary importance—what mattered was that France 
was enacting a role and asserting its identity as a status-conscious Great Power worthy of 
the burdens of European leadership.341 This was a far cry from the revolutionary 
remaking of the continent around new international principles that many within and 
without France expected it to pursue. Indeed, the most ‘nationalist’ and ‘revisionist’ thing 
the Empire actually managed to accomplish in its short existence, the replacement of 
Austrian control of northern Italy with an Italian buffer-state, expressed the essence of 
this contradiction: France would support the raising up of a disruptive, nationalist 
revolution in Italy (led, oddly enough, by an established monarchy) in exchange for 
territorial compensation in Savoy and dynastic aggrandizement through the marriage of 
Napoleon’s cousin to a Sardinian princess.342 This was a slight tweaking of the balance of 
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power in France’s interest conducted relatively responsibly—no Power was dethroned or 
stripped of its status—and most certainty not a radical departure from the practices and 
concepts of the traditional Great Power system.343  
Nor would imperial France be contented with Italian and Near Eastern 
entanglements. Once secure in its status—which it felt it was after policy successes in 
Russia and Italy—France would only think of maximally asserting its authority through 
the assertion of a Great Power role not dissimilar from that enacted by its Bourbon 
predecessor a century before. It meddled in Poland with the aim of creating a 
counterweight to Prussia, but found that its authority-claim there (based rhetorically on 
its patronage of national movements) was untenable without the backing of a Baltic 
Power; its reach having exceeded its grasp, it backed down in this theater for fear of 
further damage to its prestige.344 Similarly, the two Great Powers that served as its 
‘model states’, Russia and Great Britain, both had extensive extra-European colonies 
around which a burgeoning international legal community was beginning to articulate “a 
right or duty to intervene outside Europe” for all the Powers.345 France, at the forefront of 
this movement, was eager to transform principle into practice. Always the speculator, 
Napoleon looked to Mexico, where the government had suspended interest payments to 
its Great Power creditors. Claiming a right to intervene, Napoleon occupied the country 
and—as a friendly gesture to Austria—helped place a Habsburg on a new imperial 
Mexican throne. Ultimately (and ironically) defeated by a liberal republican insurgency, 
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Napoleon’s grande pensée to establish a sphere of influence for France in the western 
hemisphere proved “un authentique fiasco.”346 But it is in the end of this iteration of 
French Great Power that its character is most clearly revealed. When Prussian dynastic 
ambitions flirted with placing a Hohenzollern on the throne of Spain, even the withdrawal 
of their candidate was insufficient to satisfy the consideration owed to French honor: 
If the French government had really been concerned with Spain or even with 
scoring a diplomatic success, the crisis would have been over. But the fatal theme 
of Bonapartist prestige had been launched and could not be silenced. . . . The 
Second Empire had always lived on illusion; and it now committed suicide in the 
illusion that it could somehow destroy Prussia without serious effort. There was 
no policy in the drive to war, no vision of a reconstruction of Europe on lines 
more favourable to France, not even a clear plan for acquiring territory on the 
Rhine. To arrest the unification of Germany, still more to dismember Prussia, 
went against every canon of Napoleonic policy, if such a thing still existed; that 
did not matter in the explosion of irritation and impatience. Like the Austrians in 
1859 and 1866, though with less justification, Napoleon and his associates wanted 
war for its own sake, without thought of the outcome.347 
 
The lesson to be drawn from the French example is that the lure of status and 
authority bound up with the prevailing notions of Great Power could condition even 
explicitly revisionist, dissatisfied Powers to behave conservatively. France was a re-
invented, dissatisfied Great Power led by an inveterate schemer firmly convinced that 
nationalism would remake Europe348—but even this was not enough to turn its behaviors 
and mindsets far from the norms of the established Great Power identity, nor to shift its 
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own Great Power role from its traditional patterns. The meaning of Great Power would 
remain virtually untouched by its awakening, while France’s international role would 
express traditional rights and duties differentiated from the past only by their elaboration 
across wider geographic regions and issue areas. Whatever its rhetoric and whatever the 
psychological idiosyncrasies of its statespeople, Great Power France of the mid-19th 
century had no real interest in systems change, the overthrow of an entire way of 
international life. Instead, it sought only systemic change, the reorganization of the 
existing moral and material distribution to promote its relative elevation.349 In the final 
tabulation, the fact of French Great Power had more of an impact on France than it did on 
the meaning of Great Power. The Second Republic that began, in theory, as a force for 
systemic disruption eager to revise international politics along rational, liberal, and 
national lines ultimately ended—now an empire—with the capture of its emperor in a 
war fought over national honor. The need for the actualization of national greatness on 
the international scene thus impelled a formally-revisionist regime to channel its energies 
and practices into the prevailing mold provided by the general Great Power identity. 
France craved prestige, consideration, and dynastic advancement as much as ultra-
traditional Austria. It fretted over the balance of forces as much as aloof Britain or lean-
and-hungry Prussia. And though its Emperor ultimately achieved the Congress at Paris of 
which he had long dreamed, it “was not a European acknowledgement of the Second 
Empire; it was an acknowledgement of France as a conservative Power.”350 
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The French case was not the only instance of a power transition potentially 
threatening the established right- and responsibility-complex. Like the Second Republic 
and its imperial successor, the German Empire would seem at first glance to be a strong 
candidate for non-conforming behavior. After all, its very existence was based on the 
revision of moral and material distributions in central Europe, and its relationship to 
international rights and duties was of undoubtedly secondary importance to the 
ideological, nationalistic impetus that had called it into creation. Many Powers were 
scandalized by its very existence, and it was not immediately clear what place there 
would be for an entity of such overwhelming material capability within what was 
essentially the same complex of rights, duties, and typical behaviors that an upstart 
Prussia had only grudgingly adopted in the previous century. Would a national Germany 
aim at universal monarchy along the pattern of Napoleon I or Charles V? 
Again, these fears were unfounded. The German nation was built around 
traditional Great Power from the beginning, and a traditional Great Power it would be. 
The multitude of German states, small and large, that dotted the post-Vienna international 
landscape had armies, bureaucracies, and ambitions—they lacked only unity, and unity 
on a scale as grand as the panoply of German-speaking peoples could only be actualized 
at the level of Great Power. The controversy over the duchies of Slesvig and Holstein—
the first step toward unification—was formally based around old questions of dynastic 
inheritance and new ones of national self-determination, but these were only proximate 





assert its will as a Great Power.”351 The cadre of Prussian administrators and German 
nationalists that desired to use the duchies as a test case finally found success, even 
dragging along an unwilling and highly-suspicious Austria, by adopting a discourse of 
rights—specifically, the right to establish order and execute the international treaties that 
justified intervention in Denmark352—and duties—both obligations to international order 
and law as well as a more novel and subjective duty to the German-speaking majority of 
Holstein. When the duchies question was eventually resolved, its true significance lay not 
in the transfer of principalities from one realm to another; rather, it was in the realization 
that the collective action problem that had plagued German supra-national entities since 
the Holy Roman Empire was indeed solvable by means of Great Power practices and 
concepts. In essence, Germany was gathering the elements of the universal Great Power 
identity unto itself and even formulating a localized Great Power role—all of this before 
there was a true ‘German’ state to which those concepts might be coupled. 
After such a state was finally forged through a number of Great Power wars 
fought largely over questions of prestige and of Prussia’s Great Power role within central 
Europe, the temptations to German policy were tremendous. A state that possessed such 
material capacity and that had been created through the disordering of traditional 
alignments in Germany was something truly new in Europe, and it carried with it 
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enormous potential for further disruption still.353 Nevertheless, the German Empire 
quickly took its place as a highly conservative, conformist, and mimetic Great Power. 
Like the French Second Empire, it was eager to assert itself only through traditional 
methods.354 Henceforth, Germany would aim at order and stability in Europe to protect 
its own primacy, committing a significant portion of its Great Power role to the 
preservation of Austria as a Great Power by warding off challenges from Italy and 
Russia.355 This reflected another very traditional element of Great Power status-seeking 
as Germany used its diplomacy not just to arrange the European balance of forces but to 
claim the prestige of wise, measured, and productive international leadership. When 
Russia’s defeat of the Ottomans trigged a war scare over the creation of a number of new, 
national states in Turkish Europe, Berlin even claimed the honor of hosting the Congress 
aimed at pairing back the Russian threat: “The congress of Berlin marked an epoch in 
where it met. . . . now Germany attained full stature as a European Power—and, with it, 
full responsibility.”356 For the next two decades, Germany would be the pilot of European 
diplomacy, steering the course of events as had the France of Louis XIV; Bismarck, the 
framer of German Great Power, was a new Metternich guiding a Great Power system 
that, while different in its material distribution, remained very similar in its moral 
configuration of practices and standards to that which had come before.357  
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However, German prominence on the continent revealed a troubling caesura in its 
assumption of Great Power status: unlike Russia in Asia, Britain in the Middle East, 
France in Africa, and even Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, Germany lacked ‘world 
policy’. Bismarck preferred it this way, famously chiding a colonial enthusiast: “Your 
map of Africa looks very fine, but my map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia and 
there . . . lies France, and we are in the middle; that is my map of Africa.”358 Bismarck 
understood what scholars would later deduce: when conflicts on the periphery came to 
overwhelm the focus on a pacific core, the system’s stability was put at risk.359 Thus, his 
pithy retort was actually a concise statement of how Great Power Germany was 
embracing restraint and managerialism as a part of its early role.360 For example, a 
dispute with Spain over the Caroline Islands in the 1880s was resolved when Bismarck, 
unwilling to inflict a defeat on the Spanish monarchy that would have undermined its 
stability, proposed papal mediation; Bismarck knew that the pope would side with Spain, 
thus offering him an avenue not only to preserve the status quo in Spain but to avoid the 
appearance and the reality of a German colonial policy.361 For a time, this restraint gave 
Germany a privileged position to manage the tensions caused by the colonial expansion 
of the other Powers.  
But Bismarck’s restraint was uniquely visionary. Eventually, popular sentiment—
a force greatly increasing in importance during the latter half of the 19th century—would 
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drive German policy to undertake isomorphic colonial ventures of its own.362 The ‘world 
policy’ argument was based on the mimetic requirements of Great Power status and the 
widely-held anxiety that Germany wasn’t meeting them; this was an argument that the 
restraint of the Bismarckian managerial role could not answer. Once the requirements of 
the concretized standard were conceded as essential, logic was easily overcome: 
“Germany needed a coaling-station for her non-existent fleet—and therefore a fleet to 
protect her coaling station.”363 Where France had speculated in Mexico, Germany would 
cast about for the territorial scraps unclaimed by the other Powers in Africa and East 
Asia. Utilizing the covering arguments of a ‘civilizing mission’ and pointing to the 
established maritime role of heavily-industrialized Britain and—tellingly—the similar 
role being adopted by the United States, Germany utilized the developing field of 
international law to argue that its need to act like a Great Power was a justifiable cause 
for the expansion of its global footprint:364 
The German international law community saw colonization as a natural part of 
Germany’s development into a leading European power. No questions about the 
justification of expansion were posed: everybody did it and the only problem was 
that Germany had made its move late in the day.365 
 
A massive naval building program followed, ostensibly to protect what worthless 
colonies it could find sitting about unclaimed by the early-bloomers.366 The Germans 
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themselves recognized the perverse consequences of this illogical search for empty, 
vulnerable land but pressed on nonetheless.367 Their real aim was to foster the respect of 
the other Powers by proving that Germany could exert its influence over just as wide a 
range as they—and over just as important an issue-area as Britain’s longstanding claim to 
preeminent seapower.368 Trumped-up diplomatic trials of will in places long remote to 
German policy like North Africa and Micronesia soon followed as the Germans sought to 
“show that [they] could not be ignored in any question in the world.”369 Contemporaries 
recognized the potentially-disruptive consequences of German world policy but, once it 
had begun, German Great Power—and, thus, Germany’s understanding of itself—quickly 
became tied up with its naval and colonial programs; as one foreign ministry official put 
it when contemplating a reduction in its naval armaments, “No one here likes to renounce 
all ideas of great power.”370 The status of Great Power required a fleet, and a fleet 
required the assertion of colonial authority claims outside of Europe. This is where the 
conceptual elements of Great Power confronted the basic economic problem of 
geopolitical scarcity: though the German foreign minister might publicly proclaim—and 
even sincerely believe—that “We don’t want to put anyone in the shadow, but we too 
demand our place in the sun,” the reality was that there was only so much sun to left to 
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soak up by the late 19th century.371 Consequently, Germany’s attempt to actualize a Great 
Power role matching the geographic scope of its peers—essential, in its eyes, to the 
maintenance of true Great Power status—would lead to significant conflicts of authority. 
c. Extra-European Cases 
Thus, France had been unable to turn itself away from politics-as-usual and 
Germany had proven eager to outdo the established Great Powers at their own games of 
prestige, aggrandizement, and leadership. But there were other rising Powers outside of 
Europe—what would their distance, both geographic and cultural, mean for their 
encounter with the complex of rights and duties then bound up with the notion of Great 
Power? Japan would seem a likely candidate for the rejection of Great Power society-as-
usual—the movement to ‘revere the Emperor and expel the barbarian’ that attended its 
nationalist awakening might have held out the possibility of a different way. Yet, in the 
event, “the groups of remarkable men who between them determined the aims as well as 
the structure of Meiji Japan thought of their country as a state, which they would make in 
to a Power; and for which they aspired, in due course, to the status of a Great Power.”372 
Fearful of foreign domination, Japan chose to mimic the very attitudes, behaviors, and 
foreign policy institutions it saw in the Powers that threatened its independence.373 Its 
early focus on attaining the identity elements of a Great Power was especially concerned 
with prestige and social acceptance. Thus, when the Boxer Rebellion in China provoked a 
rare joint mission backed by all the Powers, Japan pounced on the opportunity to use its 
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own participation in the suppression “to reassert her claim to a leading place among the 
Powers . . . and to do so in circumstances which brought her considerable international 
credit and réclame.”374 Similarly, it launched adventurous crusades in Korea and China to 
carve out for itself a sphere of influence, contracted a Great Power alliance with Britain, 
and used a war against Russia to prove its prowess in military and naval affairs. Its 
attitude toward the Powers was calculated in all of these ventures to appear socially 
correct, demonstrating that racial difference was of minor significance compared to the 
combination of material capacity and social understanding that united this special caste. 
Japanese policy thus sought to display the standards of behavior connected with the status 
it sought (when a Japanese fleet sunk a number of Chinese troop ships at the outset of the 
Russo-Japanese War, it meticulously rescued the European officers commanding those 
ships) and also to show that it viewed Asia, as the Powers did, as a field for the 
expression of colonial and imperial impulses (it left the Chinese soldiers to drown).375 By 
the mid-1900s, Japan had thus successfully demonstrated that it could act like a Power 
and that its aim was not the revision of the Great Power system but rather its eager, 
mimetic adaptation to serve Japanese purposes. Consequently, Japan was accepted—at 
least for a time—as a full-fledged member of the club with contributions to make to 
international order.376 Said a Japanese official to a Westerner in the 1890s, “Other 
Eastern nations have cared chiefly to adopt from you your guns and means of defence. 
We have honestly tried also to understand your thought.”377 In that understanding, Japan 
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acquired Great Power status. A cartoon in the British magazine Punch captured this well. 
In it, personified representations of the Powers are depicted encamped in China while a 
Japanese samurai gestures to the Chinese dragon in the distance; the caption reads: 
“Japan (addressing the Powers). ‘Delighted to join you, gentlemen; but permit me to 
remark that if some of you hadn’t interfered when I had him down, it would have saved 
all this trouble!’”378  
Only the United States proved hesitant to adopt the identity of traditional Great 
Power. Though it possessed an undeniably-significant share of the material distribution 
and a policy of regional imperialism (essentially a Great Power role in all but name), it 
vacillated for decades between two contradictory understandings of America’s 
international identity. The first was the Great Power politics expressed most famously by 
Theodore Roosevelt. He aggressively asserted American interests abroad in the language 
of rights and duties while adopting hitherto-unseen European Great Power practices; he 
mediated the Russo-Japanese War at the Portsmouth Conference (a hemispheric first for 
the Powers), pursued a navalist policy aimed at proving American prestige and carving 
out a colonial place in the sun in the Pacific, presided over the opening of the Panama 
Canal, and sent his famous Great White Fleet around the world to announce America’s 
new global reach. In him, European leaders for the first time found an American leader 
expressing the same ideas as they in language comprehensible within the terms of right- 
and duty-based Great Power politics.379 Yet, a second notion of American identity 
lingered in the policies of his successor, Woodrow Wilson. Throughout his political 
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career, Wilson maintained a consistent rhetoric of American ‘disinterestedness’, a 
theorized separateness from eastern hemispheric affairs that set the United States apart 
from—and made it superior to—traditional Great Power politics: 
I take leave to say that some of the difficulties of our foreign relations in the last 
two years have been due to the fact that it was not comprehensible to some 
foreign statesmen that the United States really was disinterested. They had never 
heard of such a thing, and, in proportion as the United States demonstrates to the 
world that its influence in the family of nations is disinterested, it will have that 
part of power which does not come from arms, but comes from the great invisible 
powers that well up in the human heart. When the nations of the world come to 
love America, they will obey and follow America.380 
 
There was much to this at both the elite and popular levels; at the outset of the First 
World War, “there was not . . . any discernible American will to power in August 1914 or 
any widespread expectation of it.”381 Even as events in Europe encouraged Wilson to 
frame a unique, universalist Great Power role aimed at radically altering the rights and 
duties of traditional politics, he continued to maintain that America stood apart—even his 
allies were merely ‘associates’. Though Wilson himself would succeed in pushing 
through a reform of Great Power politics at Versailles, ironically his own nation was 
unwilling to take part in its new arrangement of international rights and duties. The 
United States retreated into isolationism, and would leave the question of its Great Power 
role to another day. 
d. Conclusion 
The quotation that opened this chapter is taken from a popular English work of 
‘invasion fiction’ contemporary to Germany’s naval building program, The Riddle of the 
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Sands.382 In it, Davies—an amateur navalist convinced that Germany was up to no good 
along its treacherous northern coastline—tricks an old school chum at the Foreign Office, 
the narrator, into helping him reconnoiter its shallows. Along the way, they discover 
fiendish German sailors, damsels in distress, and, ultimately, a fleet of shallow-bottomed 
boats being inspected by the Kaiser himself in preparation for a surprise assault on 
England. But the words that emerge from Davies’s mouth as he describes the German 
threat are not those of condemnation. Rather, they are of praise for “the greatest military 
power in Europe” with a “splendid chap” for an Emperor determined to acquire colonies. 
That these acquisitions could be bad for Britain Davies certainly recognizes, but—though 
he is determined to fight the Germans and foil their anti-English plans (“Let them hate us, 
and say so; it’ll teach us to buck up and that’s what really matters”)—he cannot bring 
himself to condemn his enemy: “We can’t talk about conquest and grabbing. We’ve 
collared a fine share of the world, and they’ve every right to be jealous.”383 This perfectly 
captures how the complex of rights and duties shaped change throughout the 19th century 
by promoting mimetic, status-seeking behaviors rendered in terms of mutually-
comprehensible right- and duty-claims embedded in authoritative Great Power roles. 
Though violence and conflict were normal and necessary components of this socially-
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interpenetrated semi-archy, they were also normatively-bounded and tempered by the 
mutual recognition of status and the rights and duties that properly went with it. 
Thus, the right- and responsibility-complex mediated the ambitions and 
grievances of the rising Powers, directing their consequences—and their potentially 
disruptive changes—into a status-seeking, isomorphic reproduction of itself. Nationalist 
in motivation and endowed with the material capacities of heavy industrialization, these 
rising Powers set out to make their national visions reality. However, they did so not by 
revising the semi-archical, right- and duty-based international system, but rather by 
creating themselves in the image of the Great Powers that had once defeated, suppressed, 
and even colonized them. Outfitted with rights and duties, holding colonies and chairing 
conferences, these new nationalist entities would outdo their mature peers in the 
enactment of national roles cognizant of the behaviors and justifications proper to Great 
Powers. Thus resulted what Lebow labeled a “continuity in values” between the 19th 
century and the past, an enduring focus on status, standing, and society that “helped to 
mute the consequences of major changes” without blocking them entirely.384 Attending 
this continuity was a deepening of commitment to old ideas that had seemingly translated 
well to new circumstances; Powers invested more heavily than ever in their respective 
roles, incorporating them and the fact of their Great Power status within the core of their 
self-understandings. The nations and peoples lurking beneath the policymaking apparatus 
of the state reciprocated, adopting discourses of national roles in international politics and 
taking ownership of the collective place in the world. As the following chapter will show, 
this constituted the ontological securitization of Great Power status—national existence, 
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for both policymakers and peoples, was increasingly defined by reference to the routines 
and institutionalized understandings of a complex Great Power rights and responsibilities. 
The lesson that can be drawn from this experience is that the shared Great Power 
identity was a powerful inducement to mimetic behavior and attitudes even in ‘hard 
cases’ such as Japan or republican France. New Powers were admitted to the club once 
they had demonstrated a commitment to its shared identity elements and had rendered 
their national roles in comprehensible, conformist right- and duty-terms. The meaning of 
Great Power itself was sheltered from serious revision because the deep 
institutionalization of Great Power politics had, by this point in time, ensured that its 
prestige and standing correlated closely to a widely-accepted, but highly parochial and 
Eurocentric understanding of how states should behave. This corroborates the findings of 
Lake, who found that “status is, within limits, a multi-sum good that can be granted to a 
(flexible) number of great powers without significant loss to other high-status states.”385 
With the exception of minor changes such as opening up membership to a republic or a 
non-white state, Great Power could thus remain highly resistant to change as long as that 
status was attainable (through good behavior) by those rising Powers that had benefitted 
from bursts of material and moral development. But this came at a cost as the expansion 
of the club combined with the destruction of physical and conceptual distance brought on 
by industrialization and globalization; as the 20th century dawned, there were more Great 
Powers than ever before, all obsessed with status and all seeking to assert authoritative 
Great Power roles over geographic regions and thematic issue areas. Without real change 
in how Great Power worked, contradictions began to build up. Over time, rising tensions 
                                                             





over issues such as colonial territory and spheres of influence would illustrate just “how 
little room remained at the table” for these latest Great Powers.386 
  
                                                             






SUCCESS, ANXIETY, AND CRISIS  
The protagonists of 1914 were sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet 
blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world. 
      
                       - Christopher Clark387 
 
I. Great Power Roles, Authority, and Ontological Security  
Since the rising Powers had accommodated themselves so successfully to the routines 
and concepts of Great Power politics, there wasn’t much Great Power war in the latter 
half of the 19th century. There were, of course, many war scares, crises, blunders, and 
near misses, but these were usually resolved through the time-honored Great Power 
processes of consideration, compensation, and spheres of influence. The right- and 
responsibility-complex around which Great Power politics was built had established a 
more pacific arrangement of international order than had ever been seen, a semi-archical 
distribution of authority ordering international politics. Different Powers had differing 
levels of authority in different issues areas, and none could be said to be prima inter 
pares at all times, in all places, and on all subjects—nor was any single Power 
sufficiently over-mighty to fight the rest simultaneously. But beneath the surface of this 
system, the competitive expression of authoritative Great Power roles among an ever-
increasing number of states was locking in contradictions; these would, in the long run, 
make the system more dangerous and unstable. The sublimation of these tensions without 
resolution made this a “great age of European deceptions, not an age of European 
peace.”388 
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This chapter examines geographic and issue area tensions to show how late-19th 
and early-20th century Great Power roles were becoming mutually-exclusive points for 
the contestation of overlapping, incompatible authority claims. They were the natural 
consequences of a right- and responsibility-complex that conditioned manifestations of 
change within an international system (e.g., rising, revisionist Powers) to adapt their self-
understanding and behavior to traditional forms; their desire for upward social mobility 
earned them membership in a club that had less and less room to accommodate the new 
authority claims their roles brought with them. Crowding followed as the older Powers 
engaged in a sort of arms race, but with authority claims rather than weapons. As 
authority claims began to overlap, the ontological security the Powers had achieved 
through the long-run institutionalization of their roles was placed in jeopardy.389 The 
moral arms race of authority claims and status became a material one of guns. 
a. Ontological Security and Great Power Role Dyads 
The notion of ontological security assumes that “security-seeking between actors 
is, in part, a search for cognitive stability and routinized behaviour, allowing for identity 
stability and the reduction of anxiety.”390 After the French Revolution and the fall of 
Napoleon I, the ontological security of the Great Powers had been shaken so badly that 
the mechanism by which Great Power behavior had been formerly been routinized—the 
right- and responsibility-complex—was made an even more formal and vital component 
of international relations at the Congress of Vienna. A common Great Power identity 
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united those within the club and established cognitive stability, while the individual roles 
of each Power expressed routinized rights and duties conducive to Great Power 
managerialism. It was a tidy arrangement that greatly reduced the anxiety that naturally 
resulted from seeing one’s centuries-old traditions—for a dynastic elite, their very 
world—upended by a Corsican. Peace and stability followed, with only a few serious 
interruptions, for a century. But the introduction of exogenous forces of change over this 
century—nationalism, industrialization, and globalization—brought with it a new 
distribution of material capacity and a new set of rising Powers. As shown in Chapter 
Four, rather than attempting to alter the nature of the system outright, these Powers 
adopted conformist, socially-mobile attitudes. The right- and responsibility-complex as 
reaffirmed at Vienna consequently survived this transition without serious alteration. 
Once these new Powers had claimed the status of Great Power, they set about 
formulating national roles claiming special rights and duties just like any other member 
of the club. However, because Great Power had now become a quasi-legal status, the 
rights and duties expressed in relation to it were now particular claims of international 
authority—usually justified as managerial and rendered in the language of legitimacy—
over geographic regions and issue areas.  
The introduction of rising Powers and their new authority claims into the 
established complex of rights and duties greatly increased the anxiety of the older 
Powers, who found that the game had changed under their very noses. Where once a few 
enclaves in Africa or China or the Adriatic were sufficient proof of status and authority, 
the ‘shrinking of the world’ by means of technology, ideology, and the claims of new 





Most significantly, the fact that these were visible changes in the nature of status linked 
up portentously with domestic ideological ferment: Great Power was now a subject 
debated in parliaments, in coffeehouses, and in private homes.391 A regime’s role in the 
wider world—now subject in part to popular politics—became a pillar of its self-
understanding; its routine international behaviors—the actualization of its status and the 
expression of its authority—likewise became more important to how the a Great Power 
justified itself to its own people. From this ferment, a scramble ensued amongst the 
Powers not just for territory, but for outlets for the authoritative expression of national 
purpose outside the state that, in turn, reinforced a sense of ontological security within 
the state. The Great Power role backed by claims of right and duty thus became a pillar of 
ontological security not only for a privileged, high political class as it had previously but 
for the modern ‘nation’ itself.  
These roles were routinized behaviors and attitudes aimed at reinforcing the status 
and authority of Great Power abroad and at home, and out of the scramble to promote 
them developed a number of Great Power relationships that regularized relations between 
pairs of Powers to such an extent that it is possible to speak of them as institutionalized 
dyads. These dyads originated at points of ontological tension along the fault lines of the 
different Great Power roles. When Great Power roles overlapped or ground up against 
one another, peace was at risk; these dyadic relationships normalized and institutionalized 
these conflicts, sometimes cementing conflictual attitudes and sometimes promoting the 
cooperative resolution of authority contestation. In all cases, however, these dyads linked 
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the ontological security of both the Powers involved with the particular geographic or 
issue area because the institutionalization of these relationships was a way to relieve the 
anxiety that came with uncertainty.392 Many of them are well-known under different 
names. The Anglo-German naval arms race, for example, has long been portrayed as a 
key factor in the development of a pattern of alliances conducive to a cataclysmic war.393 
However, the heart of the issue was not who had more dreadnoughts, but rather two 
incompatible Great Power roles, each seeking to assert authority claims over oceans and 
coasts outside Europe. Germany, the most materially-capable state on the continent, had 
proven its Great Power mettle by being both victorious in war and responsible in its 
presidency of the international system of the 1870s and 1880s. It felt, however, that the 
status of Great Power generally and its own particular role required an independent navy 
and extra-European empire to match. This desire for naval independence was the key 
source of discord. Britain—long devoted to its maritime Great Power role and the 
freedom it offered it from continental affairs—was fully prepared to concede Germany a 
colonial sphere in Africa and the Pacific without interference, but could not stand for a 
German fleet powerful enough to assert those colonial rights in case Britain should ever 
change its mind and object to Germany’s program. Germany likewise could not square 
Great Power status with naval dependence on anyone—even a nation admired and even 
beloved by its often-Anglophilic Kaiser—because that meant that its Great Power status 
and the authority of its role would be conditional, and therefore false. Thus resulted a 
conflictual dyadic relationship in which the projected role of Great Power Germany was 
unobtainable within the context of the existing role of Britain. Its massive expenditure on 
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its navy—a significant driver of domestic politics in the early 19th century—would be 
called into question. The prestige it had staked upon its links to India, South Africa, 
Australia, and Canada would be debased as those links became unsure and contingent, 
and its under-investment in both its army and its continental partnerships would be 
thrown into high relief as its naval role lost its uniqueness. For Britain to admit an equal 
(or near-equal) on the sea would challenge its Great Power raison d’être and, indeed, 
throw into question the identity of the British nation.394 Churchill’s first speech to the 
House of Commons as the First Lord of the Admiralty summed up this attitude: “The 
maintenance of naval supremacy is our whole foundation. Upon it stands not the Empire 
only, not merely the commercial property of our people, not merely a fine place in the 
world’s affairs; upon our naval supremacy stands our lives and the freedom we have 
guarded for near a thousand years.”395 For both of these Powers, the certainty of an 
institutionalized, dyadic relationship of competition based on an arms race was thus 
preferable to the uncertainties and anxieties of an indeterminate relationship that could 
quietly debase their status and authority. Despite a surprising paucity of genuine 
antipathy on either side, it was easier for Britain and Germany to confront one another as 
power political rivals than to stomach the anxiety of not knowing where they stood; 
‘better the devil you know’ than the associate who might have designs on your role. 
A contrasting dyadic relationship is that of Russia-Britain, which transitioned 
from competition to cooperation. Here, a century of extra-European expansion placed the 
roles of the two Powers in direct conflict in central and eastern Asia. This was a very old 
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rivalry that had come into focus soon after the British had been ejected from the Thirteen 
Colonies and turned their eyes toward Asia. In 1791, they warned Russia over the 
annexation of the Black Sea city of Oczakov. Though the British government did not 
know the exact significance (or lack thereof) of the city—“Pitt only investigated the 
importance of Oczakov after he had decided to fight for it”—it was eager to check 
Russia’s southward drift toward what it saw as an outlet for the expression of its own 
role.396 Catherine the Great’s response threatened war and told the British to stay out of 
the Middle East entirely; this argument, “once accepted, would ring the death knell of 
Great Britain as a Great Power.”397 Consequently, the dispute lingered on at varying 
degrees of intensity for a century as the two Powers established over time a competitive 
dyadic relationship based on mutual danger. Russia could threaten Britain’s Persian and 
perhaps even its Indian territories with all the might of its seemingly inexhaustible human 
resources; Britain could choke off Russia’s international trade, raise continental 
coalitions against it, and humiliate it through targeted amphibious operations. 
Unsurprisingly, this competitive dyad proved insufficient to relieve the mutual 
ontological anxieties bound up with such a wide-ranging, Power-defining colonial 
contest. George F. Kennan captured this anxious sense of distance: “To each of them, the 
other appeared as a species of malevolent but unmovable object on the international 
horizon . . . a factor that of course had to be reckoned with, but not one with which one 
could communicate to any good effect.”398 How can one reckon with an incommunicate 
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other? A solution finally presented itself as tensions increased in the latter half of the 19th 
century. The foundation for a new, cooperative Anglo-Russian dyad was finally provided 
by three factors: the expansion of German influence toward Baghdad, the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance and Russia’s defeat in 1904, and increasing tensions in Persia, which threatened 
to cause a crisis.399 Britain thus embarked on a “transition of profound significance” by 
abandoning its traditional hostility to Russian colonialism in general and agreeing to 
mutual spheres of influence in Persia specifically.400 Russia responded by removing the 
Damoclean sword it had held over the head of Britain’s empire in the Middle East and 
India. The ontological security of both Powers was now locked into a dyad of mutual 
dependence, showing how the anxieties provoked by their common vulnerabilities could 
only be resolved by a relationship of trust and interlocking, mutually-respected rights and 
duties over areas where their Great Power roles overlapped. This allowed them to ensure 
the security of their expansion regions, thus preserving the routines and patterns of self-
understanding provided by the enactment of their roles. The words of one British official 
in 1914 could apply equally to both Powers, “It is absolutely essential to us to keep on the 
best terms with Russia . . . as were we to have an unfriendly or even an indifferent 
Russia, we should find ourselves in great difficulties in certain localities where we are 
unfortunately not in a position to defend ourselves.”401 
Other dyads reflected these conflictual (France-Germany) and cooperative 
(France-Russia; Germany-Austria) patterns, often anchored by points of geographic and 
issue area role overlap (see Figure 5.1). What is important in each of these situations was 
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the manner in which the ontological security of two Powers became uniquely linked in 
the course of conflict or cooperation over a geographic region or issue area of vital 
importance to both parties. These linkages would be very important for the development 
of Great Power politics in the early 20th century. To illustrate their consequences, the 
competitive Austria-Russia dyad will be studied in detail. 
 
b. Austria-Hungary: The Indispensable Conglomerate? 
 A Czech historian once opined that “truly, if the Austrian empire had not existed 
for ages, it would be necessary, in the interest of Europe, in the interest of mankind itself, 
to create it with all speed.”402 To understand the reality behind this statement, it is 
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necessary to explore how Austria-Hungary, the mid-19th century reincarnation of the 
Habsburg dynastic conglomerate, was actually willed into existence based on the needs 
of Great Power politics.403 Indeed, what history records as the Austro-Hungarian state 
was really the embodiment of a Great Power role that went in search of a people (or 
peoples) willing to take it on.404 Aimed at the maintenance of order and balance at 
Europe’s vital crossroads of the Russian and Ottoman Empires, the Balkans, the 
assumption of this role would shape Austria-Hungary’s international and domestic 
existence before ultimately contributing not only to its own destruction but also to that of 
the right- and responsibility-complex that had birthed it. 
The chief building block for the Austro-Hungarian Great Power role was the 
failure of the earlier roles of the Austrian Empire. No other early 19th century roles were 
spoken of as frequently, as openly, and as cogently of that of Austria, a state that was not 
only said to have an ‘Italian mission’ and a ‘German mission’ but that actually backed up 
these claims, often forlornly, by both words and arms. At first glance, these ‘missions’ 
might seem elementary covers for simple, land-grabbing imperialism, but they were 
actually rooted in a complex Austrian Great Power role constituted by the circumstances 
of the post-Napoleonic settlement. To suppress the revolutionary threat, Austria was the 
special proponent of the Vienna settlement’s reconfiguration of France’s domestic and 
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international existence. In Italy, the Austrian mission was to serve as a bulwark against 
disorder by holding down the truculent northern principalities and keeping watch over the 
unstable Bourbon kingdom in the south. In Germany, Austria was a pillar of 
decentralization and tradition. It preserved the legal and territorial status quo by 
tempering Prussian adventurism while maintaining the existing configuration of central 
Europe by frustrating German nationalism. Austria did these things because, though its 
ministers sometimes “cared little or nothing for Austria’s . . . ‘mission’ [they cared] much 
for her prestige” and recognized that without it, geopolitical circumstances could turn 
against the Habsburg conglomerate.405 Thus, Austria invested heavily in its managerial 
Great Power role even as its domestic divisions gradually debased its material position.  
Insecure at home, Austria nevertheless found ontological security in its 
longstanding missions abroad. But these missions ultimately failed beginning with the 
acceptance of a republican Great Power France, thus revealing that “the Powers generally 
. . . had ceased to believe in the moral validity of the treaties of 1815 and hence in 
Austria’s European mission.”406 Within a decade of this crack in the Viennese façade, 
Italy and Germany were both united in the wake of Austrian defeats. These debasements 
of Austria’s international role created an ontological insecurity about the purpose of the 
Austrian conglomerate at home and abroad; this would ultimately lead to its 
transformation into Austria-Hungary when the central European ethnicities of Austria and 
Bohemia—formerly the heartland but now just the western hinterland of a primarily-
eastern state—were forced to concede virtual autonomy to the Magyars of Hungary. Yet, 
the Habsburg monarchy survived because this diverse, patchwork empire was made of up 
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a collection of nationalities that, though often squabbling, had a common fear of what 
they labeled “Russian universal monarchy.”407 Consequently, the Dual Monarchy 
functioned as a collective security system against Russia that simultaneously provided a 
basis for domestic order among these competing groups, what one scholar called  
a protective umbrella under which eleven nationalities could live, argue and 
struggle with each other, and yet feel secure that their futures would be protected 
against external challenge. In fulfilling that responsibility the Habsburgs gained 
their raison d’être, gave currency to the importance of international politics in the 
life of the monarchy and conferred legitimacy upon political arrangements that—
on their face—were anachronistic.408 
 
To counter the Russian threat, Austria-Hungary, like Austria before it, had to be a 
Great Power. But Great Powers needed roles giving them scope for the expression of 
authority claims, and Austria was fresh out of central European missions. Blocked to the 
north, the west, and the east, there was only one outlet left for the repair of its prestige 
and the articulation of a cogent Great Power role. Fortunately for the new Dual 
Monarchy, the other Powers (save Russia, still weak and sulking from its defeat in 
Crimea) were uniformly supportive of the maintenance of Habsburg Great Power status 
and the channeling of its energies toward a new geographic venue.409 Unfortunately, this 
was Europe’s most insoluble problem, the Balkans.410 Here, centuries of incongruent 
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cultural and political conflicts had created a dangerous situation that could only be 
managed by cooperative or hegemonic Great Power governance.411  
This was a match of necessity. No other Power’s security—physical or 
ontological—was so intimately related to this troubled region as that of Austria-Hungary. 
The nationalist pressures gradually eroding Ottoman authority carried serious 
implications for it as well: when Serbs and Rumanians and Croats under Ottoman control 
spoke of their own ethnic communities, they understood those communities to also 
include their theorized kin living under Habsburg rule. Similarly, forces at work in 
Russian domestic politics saw opportunities for strategic and cultural aggrandizement by 
supporting Slavic and Orthodox nationalism at the expense of the Ottomans and the 
Hungarians, a potential expansion of Russian authority that threatened to encircle the 
Dual Monarchy.412 Consequently, the proper functioning of the Habsburg collective 
security system required action to ameliorate these problems. Austria-Hungary thus 
turned to the management of this troubled region out of both practical necessity—the 
need to use its own Great Power influence to block Russia—and ontological need—the 
need for prestige, the need to actualize a role, the need for a purpose beyond simple 
survival after humiliation and revolution.  
Vitally, the re-foundation of the Monarchy’s ontological security upon a Balkan 
Great Power role was consecrated by the other Powers, a group that had been deadlocked 
over this issue for some time. Despite decades of trying, the ‘Concert of Europe’ had 
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been unable to even “[agree] on a definition of the Ottoman Empire,” let alone manage 
the consequences of its European decline.413 With simple partition out of the question 
short of a general war, some form of responsible Great Power management amidst the 
authority vacuum in Turkish Europe would be required to stave off turbulent Balkan 
nationalism, Russian aggrandizement, and, ultimately, a Great Power war over the 
Straits.414 Austria, ejected from its central and southern European enclaves, stood 
properly positioned to frustrate these eventualities; at the same time, its internal 
instability would dampen any desire to swallow the Balkans whole since active 
aggrandizement in the region offered little tangible gain to an empire already consumed 
by ethnic and nationalist controversies.415 As the status quo Powers hoped, Austrian 
officials proved eager to limit territorial entanglements in the Balkans in favor of 
maximizing the prestige it would gain from maintaining stability and order; there was 
instead broad consensus that the Austro-Hungarian role should be informal, diplomatic, 
economic, and civilizational rather than imperial.416 When the Congress of Berlin 
assigned Austria-Hungary the administration of the chaotic Ottoman provinces of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, it did so with the assumption that they would be quickly annexed. 
Instead, the Monarchy promoted stability and continuity by assuming responsibility for 
the implementation of reforms in the name of the Sultan; it would take three decades 
before its cautious leaders finally exercised their right to annex the territories.417 This 
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responsibility to Balkan stability was has been called le beau rôle, or as one British 
minister put it to his counterpart in Vienna, “you lead, we follow you.”418  
Yet, the popular perception of this role was not as credulous. As an Austro-
Hungarian foreign minister explained to a foreign guest: 
This is just now our great anxiety. In the West we are believed to mean conquest, 
which is absurd. It would be impossible to satisfy the two great parties of the 
empire, and we have, besides, the greatest interest in the maintenance of peace. 
Nevertheless, we do dream of conquests, but of such as in your character of 
political economist you will approve. It is those to be made by our manufactures, 
our commerce, our civilization. But to realize them we must have railways in 
Servia, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Macedonia, and above all, a junction with the Ottoman 
system, which will definitely connect the East and West. Engineers and 
diplomatists are both at work. We shall get to the end soon, I hope. When a 
Pullman car will take you comfortably from Paris to Constantinople in three days, 
I venture to believe that you will not be dissatisfied with our activity. It is for you 
Westerns that we are working.419 
 
The civilizational duty expressed here was at work within many of the Powers, and the 
foreign guest could add without hesitation that this attitude could drive Austrian policy 
beyond the limits it hoped to set for itself: events could “force Austria to take a step 
forward. . . . States which are mixed up with Eastern affairs must go further than they 
wish: look at England in Egypt! This is the grave side of the predominant position which 
Austria has secured in the Balkan Peninsula.”420 The Austrians themselves realized this, 
and consequently shouldered their parochial duties there with significant trepidation. That 
fear was counterbalanced by the realization that they had no real choice but to play the 
role of a Great Power if Austria-Hungary was to maintain the prestige and material 
capacity necessary to have a voice in European affairs generally; as a foreign office 
memorandum put it in 1884, “We have only the East. . . .We cannot allow the completion 
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of the Russian ring from Silesia to Dalmatia. A Slav conformation of the Balkan 
peninsula under Russian material or moral protection would cut our vital arteries.”421 The 
combination of the ontological dangers attached to staying out of the Balkans with those 
of being involved there clouded its policies even as its Balkan role grew more deeply 
institutionalized by the passage of time.  
 On-the-ground Austro-Hungarian management in the Balkans took a variety of 
forms. The new Great Power role expressed the same parochial rights the old Austrian 
Empire had carved out of its long relationship with the Porte; the Monarchy had a say in 
Turkish custom rates, in the Turkish postal system, and a special right (the 
Kultusprotektorat) to the patronage of Albian and Macedonian Catholics.422 There was 
also a host of new duties ranging from shoring up Ottoman authority against Russian and 
nationalist threats to moderating the often-turbulent behavior of its own clients. Serbia, its 
chief proxy in the region, was an almost constant source of tension. When the Serbs 
launched an unprovoked invasion into Russian-leaning Bulgaria and were handily 
defeated, it was Austria that stepped in prevent the Bulgarians from launching a counter-
invasion and involving Russia.423 When the Serb government began a series of 
imprisonments and executions of liberal politicians, it was Austria that stepped in to 
secure clemency for those wrongly accused of treason.424 When a Serbian king publically 
announced that he would abdicate and allow Austria to annex his territory, it was the 
Austrians that hastened to change his mind in the name of promoting “a flourishing and 
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independent Serbia.”425 This was moral and material wisdom joined together: the Dual 
Monarchy had no moral desire to aggrandize its respectable, managerial role—and it 
lacked the material strength to confidently do otherwise. Similarly, the Monarchy acted 
as a coordinator of European balance in the region, as when Emperor-King Franz Joseph 
took it upon himself to negotiate and maintain over a span of decades a secret alliance 
with the unpredictable king of Rumania; these secret links formed “a non-Slavic barrier” 
separating Russia from its would-be client ethnicities in the Balkans and, crucially, 
barring its way to European Turkey.426 The Monarchy could also cite this role to justify 
police actions when necessary. For example, when contumacious Montenegro refused to 
desist in the siege of a key Ottoman costal city, Austro-Hungarian ships staged a naval 
demonstration in protest that was later joined by the other Powers, convincing even 
Russia to abandon the aggressive Balkan principality.427 In the words of an Austro-
Hungarian foreign minister, the broad contours of this Balkan policy thus aimed at 
“stability and peace, the conservation of what exists, and the avoidance of entanglements 
and shocks.”428 
 But Austrian managerialism would be challenged by the unpredictable tides of 
Balkan nationalism when these nationalities decided to liberate themselves from Turkish 
rule. The resulting Balkan Wars first established a new collection of Balkan states at 
Turkey’s expense, then saw those same states fight it out amongst themselves for the 
fruits of victory; however, the real loser in all of this was Austria, whose diplomacy 
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proved incapable of directing events at crucial points in the conflict.429 By the end of the 
Second Balkan War, the empowered nationalist states were proving increasingly resistant 
to Austrian influence. The sectarian massacres that followed the defeat of Bulgaria by its 
Balkan neighbors were carried out despite the Monarchy’s condemnation, while Serbia’s 
serious (and Russian-backed) efforts to forge a union with Montenegro augured a united 
anti-Habsburg front aimed right at Bosnia-Herzegovina.430 By 1914, the Austrian 
ambassador to Belgrade was summing up the prevailing view of Serbia, once a loyal 
client but now self-aggrandizing and brutally imperialist: “murder and killing have been 
raised to a system in Serbia,” which was not to be counted among the “civilized 
states.”431 Austria-Hungary’s role as benign manager of the Balkans was disintegrating. 
This process of decay was not just the result of Russia’s reoriented and disruptive 
Great Power role (discussed below). Instead, the Powers collectively gave it both passive 
and active encouragement. The Balkans, once seen as a Pandora’s box that had to be 
either managed by a restrained Austria or consumed by a crusading Russia, were 
increasingly viewed in partisan terms. A symbolic turning point was reached when the 
multi-Power condominium over Macedonia (1903-1907)—a conservative partnership 
designed to preserve Ottoman authority while curtailing sectarian violence—began to 
fragment. Originally conceived as a Concert-backed, Austro-Russian led effort to 
preserve order, over time the other Powers began to defect from this collective agreement 
to support more radical solutions based on currying favor with either the nationalists 
(Britain and Russia) or the Sultan (Germany); Austria-Hungary was left alone in its 
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determination to hold a middle ground.432 The creation of rival alliance blocs only 
intensified the tendency to view the region in zero-sum, power-political terms “rather 
than as a continental geopolitical ecosystem in which every power had a role to play.”433 
The introduction of France to the region as Russia’s key ally provided a dangerous 
accelerant to the nationalist fires that had long-simmered in Belgrade. As early as 1905, 
the French were using their Russian ally’s improved position to replace Austria as 
Serbia’s supplier of armaments and loans, positioning Serbia as a partner not just of 
Russia but of the entire Entente system.434 Given the importance of international loans 
and armaments contracts to spheres of influence during this period, France and Russia 
were now directly subverting Austria-Hungary’s sphere of influence.435 Indeed, by 1914, 
France was such a strong backer of the Russo-Serbian alliance that observers were 
surprised that the French ambassador to Belgrade could even summon the courage to 
protest a series of sectarian massacres carried out by the Serbian army.436  
The Entente’s financial, cultural, and military assertiveness altered the place of 
the Balkans in European politics writ large. Formerly, it had functioned as a quasi-
colonial region for Austria-Hungary, the one Power without a colonial outlet. Since Great 
Powers knew that “they must now and then exert themselves and be seen doing so,” the 
ability of the virtually landlocked Dual Monarchy to express its Great Power role there 
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was an important foundation for its Great Power status generally.437 All the Powers had 
their parochial ‘little wars’ for territory and prestige outside of Europe, and the 
Monarchy’s desire to stabilize its southern frontier was hardly non-normative when 
compared with the assertive, extra-European record of literally all the other Powers.438 
Yet, as the Balkans developed from a troublesome colonial backwater into a vital element 
in the wider European alliance system, it became more and more difficult for Austria-
Hungary to ‘exert itself’ there without risking war. A managerial Great Power role 
requires a certain amount of institutionalized discretion and leeway for the Power 
involved; when a rival alliance bloc interposed itself in southern Europe, Austria-
Hungary’s authority claims were debased and its role undermined. Indeed, it was one 
thing for Napoleon III to assert a prestige-based right-claim to influence in a faraway 
principality like Rumania based on Great Power France’s promotion of a “just and 
civilizing cause.”439 It was quite another for President Fallières of the Third Republic to 
arm and finance Serbia and then to publicly hail King Petar of Serbia as ‘King of all the 
Serbs’ (“including, implicitly, those living within the Austro-Hungarian Empire”).440 The 
first was a natural expression of Great Power authority, certainly competitive in its way 
but normatively-bounded and comprehensible within the right- and duty-claims common 
to the time. The second was far more serious because it was akin to questioning the 
legitimacy not only of a Great Power role consecrated by the Powers collectively, but of a 
Great Power’s right to exist. Austria-Hungary—confronted by a Franco-Russian policy 
that was, in an official’s words, “aggressive and directed against the status quo”—thus 
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had every reason to be ontologically insecure.441 Even its ostensible allies—Germany and 
Italy—began meddling in Ottoman affairs in ways contrary to Austro-Hungarian interests 
and disruptive of the routines of its role.442 Italy even went so far as to undermine the 
Kultusprotektorat in Albania, a special Austrian right dating back to 1606.443 The other 
Powers were abandoning their support of a mission they had assigned Austria-Hungary 
decades earlier. Facing apathy and outright hostility, the Dual Monarchy’s ability to act 
declined, and its prestige followed.444 
During the run-up to a British parliamentary election in 1880 unusually concerned 
with issues of foreign policy, William Gladstone exclaimed against Austria with his usual 
vehemence: “There is not an instance, there is not a spot upon the whole map where you 
can lay your finger and say: ‘There Austria did good’.”445 Ever in search of progress in 
the backyards of the other Powers, Gladstone was missing the point. It was in the 
eventualities Austria was keeping off the European map that its international value was 
found. By keeping Russia out, the Turks in, and the Slavs quiet, Austria was fulfilling an 
indispensable mission not only for its own Great Power status but for European politics in 
general. That this thankless task fell upon the Power the least materially-equipped to 
carry it out would help engender numerous contradictions in the development of Great 
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Power politics there. As the Balkans began to respond to the call of nationalism and its 
peers began to see opportunities for aggrandizement there instead of insoluble problems, 
Austria-Hungary’s ontological security—and quite literally, its very existence—would be 
put at stake. 
b. Russia: Anxious Giant 
The single biggest challenge to the right and duties of the Austro-Hungarian Great 
Power role would come from its competitive and ultimately dyadic relationship with the 
rights and duties of Russia’s Great Power role. Just as the former was reformulating its 
domestic structure and international role to address the problems of eastern European 
nationalism, the latter was also in search of a new mission. Previously, Russia had 
assumed the role of European gendarme: the enforcer of Great Power legitimacy and the 
final guarantor of bayonet-backed stability against ‘the revolution’. However, chastened 
at Crimea and forced to back down from its traditional influence over Turkey, Russia 
abandoned its previous role and withdrew from the conservative mission it had advanced 
outside its own borders in places as diverse as Belgium, Hungary, and the Balkans.446 
Instead, it redirected its traditional emphasis on territorial expansion—related, of course, 
to the classic Russian security dilemma by which territory was seized to defend territory 
previously seized—to new lands. It turned its attentions eastward, to Siberia and 
eventually China, and westward, to an economic and eventually military relationship with 
the French designed to improve its position in its ongoing Great Game with Britain.  
This would change in 1876, however, as Slavophile forces at the Russian court 
combined with favorable geopolitical circumstances in the Balkans to reorient Russia’s 
                                                             





expansionist posture toward its role as protector of the “children of Russia”—the 
nationalities of European Turkey.447 Russia’s expansionism toward the Straits latched on 
easily to the pan-Slav nationalism then coming to a head in the decaying Ottoman 
Empire; the latter provided a facilitating justification for the former, while the former 
offered a practical means to achieve the latter after centuries of European waffling on the 
liberation of ostensibly Christian territories under Ottoman occupation.448 Henceforth, 
Russia’s role would be oriented around what Tsar Alexander II had called its “sacred 
mission:” intervention in the Balkans to support the extension of Russia’s sphere to the 
Straits and beyond, its territorial aggrandizement through the establishment of dependent 
client states, and the civilizational promotion of Orthodox nationalism.449 This was no 
mere alteration in policy. Rather, it was a deep-seated embrace of a role deriving from the 
macro-level understanding of Great Power as a status entailed with prestige, duty, and 
rights and the parochial situation of a Russia in which both rulers and ruled were 
motivated by a strong sense of religious and cultural obligation as well as a chauvinistic 
belief in a national destiny of imperial expansion. 
The first step in the actualization of a Slavic Russian role was a Russo-Turkish 
war inaugurated shortly after the Tsar’s southward reorientation in 1876. Surprisingly, 
the Ottoman army showed signs of life, delaying the Russian advance to the Straits for so 
long that Russia’s victory felt like defeat, especially since the Tsar had gone to war “for 
reasons of national pride and of Panslav sentiment, not to achieve any practical aim.”450 
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Istanbul remained Turkish, Russia’s gains (especially the brief existence of a ‘big’ 
Bulgarian state) were rolled back by the other Powers at the resulting Congress of Berlin, 
and Austria’s role as manager of the region was reinforced by its mandate to occupy 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the consolidation of a Serbian state within the its sphere of 
influence.451 Chastened again, Russian policy reluctantly conceded to Austria managerial 
control, though it struggled mightily to maintain a measure of influence in Bulgaria and 
at the Porte to keep the Straits closed to foreign navies (so weak was its own navy in the 
Black Sea).452 However, its Balkan ambitions were merely placed in remission; the Great 
Power role that Russia had taken on would instead be pursued using the new tool of a 
French alliance freeing Russia to act against the forces frustrating its authority claims in 
Turkey: Austria, Germany, and Britain. To work around his stalemate in the Balkans, 
“the autocrat of all the Russias stood to attention for the Marseillaise; and that hymn of 
revolutionary nationalism was played in honour of the oppressor of the Poles.”453 
This significant moment of development in Russian international politics reflected 
an understanding of how, as the foundations of the autocratic regime at home began to 
grow unsettled, its Great Power role was increasingly vital to its ontological security. 
Orthodox and pan-Slav sentiment ran high among the people and within the Russian 
court, and the patriarchal understanding of imperial authority meant that the duties of the 
Tsar to the nationalities of the Balkans were very real motivators of state policy. The 
containment of Russian eastward expansion by the Japanese (and the domestic revolution 
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that followed) and the barrier to southern expansion provided by the British only 
intensified the ontological necessity of Russia’s Balkan role: “the Balkans remained . . . 
the only arena in which Russia could still pursue a policy focused on projecting imperial 
power.”454 This was the mirror image of the situation then prevalent in Austria-Hungary, 
a contradiction of grave import: “Once the Balkan Slavs were astir, the Russian 
government dared not let them fail; Austria-Hungary dared not let them succeed.”455 That 
Russia’s desperate southeastern orientation crossed directly in the path of Austria’s own 
‘last-chance’ role ensured that tensions would result; Russia’s role of aggrandizement and 
Austria’s role of managerial stabilization—both essential to their existence not only as 
Great Powers but as stable states—seemed locked into a competitive dyad and destined to 
clash.456 
The two Powers recognized this contradiction, and both took small steps to stave 
off its consequences through cooperation in some of the more turbulent situations that 
plagued the Balkans.457 But when Balkan nationalism began to permanently erode the 
foundations of Austro-Hungarian management in the 1900s, this spurred a renewal of 
Russian efforts to supplant the Monarchy’s authority claims with its own Great Power 
role, Slavophile in ideological orientation and geopolitically aimed at the Straits; this was 
“the military version of national liberal neo-Slavism, ‘The shortest and safest operational 
route to Constantinople runs through Vienna . . . and Berlin.’”458 The first step in this 
process was a diplomatic coup separating Serbia from its traditional status as an Austrian 
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client. When a cadre of revolutionary military officers hacked to death the Serbian king, 
queen, and several top cabinet officials in 1903, they brought to power a weaker monarch 
unable—and, egged on by Russia, increasingly unwilling—to restrain popular Serbian 
nationalism. This movement envisioned a unified ‘greater Serbia’ that would encompass 
large swaths of the Balkans. Since the Serbian nationalist vision of what made one a 
‘Serbian’ was rather loose and consequently maximalist, its ideological program naturally 
targeted the Habsburg Empire—especially its Hungarian component—for dissolution and 
reincorporation into a pan-Serb empire.459 This set its interests not only against Austria’s 
conservative, managerial role but against its very existence. Russia—humiliated by Japan 
in 1904 and shaken by a subsequent revolution, pounced on this opportunity to express its 
debased Great Power authority. It began serious efforts to add Serbia to its sphere, 
directing that state’s militant energies in the process toward expansion at Austria’s 
expense.460 When a favorable geopolitical shift presented itself—Austria-Hungary’s 
gestures of goodwill toward the new Serbian regime, including being the first Power to 
recognize the regicide government, had been rebuffed—the Tsar pounced. It seemed a 
small thing at the time, but the entire mental map of Great Power roles that had defined 
the development of the modern Balkans had been rewritten.  
Austria-Hungary’s formal annexation of long-occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
1908 definitively exposed the divisive nature of these conflicting roles. It did not matter 
that the annexation exercised an Austro-Hungarian right that had been formalized in 
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multiple treaties and, ironically, had only been exercised at the suggestion of Russia’s 
own foreign minister in his attempts to strike a bargain over the Straits.461 The Tsar 
quickly disavowed this provocative suggestion, but it was too late; Russia’s policy 
blunder had offended its own sacred role publicly. Amidst outcries in St. Petersburg and 
Belgrade, a crisis developed and a joint Russo-Serbian mobilization followed.462 The 
Russians had thrown down the gauntlet over their Balkan position, and Austria answered 
it with both mobilization and with the threat of revealing Russia’s own complicity in the 
casus belli—a threat that would have further discredited Russia’s position and the 
authority it claimed by virtue of its Balkan role. But even the combination of Austro-
Hungarian mobilization, the fact that Russia had ceded Bosnia-Herzeogovina to the Dual 
Monarchy on multiple occasions, and the threat to reveal Russia’s hypocrisy to the world 
was insufficient to stop war; instead, German intervention was required to compel both 
Russia and Serbia to back down and recognize the annexation. The Great Power roles of 
Austria-Hungary and Russia had now proven irreconcilable without resort to the armed 
mediation of a third Power. This was “a turning point in Balkan geopolitics. . . . from this 
moment onwards, it would be much more difficult to contain the negative energies 
generated by conflicts among the Balkan states.”463 Henceforth, a humiliated Russia’s 
Balkan mission and its ultimate aim—the creation of a Balkan League directed ostensibly 
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at the Porte but really at Vienna while Russia itself took the Straits—would be a do-or-
die affair.464  
The remainder of this narrative of Russian assertiveness coincides with that of 
Austro-Hungarian decay outlined above. By 1913, Russia’s ambassador to Belgrade—the 
town’s unofficial ‘king’—was publically calling out the Dual Monarchy as the new ‘Sick 
Man’ of Europe and predicting its collapse would be brought on just as swiftly by Serbia 
as its Ottoman predecessor’s had been by the united Balkan states.465 This was no idle 
boast; rather, “Russian imperialists were dead serious about dismembering Turkey—and . 
. . Austria-Hungary too.”466 Wrote a Russian foreign minister to Belgrade, “Serbia’s 
promised land lies in the territory of today’s Austria-Hungary,” an empire in 
“decomposition.”467 This was—or, rather, should have been—beyond the pale.468 
Certainly, under the normal operation of Great Power politics, some measure of Russian 
influence in Belgrade and some competition over Austria-Hungary’s southern sphere 
would be relatively normative behavior. But this was more than a simple realignment of 
forces, and much more than a chess match between friendly rivals over an important 
geostrategic point. This was an extraordinary, maximalist leap that went against the grain 
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of centuries of right- and duty-based Great Power politics. Even Napoleonic France—the 
bête noire against which the Vienna system had coalesced—had not been threatened with 
obliteration.  
But, from a different angle, Russia’s assertion of its own role made this a natural 
leap to take: this had become a battle of ontological existence for the Tsarist state. 
Geographically, Russia could only expand by fighting the Japanese, the British, or the 
Ottomans; given the importance of successful expansion to Russia’s self-understanding, 
this left little room for maneuver. Economically, the vital Russian interest in maritime 
trade through the Straits (75-80% of its wheat exports traveled that route) meant that the 
status of the Straits was not merely one of high politics and ideology, but was instead 
closely linked to the lives of ordinary, increasingly-dissatisfied Russian subjects.469 
Popularly, the debasement of Russian prestige by the Japanese and the subsequent 1904-5 
revolution had led it to embrace nationalist, Orthodox, and Slavic popular energies at 
home as points of linkage between the people and the Tsarist government; the awakening 
of these social forces fostered a widespread belief “that responsible politicians had to 
protect the Great Power status of the Russian Empire, even if it might mean political and 
social ruin.”470 Concrete promotion of this status in what amounted to Austria-Hungary’s 
backyard was—however adventuresome—thus eminently necessary. Thus, the Russian 
role crossed-purposes with the Austro-Hungarian, producing tremendous tensions that put 
the basis of both their external and internal authority claims at issue. Failure to contain 
those energies could now only produce a general war of three or more Powers.  
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By the time the Second Balkan War had reconfigured the eastern European map, 
it was clear that the Great Power roles that had long defined it had shifted drastically. 
Austria’s role as Balkan manager, consecrated by both the European Concert and 
ontological necessity, was virtually inoperative; its former client, Serbia, had morphed 
into an imperialistic and bloody-minded client of the Entente, while the balance of forces 
had supplanted Great Power consensus as the minimalist ordering mechanism for the 
region. For its part, Russia had adopted a role aimed at the remaking of the Balkans into a 
collection of client states culturally dependent upon it and serving its strategic aims. 
These were more than mere policies, they were the cornerstones of the ontological 
security of both Powers. Austria needed to guide events in the Balkans not only to protect 
itself from the external threats of Russia and Balkan nationalism, but also to justify the 
many ethnic partnerships that constituted the Austro-Hungarian collective security 
system. Without the status and authority of a Great Power abroad, the purpose of the 
Dual Monarchy at home would be called into question. This empire of nationalities had 
based its Great Power role (and, consequently, its domestic stability) on the assertion of 
its particular authority over the Balkans; its final failure in this task would lead to its 
disintegration.471 Similarly, Russia’s turbulent 1900s had left it without an outlet for 
expansion and in desperate need of a mission linking the people with the Tsar in a 
collective mission; the promotion of religious and ethnic affinities combined perfectly 
with Russia’s strategic and economic need to geostrategically reorient to (and revise the 
balance within) the Black Sea region. If it failed in this task, it would be definitively 
                                                             





contained—forcibly by enemies and passively by allies—on all sides; centuries of 
Russia’s expansionist, imperial Great Power role on two continents would thus be 
rendered defunct just as the forces of revolution, industrialization, and nationalism were 
calling into question the basis of Russian domestic life. The consequences of so many 
simultaneous shifts could prove disastrous. 
The periodic moments of role overlap that revealed themselves in this Austro-
Russian dyad show how the normal operation of a Great Power politics based on a shared 
status expressed through parochial claims of authority was sublimating rather than 
resolving dangerous contradictions. Though the system as a whole “displayed a 
surprising capacity for crisis management and détente,” it could not escape the fact that a 
changing social and material context had bequeathed it too many Great Power asserting 
too many rights and duties over too few geographic and issue areas.472 As the domestic 
tensions so common in an age of nationalism, revanchism, and jingoism threatened the 
stability of the Great Powers, their individual roles gave purpose and direction to peoples 
increasingly crying out for it; the more the identity of the nation drew from the 
expression of its Great Power, the deeper that nation’s commitment to its parochial role 
became. Brittleness was the natural result, even as crisis after crisis was averted thanks to 
the consideration, compensation, and commonly-comprehensible vocabulary of rights 
and duties that had kept the peace for a century. This was a right- and responsibility-
complex that worked, a semi-archy of largely peaceful social interaction. However, it did 
so only by self-replication, a multiplication of Powers and roles made all the more 
dangerous by the advances in technology and ideology that made possible a truly global 
                                                             





politics. Old Powers were squeezed out, and had to go poaching in their neighbors’ back 
yards. The incremental change this system promoted could not contain the contradictions 
springing from a smaller, more dangerous world. Systemic upheaval was growing ever 
more likely. 
II. Rights, Responsibilities and the First World War 
 The First World War, in the words of one scholar, was “essentially a traditional 
phenomenon. It was, at its origin, a general war of typical character.”473 This statement 
may seem confusing given the exceptional brutality, the atypical, maximal claims, and 
the landmark peace settlement that came to characterize it. But, in reality, the origins of 
the war were neither obscure nor novel because they were put in place through the long-
run operation of an international system consistently pressured by profound forces of 
change that engendered profound anxieties. This section elucidates an explanation for the 
war focused around the enactment of Great Power roles that, over a century of 
technological progress and moral innovation, had grown mutually-exclusive and ossified. 
This was a war of identity into which Powers long accustomed to the authoritative 
actualization of their roles across special geographic and thematic areas finally blundered 
as their mutual status as Great Powers—long interwoven, but increasingly tangled—
became lastingly incompatible. This is a narrative of how the ontological insecurity of the 
Powers led to a general war.474 The culprits—if they may be called that—were a series of 
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overly-institutionalized Great Power roles that, over time, came to express mutually-
exclusive authority claims over issue areas and geographic regions. This ‘crowding out’ 
process was greatly exacerbated by the concretization of the conceptual and behavioral 
elements of the shared Great Power identity into an externally-visible, quasi-legal social 
status that closely linked the ontological security of the state—and, increasingly, of entire 
societies—to the actualization of visible Great Power. Because “actors prefer 
relationships they have practiced and recognize, even if attachment to these relationships 
maintains conflict or reproduces other harmful, but recognizable and certain, situations,” 
the long-run operation of the right- and responsibility-complex from which these roles 
sprang dis-incentivized receptiveness to structural change by linking it to ontological 
anxiety.475 With the Powers unable to change their specific roles for fear of losing their 
ontologically-vital shared status, their complex of rights and responsibilities grew brittle. 
In their fundamental unwillingness to abandon the security long provided by their roles 
even as they became contradictory, it would finally break, giving way to a great 
upheaval. 
A recent history of the July Crisis labels its participants “sleepwalkers, watchful 
but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to 
bring into the world.”476 In the same vein, this section characterizes the Powers as actors: 
absorbed in their unique roles, self-conscious of and fearful for their status, and unable to 
empathize with those sharing their stage. They would recite their lines to perfection—
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their claims and justifications and goals honorable and just and, to them, imminently 
necessary; but, over time, they had begun to recite past one another. What was once a 
Europe of dialogues became a Europe of monologues, and it was in the natural, flawless 
recitation of their soliloquies that the Powers finally brought down their own curtain. A 
century of role-building based around a shared status had built a Europe of too many 
Powers and far too many incompatible claims of right and duty. When these 
contradictions came to a head in such a way as to threaten the self-understandings of 
multiple Powers at once, the Powers behaved as Powers traditionally have: they resorted 
to material capacity to protect their moral existence. 
a. The First World War as a Conflict of Status and Authority 
 The July Crisis of 1914 was the moment at which a century of highly attenuated, 
right- and responsibility-mediated international change contained within the roles of the 
Great Powers finally failed. Great Power status was by this point an important state asset. 
As in the case of Austria-Hungary and Russia, it could even be a vital determinant of 
domestic social and political cohesion. Like any asset, however, it could be lost. As the 
wars of the 19th century had demonstrated, moments at which Great Power status and 
authority were called into question were dangerous. Traditionally, this danger had been 
mediated by the limitation of these conflicts to only one of these two attributes at a time. 
The Crimean War was a thus conflict over authority in Turkey rather than a serious 
challenge to the membership of any particular state in the Great Power club; Russia, 
defeated, nevertheless remained a Great Power and a cohesive political entity. Similarly, 
the wars that ejected Austria from Italy and Germany were wars over particular Great 





Germany had rights and duties in those areas that superseded those of Emperor Franz 
Joseph, and he accepted these decisions as honorable not only because they had been 
ratified by force of arms but also because they left intact an Austro-Hungarian core still 
worthy of Great Power status. In contrast, the Franco-Prussian war had been a war over 
status, but not over any particular authority claim. After all, France declared war over 
issues of national prestige (recall that its authority claim over Spain had been accepted by 
Prussia and that the war was fought over the perceived insolence of Prussia’s acceptance 
of this fact rather than an actual conflict of interest). For its part, Prussia’s real 
ambition—to unite Germany around it—was aimed at the realization of Great Power 
status for a new German state that would coalesce around its claims. Germany triumphed, 
gaining Great Power status and two French provinces but otherwise leaving France’s 
Great Power authority claims unmolested (e.g., a Hohenzollern did not end up on the 
Spanish throne in contravention of France’s right-claim to forbid such a match). France 
was angered and humiliated, but its status was not revoked as it had been after Napoleon. 
 What made the wars that sprang from the July Crisis different was its 
simultaneous involvement of interlocking status and authority disputes that combined to 
create a series of unprecedented ontological security dilemmas for that touched multiple 
Powers. Scholars have written in the past of the ‘domino effect’ of alliances in 1914; it 
was not the alliances per se that made the difference, however, it was the cascading 
challenges to the authority, the status, and, ultimately, the ontological security of the 
individual Powers involved that created a general upheaval in the span of a mere month. 
In this way, centuries of embedding rights and duties so deeply into the fabric of 





ontological basis of the actors that carried it out, fed back upon itself. What had been a 
mediating and normalizing force older than the international system itself thus became 
the author of its destruction, an ontological security dilemma from which all the Powers 
could not possibly escape with their status and roles intact. Thus, the Powers went to war 
because they could not do otherwise without changing the behavioral patterns and 
cognitive routines that defined how they understood themselves and their purposes. 
b. The July Crisis as an Ontological Security Dilemma Cascade 
The Great Powers had invested heavily in their respective roles, building them 
into the foundations of their domestic politics and institutionalizing them in their foreign 
affairs. Longstanding dyadic relationships between different sets of Powers were now 
firmly established amidst an international environment characterized by scarcity of 
material and moral space; though not set in stone, they provided a powerful disincentive 
to responsive change. By July 1914, the competitive role dyad of Austria-Russia had 
grown particularly heated. Further, it was linked to wider European security 
arrangements through the bipolar alliance bloc system, which itself expressed a number 
of other important role dyads, cooperative and competitive, defining the geopolitical 
landscape. This was a potentially dangerous situation; if a crisis were to somehow 
threaten a zero-sum revision of this conflicting dyad, it could trigger a cascade of 
ontological security dilemmas among these interlocking role relationships that would 
engulf the entire system.  
The Sarajevo assassinations provoked just such a crisis by creating a situation in 
which Austria-Hungary’s Great Power status—and, thus, the ontological security of its 





from the Monarchy’s crisis of authority in Bosnia, and this crisis seemed a microcosm of 
the Habsburg predicament as a whole.”477 The assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand was more than a simple terrorist outrage; rather, it was a calculated political 
maneuver, an assault on the existence of a Habsburg Great Power dependent upon its 
assertion of authority in the Balkans to support its Great Power role, its Great Power role 
to maintain its Great Power status, and its Great Power status to buttress the cohesion of 
the Habsburg quasi-state. Such a confrontation had been predicted in Vienna and 
Budapest since the Russian reaction to the annexations; this attitude prophesied that 
“unless you are willing to surrender, sooner or later you will have to fight for the survival 
of the traditional political order in Europe.”478 That do-or-die moment for its Great Power 
status arrived with the Sarajevo assassinations. 
That the Dual Monarchy’s dissolution could be seriously portended from the loss 
of one imperial heir was the result a combination of factors, many relating to the central 
place of its Great Power role in the constitution of its domestic legitimacy. The first 
element making it so was the impossibility of an effective judicial or diplomatic 
resolution of the situation because these avenues either did not exist or did not provide a 
viable path for Austria-Hungary to obtain honorable satisfaction of its Great Power 
rights. The first salient point to made in this area is that there was no supra-national legal 
authority with the competence to take on this case; the Serbian state, not just specific 
Serbian citizens, was on trial for inciting the incident as well as for possibly organizing 
and carrying it out. What court could judge these accusations? What investigating 
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authority had competence to collect evidence—especially when the Serbs themselves 
refused to meaningfully cooperate?479 Further, these charges were not mere speculation 
or a pretext for profitable aggression. The Habsburg decision-making apparatus knew—
even if it could not prove from afar—that the plot had originated on Serbian soil, had 
been backed by elements within Serbian military intelligence and probably the Serbian 
government itself.480 Indeed, the Serbian government itself had issued a cryptic warning 
to this effect prior to the attacks. Further evidence for each of these charges existed at the 
time of the event—including an un-coerced confession from one of the terrorists—but 
Serbia’s refusal to offer real cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian authorities in a 
subsequent investigation scotched any hope for a proper judicial resolution in the 
Monarchy’s courts.481 Instead, Serbia was quick to spirit potential witnesses out of 
Belgrade and deny their existence.482 A century would pass before scholars were able to 
confirm just how deep the plot was intertwined with official Serbia, but for Austria the 
case was as open and shut as it could possibly be as long as the Serbs themselves refused 
to cooperate. Finally, there was widespread doubt among the Habsburg elite that a 
judicial or diplomatic solution could ever accomplish Austria-Hungary’s overarching 
objective: the shoring-up of its Great Power status. This thinking, articulated in the crown 
council during the crisis, noted that “A purely diplomatic success . . . would have no 
value at all, since it would be read in Belgrade, Bucharest, St Petersburg and the South 
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Slav areas of the monarchy as a sign of Vienna’s weakness and irresolution.”483 This 
would only contribute to the erosion of both the foreign and the domestic basis of the 
Habsburg collective security system, threatening the breakup of a Monarchy unable to 
behave as a Great Power.484 
Austria-Hungary had only arrived at this particularly perilous situation of prestige 
politics thanks to the second significant element, the gradual abandonment by the other 
Powers of their support for its Balkan role. Prior to 1914, this abandonment had been 
subtle and halting, as discussed above. But after the Bosnia-Herzegovina annexation—a 
diplomatic victory for the Monarchy even if one obtained on the strength of German 
threats—Paris, London, and St. Petersburg turned increasingly anti-Austrian. The 
reaction of Europe’s responsables to the Sarajevo outrages vividly illustrates the isolation 
of Vienna and Budapest. The French president, visiting Russia shortly after the attacks, 
publicly snubbed the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, even taking the extraordinary steps 
of rebuking the Dual Monarchy for wanting an inquiry into Belgrade’s role in the plot, 
charging that it was responsible for endangering peace, and warning that Serbia’s friends 
in Europe would look out for it.485 For its part, Russia—whose own representatives had 
links to Serbian military intelligence’s black operations in Bosnia—denied “Austria’s 
right to insist on any kind of satisfaction from Belgrade” and encouraged its ‘little 
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brothers’ in Serbia to resist militantly.486 More importantly, it sponsored “a seamless 
counter-narrative of the event at Sarajevo” painting Serbia as the victim of Habsburg 
anachronism (and eliding its own “sponsorship of Serbian expansionism and of Balkan 
instability in general”) and successfully popularized it throughout Europe.487 This was but 
the latest entry into what had become by 1914 a “widely trafficked narrative of Austria-
Hungary’s historically necessary decline . . . [that] gradually replaced an older set of 
assumptions about Austria’s role as a fulcrum of stability in Central and Eastern Europe, 
disinhibited Vienna’s enemies, undermining the notion that Austria-Hungary, like every 
other great power, possessed interests that it had the right robustly to defend.”488  
Importantly, the third and final element that transformed Sarajevo from a tragedy 
into a dire challenge to Austria-Hungary’s very existence was the loss of the man who 
most clearly recognized this narrative and sought to counter it with energetic action, 
Franz Ferdinand himself. He was an energetic reformer, a navalist eager to bolster 
Habsburg prestige, and a friend to minority nationalities within the empire, whom he 
wished to accommodate through a far-reaching transformation of the Monarchy into a 
federal state that would have created many Slav-majority jurisdictions.489 Princip himself 
justified his attack as a measure designed to prevent Ferdinand from carrying out his 
reforms and preventing the creation of a pan-Slav state.490 In this light, the ontological 
challenge posed by the assassination of the Habsburg heir is much clearer. In Clark’s 
words, “it was not just the extinction of the person Franz Ferdinand that mattered, it was 
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the blow to what he stood for: the future of the dynasty, of the empire and the ‘Habsburg 
State Idea’ that unified it.”491 
If, a moment of decision had been forced by the assassinations, then why did 
Austria-Hungary choose war? The evidence presented here strongly points to a loss of 
ontological security following not only the assassination of a vital cog in the complex 
machine of the Dual Monarchy’s government, but decades of uncertainty about its 
ability—and, especially, about the willingness of its peers to support—its role in a theatre 
essential to Great Power status and thus its national cohesion. The breakup of the 
Habsburg entity—the failure of the collective security system that held it together—was a 
terrifying, even unthinkable prospect to many within and without the empire. The 
uncertainty of what would happen after this occurred—and, recall, decision makers in 
Vienna and many other capitals were convinced that this hour would be at hand if the 
Serbs were not suppressed and the Russians turned back—stripped Austria-Hungary of 
its ontological security. As Jennifer Mitzen pointed out, “Where an actor has no idea 
what to expect, she cannot systematically relate ends to means, and it becomes unclear 
how to pursue her ends.” In such cases, even “harmful or self-defeating relationship[s]” 
can provide outlets for the routines and familiar cognitive patterns necessary for clear 
understanding of one’s place in the world.492 Unable to satisfy its status and role 
judicially, abandoned by most of its peers, and fearful of the permanent undermining of 
its Great Power status—the external superstructure holding in the tensions of its 
numerous nationalities—Austria-Hungary had little alternative but to act like a Great 
Power and assert its role and its right to exist in the face of an unruly secondary state in 
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its zone of special responsibility.493 With circumstances turning against it, war against 
Serbia “was the only serious choice left available. . . . It was therefore a rational choice, 
though made too late and executed badly, to attempt something drastic to change the 
rules and alter the tilt of the table [i.e., of the international system], even at the risk of 
knocking it over and ending the game.”494  
An ontological security dilemma ensued: Austria-Hungary had to fight Serbia to 
protect the routines and cognitive patterns of its role and status, but in doing so could 
only threaten those of its Russian neighbor. Given its fear of the future, it could only 
understand the former of these dire conditions.495 Thus, the ontological security dilemma 
facing Austria-Hungary set off a cascade of similar crises of ontological security that 
ultimately transformed the Third Balkan War into the First World War. If the Dual 
Monarchy’s position in 1914 boiled down to ‘fight Serbia or reconsider not only its 
longstanding Great Power role but also its Great Power status and thus its existence as a 
political entity’, Russia faced a similar dilemma. It was not that there existed an 
immediate threat to the physical security of Russian territory from Austria-Hungary’s 
potential punishment of Serbia—the occupation of Belgrade would, on the contrary, 
actually tie down the Dual Monarchy and hamper its ability to make war in the east. 
Rather, time-worn mental patterns of national ambition (directed at the Straits) and 
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ideological justification (the support of the Slavic states) had become ossified in the 
Russian political imaginary; a major reversal in the Balkans would obliterate years of 
successful diplomatic work and leave Russia without a geographic direction in which to 
expand and thus without a coherent Great Power role with its attendant authority claims 
of special rights and duties. A Great Power without authority was hardly a Great Power at 
all, and anything that placed this status at risk was unthinkable. This was true for all the 
Powers of this period, but especially for Russia, which had barely survived a crisis of 
status still fresh in its memory, the popular revolution that had followed its humiliating, 
debasing defeat at the hands of the Japanese. The Russian government had chosen to 
embrace the rush of nationalist, mass political sentiment in the aftermath of the revolution 
by tying the concept of the Russian nation to the Tsar and the national mission in the 
Balkans.496 Sazonov put it to the Tsar bluntly, proclaiming that “[Russia] would be 
considered a decadent state and would henceforth have to take second place among the 
powers”497 if it turned its back on the Balkans, lamenting also to the Council of Ministers 
that “Russian prestige. . .would collapse utterly.”498 It would be the Japanese War all over 
again. 
Russia thus began the July Crisis with no intention of supporting any claims 
Austria-Hungary might make on Serbia as a result of the assassinations; the reactions of 
its officials at home and abroad were noted for their disregard of diplomatic protocol and 
basic manners, evidence that the consequences of Serbian guilt and Austrian victimhood 
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verged on the unthinkable for its policymakers.499 Russia’s commitment to its Balkan role 
easily thus overrode the empathy one might otherwise expect from the most autocratic 
and traditional of the Great Powers. Instead, there was great anxiety about the potential 
results of inaction and great hope for the fruits of firm action against the Habsburg 
conglomerate. Fear counseled war. Inaction would undo its diplomacy in the Balkans by 
humbling its Serbian client; worse, since Austria-Hungary was unlikely to take Serbian 
territory for itself, there was a real possibility of partitioning Serbia among the other 
Balkan states, perhaps the beginning of an anti-Russian bloc organized by Vienna to bar 
it from the Straits. Were that to occur, Russia would be definitively contained at a series 
of maritime choke points by upstart or weak Powers (Britain and Turkey at the Straits, 
Britain and Germany in the Baltic and North Sea, and Japan and Britain in Asia). For an 
industrializing nation dependent on maritime commerce, this would have been a 
destabilizing, delegitimizing state of affairs.500 For a nation long accustomed to 
expansion and promises of destiny, its containment and isolation would be ontologically 
disorienting—and the Russian nation had already seen too much disorientation in the 20th 
century. Were its Great Power status to be again imperiled, Russia could easily find itself 
once more in the dangerous atmosphere of 1905. It was in this spirit that the Tsar and his 
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advisers resolved to deny Austria-Hungary the satisfaction it required, for this satisfaction 
could not be squared with Russia’s own ontological security. 
 These fears dictated what response was thinkable for the Russian state after the 
assassinations, so it is no surprise that the Russians ordered full mobilization against both 
the Monarchy and its German ally.501 This they did out of both calculation—they were 
certain Germany would not sit out a Russian invasion of Austrian Poland—and out of a 
desire for a general settling of accounts that would alleviate Russia’s virtual containment. 
The Tsar articulated a set of war aims remarkable for the scale of their revision as they 
tried to solve all of Russia’s security problems, physical and ontological, at once. 
Together, they offer a fascinating look into how Russia’s Great Power role would seek to 
remake Europe while pursuing the same traditional, expansionist aims it had used for 
centuries: Austria-Hungary to be demolished, with the Habsburgs allowed only Salzburg 
and the Tyrol (‘Austria’ would not even possess Vienna), Germany to be disassembled 
into a number of small states (a Balkanization that would allow St. Petersburg to repeat 
the same processes of penetration that it had deployed in southern Europe), the 
culmination of a Russian “historic mission” to reunite the old lands of Poland under the 
Tsar, and the establishment of a Russian protectorate over Istanbul (this was prior, of 
course, to Ottoman entry on the side of the Central Powers).502 All these revisions—
including the elimination of two Great Powers—had the same goal: the opening up of 
new areas for the effective expression of Russian authority claims satisfying its role and 
providing it with self-assurance. Russia would expand to keep its Great Power status, to 
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find space over which to exert its national missions, to placate an unsteady populace, and, 
ultimately, to survive as it had for centuries—through growth. In the event, however, 
Russia was unable to assert these claims and these fears ended up being justified: the 
empire of the Tsars disintegrated from within. 
Long confronted by the classic security dilemma in its colonial expansion, 
Russia’s actions in July 1914 only perpetuated the ontological security dilemma cascade 
touched off by the assassination of the Habsburg heir. By mobilizing against Germany 
before that Power had taken any measures of its own, against Austria before it had 
mobilized in the east, and by activating its alliance with the French, Russia made clear 
that the conflict would not be localized to the Balkans.503 Like their Austro-Hungarian 
allies, the Germans had only their routines, their fears, and the certainties of their dyadic 
role relationships to rely upon in the face of this new development. In this case, the 
sudden and unprovoked Russian mobilization against Germany played right into the 
ontological weak spot of German security: its fear of encirclement. This had plagued 
German planners since the inauguration of the Franco-Russian alliance, and the bellicose, 
uncompromising noises being made in both St. Petersburg and Paris left little room in the 
German policy imaginary for creative solutions for the maintenance of the status quo. 
Berlin could not lose Vienna, its only firm ally on the continent, without finding itself 
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surrounded. Further, Germany was still a powerful status quo voice eager to defend the 
prerogatives of Great Powers in secondary states, and therefore felt Austria-Hungary was 
justified in policing the region in which its role granted it special interests; whatever 
interests Russia’s own role there granted it would surely be overridden by the principles 
of monarchical and Great Power solidarity.504 When it became clear that this was not the 
case, Germany mobilized and activated its war plans for a quick war to subdue France 
followed by a long one to defeat Russia. This was a logical decision based on its deep-
seated fear of a limitless army of Russian peasant-soldiers threatening it from the east; it 
did not have the strength to wait for a French attack in the west and hold off the Russian 
army—even a neutral France would have posed an unacceptable threat by requiring a 
guarding force to be left in the west. Since Germany pictured the war in the east as a 
titanic showdown of uncertain resolution, it could not allow France to divide its forces. 
Thus, it resolved to strike France through neutral Belgium because any other plan would 
have resulted in a two-front war German policymakers were certain it would lose. 
Encirclement would have been achieved, and Germany would be caught in a Franco-
Russian pincher movement which would crush it and leave its Great Power status—
perhaps even its status as a single nation—at the mercy of French revanchistes and 
Russian ‘hordes’.  
 Finally, the ontological security dilemma reached out to encompass Great Britain. 
Strictly speaking, despite the avowedly anti-German feelings of the British leadership, 
British participation on the side of the Entente was not a given.505 The Balkans remained 
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peripheral to Britain’s wider Great Power role, and the Franco-Russian alliance could 
field forces that, at least on paper, were superior to those fielded by the Central Powers. 
Yet, a combination of interests and relationships counselled war to protect Britain’s main 
wellspring of ontological security, its imperial Great Power role. The single most 
important element was its cooperative role dyad with Russia. Britain’s continuing 
vulnerability to Russian attack in Asia was very much on the minds of the Foreign Office 
in the months leading up to the crisis, leading the British ambassador to St. Petersburg to 
point out to London that “Russia is rapidly becoming so powerful that we must retain her 
friendship at almost any cost. If she acquires the conviction that we are unreliable and 
useless as a friend, she may one day strike a bargain with Germany and resume her 
liberty of action in Turkey and Persia. Our position then would be a very parlous one.”506 
The loss of its empire to which this note alludes would have completely upended 
centuries of the behavioral routines and cognitive patterns comprising the British role, 
and consequently disrupt its ontological security; in light of this, the British decision to 
defend its interests by “appeasing and tethering Russia” through a dyadic relationship 
was logical.507 To prevent the destruction of this dyad, Britain would have to ensure that 
Russia won the war, but also that it did so with British help. 
A second important impetus for war came from Britain’s commitments, moral and 
material, to the defense of Belgium and France. When Lloyd George told an audience a 
few months later that “National honour is a reality, and any nation that disregards it is 
doomed,” he was explaining how this moral commitment to one’s friends was actually a 
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motivating factor as Britain evaluated the circumstances of July 1914.508 Though all the 
Powers valued national honor and cited it in their declarations of war, only Britain found 
itself with sufficient freedom of action for it to become a significant factor in an 
evaluation of the merits of belligerency and neutrality.509 In case of Belgium, British 
policymakers quickly determined during the July Crisis that they were not legally 
obligated by the 1839 Treaty of London to defend Belgium from attack, and there was 
even talk of permitting a German violation of Belgian territory provided they stayed 
away from Antwerp. The actual German invasion, however, was not an orderly stroll 
through Liège on the way to Paris. Rather, it sparked fierce Belgian resistance that turned 
what the Germans hoped to portray as a temporary derogation of international law in the 
name of national self-preservation (recall, those Russian ‘hordes’ would soon be arriving 
in Pommerania) into a full-scale invasion of a neutral state within Britain’s sphere of 
influence, and consequently a direct challenge to its Great Power authority claim there. 
There was also much made of Britain’s moral commitment to France, which had denuded 
its northern coast of defenses and sent its fleet to the Mediterranean as a result of its 
British alliance; how could France defend itself from the powerful German navy if 
Britain abandoned it? The only answer was some form of protective action, such as 
interdicting the German fleet. The foreign secretary gave a widely-acclaimed speech to 
this effect during the crisis which has been credited with helping shift opinion toward 
British intervention.510 Thus, Britain’s physical security—at least in the short term—was 
not really at issue in 1914, but it still had to confront a pair of questions related to its 
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ontological security: if the Entente were to succeed without it, what would become of its 
empire in the face of an unchecked Russia? If the Entente were to fail, what would 
become of Britain’s honor and standing? These elements of Britain’s self-
understanding—its imperial role and its reputation—were thus sufficient for the cascade 
of ontological security dilemmas to reach out and propel it to war.  
c. Theoretic Implications  
The contingent international order provided by this semi-archical, right- and 
responsibility-based ordering had its moment of truth in 1914. It failed its essential 
purpose, the maintenance of restrained Great Power competition, but not it did not fail in 
its operation. Indeed, the cascade of ontological security dilemmas that paved the way to 
world war grew naturally out of tensions inbuilt within the roles of the Great Powers and 
the authoritative claims of rights and duties they asserted through them. The Great 
Powers of the 19th century did not just enact their roles, they internalized them, linked 
them together with the other members of the Concert, and relied upon the time-honored 
practices of consideration, compensation, and cooperation to sublimate the competitive 
tensions inherent to an international politics of moral and material scarcity. In the end, 
this complex of rights and responsibilities did not really fail the Powers; rather, it was a 
victim of its own success. It was not the Powers cared too little for these principles. 
Rather, they cared too much. 
In abstract terms, July 1914 saw a contradiction in role relationships that could 
not be easily papered-over brought to a head by a crisis uniquely-positioned to create an 
ontological do-or-die moment for a particular Power. This first Power, concerned for its 





through war with a secondary state. This created an ontological security dilemma 
because, though this Power did not seek a Great Power war, the act of shoring up its own 
ontological security indirectly threatened that of a second Power. This second Power’s 
role was also intimately concerned with the secondary state—indeed, its domestic 
legitimacy was tied up with its position there in a mirror-image of the first Power. These 
two Powers happened to belong to different alliance blocs, themselves expressing other 
dyads, competitive and cooperative, deeply implicated in the social construction of this 
period’s international politics. Thus, “the conflicts of the Balkan theatre became tightly 
intertwined with the geopolitics of the European system, creating a set of escalatory 
mechanisms that would enable a conflict of Balkan inception to engulf the continent.”511 
Within a month, all the relevant dyads had been activated as the arguably defensive 
belligerency of each Power—each trying to protect its status and self-understanding—
threatened the forcible alteration of behavioral patterns and cognitive routines built into 
the ontological security of other Powers.512 As a result, the complex of rights and 
responsibilities that had grown organically for centuries was abandoned in favor of a 
general war that finally brought on the systems change that Great Power politics had 
staved off for so long. 
To conclude by mapping this abstract summary onto actual events, it is useful to 
return to Bahar Rumelili’s definition of ontological insecurity articulated in a footnote at 
the beginning of this section. It is clear that July Crisis—a product of centuries of Great 
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Power rights and responsibilities—bore all five of hallmarks of a conflict originating in a 
loss of ontological security:  
1. [Ontological insecurity] set[s] in motion political and social processes . . . 
reproduc[ing] and reactivat[ing] conflicts. . . . generat[ing] pressures for the 
reinstatement of conflict narratives and practices . . . provid[ing] consistent, 
firm, and non-negotiable answers to existential questions about being and 
acting, through friend/enemy distinctions and securitization.  
 
Austria and Russia, both shaken by military defeat and domestic instability, 
reformulated their Great Power roles by claiming special collections of rights and duties 
across the same geographic area, the Balkans. Neither could afford to totally withdraw 
these claims once they were staked, especially after geopolitical developments elsewhere 
redefined the region as an essential periphery for both. Since influence over this region 
was important to the enactment of their respective self-understandings as Great Powers, 
there resulted a self-reproducing situation of conflict.513 Though this conflict narrative 
could be mediated and sublimated by the traditional right of compensation and the duty 
of consideration, it could never be totally overwritten as long as claims important to each 
state’s ontological security overlapped in a mutually-exclusive fashion. A friend/enemy 
distinction thus came to prevail rather than a cooperative, managerial partnership, and a 
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 2. Ontological insecurity undermines trust and accentuates the perception of 
general threat from the outside world.  
 
As this situation worsened over decades, particularly after the Serbian palace coup 
in 1903 and the Austro-Hungarian annexations in 1907, the anxiety both Powers felt over 
their positions in the region manifested itself in policy papers, military plans, and 
armaments purchases as the perception of threat grew more acute. Austria-Hungary felt 
abandoned by its Concert partners and was increasingly turning to unilateral action as its 
primary policy tool in the region. At the same time, Russia had watched uneasily as the 
Balkans had grown more unstable after it had backed down over the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
annexation and over more recent crises related to the creation of Albania. The result was 
increasing concern among Russian policymakers over their longstanding ambitions to 
control the Straits. Even though these setbacks took place far from actual Russian 
territory, did not directly implicate Russian physical security, and did not lead to 
particularly advantageous gains for a rival Power, what mattered is that Russia’s trust in 
cooperation had been diminished and its perception of an ontological threat to its role 
subsequently increased.  
Both Powers drew grave lessons from these events about the need for assertive 
action to defend their roles. Thus resulted “a kind of temporal claustrophobia that we find 
at work in the reasoning of many European statesmen of this era—a sense that time was 
running out, that in an environment where assets were waning and threats were growing, 
any delay was sure to bring severe penalties.”515 This fear extended to the allies of both 
Powers, whose positions in cooperative Great Power role dyads linked their ontological 
security to the outcome of the competitive Austria-Russia dyad. Germany, the Dual 
                                                             





Monarchy’s only real ally, lacked confidence in its partner; this was detectable by the 
Habsburg policymakers themselves, and only intensified their fear of backing down from 
what they saw as the honorable assertion of their role. Similarly, the Germans were 
increasingly eager to ascertain “the true level of threat posed by Russia,” and used the 
July Crisis as a method of “testing for threats” by waiting to observe what military 
measures Russia took before taking any itself (ceding, in the process, its ability to 
influence events). When intelligence reports began to filter back that a secret general 
mobilization was underway in Russian Poland, this was all the Germans needed to 
confirm their worst fears about Franco-Russian encirclement.516  
The July Crisis was likewise characterized by France’s deep-seated concern about 
its Russian ally’s uncertain strength and resolution. France had been greatly disturbed by 
Russia’s failure to aggressively assert its position during the Balkan crisis of 1913. This 
strongly encouraged French policymakers to reinforce the perception of external threat in 
St. Petersburg as a way of stiffening Russian resolve; when the French President visited 
that city in July 1914, he carried with him a message of aggressive support that French 
policymakers hoped would encourage Russia not to back down from a potential conflict. 
So great was French anxiety over its Russian ally—a state in which the French nation had 
invested millions of francs and years of ambition—that its “security credo” could be 
summarized as “the alliance is our bedrock; it is the indispensable key to our military 
defence; it can only be maintained by intransigence in the face of demands from the 
opposing bloc.”517 The incompatibility of the Austria-Russia dyad in the Balkans thus 
extended beyond those two Powers to their immediate associates, activating the 
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ontological security dilemma within the cooperative France-Russia and Germany-Austria 
dyads and encouraging both alliance blocs to feel as though the July Crisis posed a threat 
worthy of war.  
3. It, thus, creates a setting conducive to the manipulation of this distrust by 
political actors, who act to re-channel this anxiety into specific and habituated 
fears. . . . . 
5. It may also empower spoilers of the peace processes.  
 In this ontological security dispute, carried out in an atmosphere of universal fear 
and mistrust, voices calling for war on both sides were greatly empowered. As the 
Austria-Russia dyad grew more ossified and competitive in the early 20th century, 
policymakers in both camps linked its frictions to wider programs of national ontological 
security-seeking, channeling and attenuating their perceptions of what happened in, say, 
Belgrade so that it became essential to the resolution of disputes elsewhere. Among the 
Central Powers, particularly concerned with what they habitually saw as their gradual 
isolation and encirclement, this did much to encourage a resort to the general staffs of 
their armies.518 These organizations had been living in an atmosphere of claustrophobia 
and fear for decades, and their solution was to call for the breaking out of the Entente 
snare by smashing it militarily; particular attention was given to the forecasting of 
Russian armaments and railway growth since these developments acted as a 
technological accelerant to a very old German and Austrian fear of endless Russian 
‘hordes’ falling upon them from the east. On the side of the Entente, this situation 
conversely empowered radical civilian voices calling for the aggressive assertion of 
programs of national destiny, all desiring a successful confrontation with the Central 
Powers to resolve longstanding ontological insecurities directly derived from the 
                                                             





nationalist, revanchist, and chauvinist sentiments that their polities had embraced. Alsace 
and Lorraine, the Balkans and the Straits: these issues were bundled together through 
decades of nervous, mounting anxiety over the Austria-Russia dyad. The fear thereby 
inbuilt meant that, for the French and Russians, the road to Strasbourg and 
Constantinople traveled first through Belgrade and Vienna.  
Moreover, the pent up tensions of a long period of relatively pacific Great Power 
relations concealing significant role contradictions made many look on a major war as an 
opportunity rather than a catastrophe. For war-parties on both sides, the July Crisis 
presented above all a chance to finally resolve the contradictions that had built up over a 
century of the right and responsibility complex’s operation—a chance to break and 
reformulate rules, to resolve ontological anxieties, and open up new geographic regions 
and issue areas for the assertion of Great Power roles. Kaiser Wilhelm II’s resigned 
statement his generals upon discovering that his Anglo-German peace initiative was not 
going to succeed (he had even had champagne served to celebrate the localization of the 
conflict) captured the how the tenure of restraint and confidence was finally giving way 
to assertiveness and fear: “Now you can do what you want.”519 
4. Ontological insecurity may hamper the negotiation process by leading parties 
to elevate minor outstanding aspects of the deal to existential issues, 
generating new issues of discord beyond the ones addressed by the conflict 
resolution process.  
 
Finally, much of the rhetoric and procedure of the July Crisis revolved around the 
Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia enumerating a series of reforms to redress violent 
irredentism and demands for joint Austro-Serbian action to investigate and prosecute the 
crime. When Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, famously proclaimed it “the 
                                                             





most formidable document he had ever seen addressed by one State to another that was 
independent” he was encapsulating a particular side effect of ontological insecurity, the 
tendency to transform minor issues of dispute into accelerants of conflict.520 The 
ultimatum was hardly outside the norm of Great Power politics, and one cannot help but 
wonder what the Boers, or the Egyptians, or the Chinese would say in response to Grey’s 
assertion. However, in this context, with Russia and France already determined to block 
any measure of satisfaction for Austria-Hungary and promoting an aggressively anti-
Habsburg counter-narrative, Grey’s reading of it elevated the specific demands to a level 
not in keeping with their real significance. What was really at issue was the satisfaction 
the Dual Monarchy demanded by reference to its rights as an aggrieved Great Power with 
a special Balkan role, not the wording or even the manner in which that satisfaction was 
ultimately provided. But Grey, dragging British foreign policy with him, focused on the 
ultimatum rather than the substance of the problem it identified. Consequently, no serious 
British proposals for mediation—i.e., those that offered any real chance of affirming 
Austria-Hungary’s right to address the Serbian threat in any way—were ever offered 
during the crisis. This was not because Grey was rabidly anti-Austrian nor because he 
wanted war in the Balkans; rather, they stemmed from the barrier to consultation and 
conciliation thrown up by the uncompromising wording of the ultimatum—a minor factor 
of discord that the circumstances of the ontological security crisis elevated to a position 
of outsized importance.521 
In conclusion, prior to 1914 all the Powers could obtain and hold their ontological 
security independently, a universe of absolute gains backed by a complex of rights and 
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responsibilities sanctifying and legitimizing those gains. This was a delicate balancing act 
that ultimately gave way at Sarajevo—or, rather, at the reaction of Russia and France to 
Sarajevo, which foreclosed any possibility of Austria-Hungary maintaining even an 
outward appearance of imperial routine in the Balkans. Afterward, ontological security 
became a zero-sum game, first within Austria-Hungary, then between Austria-Hungary 
and Russia, then between Germany and France, and finally Great Britain-Germany and 
Great Britain-France. Dyads long in place linking together pairs of Great Power roles 
were activated, both competitive ones counseling war and cooperative ones 
disincentivizing resistance to it. The Third Balkan War became the First World War, and 
the First World War expanded outward in an ever-increasing cascade of fear and 
bloodshed. 
V. Conclusion 
To summarize, late 19th and early 20th century Europe was characterized by a 
semi-archical international system in which a small number of Great Powers possessed 
disproportionate shares of the systemic distribution of material capacity and colored their 
mutual relations with normative concepts of rights and duties. This established a shifting, 
multivariate, and relational order among them in which material ability was at times 
tempered, at times enhanced by purposive understandings of shared identity and 
parochial role. Within this system, partially inherited from centuries of past practice and 
partially institutionalized by the Vienna settlement, ‘Great Power’ had itself been reified 
to a point that it no longer merely reflected the moral and material changes that took 
place around it, but could actually influence the consequences of those changes by 





over a geographic regions and issues areas. As in the past, these authority claims were 
rendered in the language of rights and duties and packaged into bundles of behaviors and 
attitudes forming parochial Great Power roles. Where this period differed from what had 
come before, however, was in the presence of exogenous forces of change such as 
nationalism, industrialization, and globalization. These called into creation new rising 
Powers; though they proved eager to socialize along traditional Great Power lines, their 
need to articulate their own roles and express their own authority gradually began to 
crowd the international system with increasing numbers of right and duty claims, national 
missions, and strategic necessities. The Great Power system struggled to hold these 
multiplying motivations together peaceably. Contradictions developed, roles became 
incompatible, and, ultimately, the Powers were unable to hold together a system in which 
Great Power competition was restrained to protect the ontological security of each Power, 
even losers in particular contests. 
The theoretic implications of this narrative thus call attention to how the organic 
development of a semi-archical ordering of states reliant on an informal complex of 
rights and duties can accumulate contradictory social and material relations. Great Power 
politics is neither inherently conflictual nor inherently cooperative, but is rather 
determined by the compatibility of their respective roles and the incentives and 
disincentives disclosed by their shared identity. As changing social and material contexts 
multiply the number of actors claiming a concretized status and reduce the geographic 
and social space available for the expression of their special roles and authority claims, 
the ability of the system to promote isomorphism—a great ally in socializing new Powers 





the long term by forestalling the innovative resolution of ontological security dilemmas 
and hardening competitive and cooperative role dyads into alliance blocs increasingly 
focused on zero-sum, relative gains. As a result, the system becomes increasingly 
sensitive to points of sublimated tensions and particularly prone to cascades of 
ontological security dilemmas. When this cascade historically began in July 1914, it 
provoked an upheaval that would shatter the right- and responsibility-complex’s 
conceptual and operation components, bequeathing a legacy to international politics 










At first we sang of how we would knock the hell out of Helgoland and hang the Kaiser and 
march over there and clean up the mess them damn foreigners had made. 
 
- John Steinbeck, East of Eden (1952) 
 
The power of the United States is a menace to no nation or people. It will never be used in 
aggression or for the aggrandizement of any selfish interest of our own. It springs out of 
freedom and is for the service of freedom. 
 
- Woodrow Wilson 
 
Sir Humphrey Appleby: Minister, Britain has had the same foreign policy objective for at 
least the last 500 years: to create a disunited Europe. In that cause we have fought with the 
Dutch against the Spanish, with the Germans against the French, with the French and 
Italians against the Germans, and with the French against the Germans and Italians. Divide 
and rule, you see. Why should we change now, when it’s worked so well? 
 
- “The Writing on the Wall,” Yes, Minister (1980)522 
 
I. Summary 
These chapters have traced how a complex of international rights and responsibilities 
came to define the identity and roles of the Great Powers, thus exerting a significant 
influence on the development of international relations. This complex was deeply rooted 
in the contingencies of European history, growing organically out of the anarchy of the 
early Middle Ages. There, overlapping relationships of rights and duties mediated 
violence and insecurity, first at the micro-social level but later at progressively wider 
levels of political life. This ordering feudal habitus—discourses of purposive rights and 
duties ontologically contextualizing material capacity—would exert an enduring 
influence on how the emerging international sphere was understood and operationalized; 
as feudal conglomerates gave way to autonomous states, it was to these concepts that 
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they turned to make sense of themselves. As a result, this creedal inheritance of rights 
and duties was combined with the rational imperatives of modernity to create an 
international system of sovereign states.  
Though formally anarchical, this system was actually ordered by a sophisticated 
social arrangement of Great Power relationships based on mutually-comprehensible 
rights and duties. These were expressed through a shared identity as well as a number of 
differentiated roles unique to individual Powers. This was a semi-archical order, a 
pluralistic compromise that straddled extremes by providing a measure of contingent 
governance without creating a strict, hierarchical ordering of the units based on any 
single variable. It admitted the rights of law as well as force; it confessed transcendent 
responsibilities to higher principles as well as duties to commit necessary evils in the 
name of greater national and transnational goods. There was violence and injustice within 
it, but they were tempered by a minimal set of normative and material checks that 
generally kept the system balanced and minimally governed; there was cooperation and 
moral unity within it as well, but never to such a degree that the independence of the 
members was threatened by a supra-national, universalist alternative. The material 
abilities of its Powers were understood in light of their moral commitments to their peers, 
to the political community around them, and to their own self-understandings. These 
encouraged certain behaviors, discouraged others, and kept European international 
activity rooted in a shared political culture that promoted mutual recognition, 
consideration, and restraint among its members. This was viewed as a precious public 
good by many, and over time this arrangement was institutionalized to the point that the 





and duties expressed by the individual Powers came to exert legitimatized ordering 
authority across regions and issue areas. Viewed from the late 19th century, this long arc 
proceeding from feudalism to the Concert of Europe could even seem to be a sort of 
divinely-instituted evolutionary process by which the ‘circle’ of violent material capacity 
and anarchical self-seeking was ‘squared’ by the moral structure of the Great Powers’ 
status and authority. Wrote one legist: 
It is not merely that the stronger states have influence proportionate to their 
strength; but that custom has given them what can hardly be distinguished from a 
legal right to settle certain questions as they please, the smaller states being 
obliged to acquiesce in their decisions. At present this right is in a rudimentary 
stage; but it tends steadily to increase in importance. Great living statesmen build 
their best hopes for the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes upon 
the preservation of the European Concert; and the European Concert means 
nothing more or less than the agreement of the six Great Powers. . . . [I]t is 
impossible to hold any longer the old doctrine of the absolute equality of all 
independent states before the law. It is dead; and we ought to put in its place the 
new doctrine that the Great Powers have by modern International Law a primacy 
among their fellows, which bids fair to develop into a central authority for the 
settlement of all disputes between the nations of Europe. . . . [The Concert] is a 
natural and healthy growth. It has sprung without any forcing out of the 
circumstances of modern Europe; and therefore it possesses a chance of 
permanence. It is probably destined to become more and more effective as the 
desire for a peaceful settlement of their quarrels increases among the nations; and 
it may in some far distant time develop into that Supreme Court of International 
Appeal, for which statesmen, philosophers, and divines have longed throughout 
the last three centuries.523 
 
However, this was not to be. The relatively continuous development of the right- 
and responsibility-complex since early modernity ultimately came to grief on the fruits of 
its own success. It survived the transition from a Europe of dynastic Powers to a world of 
nationalist ones, continuing an unprecedented period of peace, stability, and growth—but 
it did so only by reproducing old structures overtop of new territories and new nations. 
Rising Powers wanted status and authority on the same terms as their established peers, 
                                                             





while these established Powers found themselves challenged to keep up with the 
changing requirements of status and role. This wasn’t substantive development, but rather 
simple replication. The behavioral routines and cognitive patterns of the complex did not 
evolve as the moral and material contexts of the 19th century went through their own 
profound transformations; instead, the same essential ideas and practices that had been in 
operation for centuries were simply expressed by an ever-growing number of Powers 
across a now-globalized field of competition. In essence, the capacity of states to do 
violence and the capacity of ideas to challenge old forms were growing exponentially, but 
the routines of international politics were experiencing only additive increase. This 
incongruity made an upheaval event possible as the system crowded itself out: more 
Powers meant more roles expressing more authority claims of rights and duties, and this 
would necessarily multiply areas of tension and points of potential conflict in a system 
with greater violence potential than ever before. 
Yet, the fact that a radical upheaval event was possible did not mean that it was 
inevitable. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of the complex across the centuries had been its 
ability to promote the reconciliation of tensions through mutually-recognized rights and 
duties of restraint, consideration, compensation, and coordination. What changed this was 
the moral shift that took place inside the Powers during the 19th century. The rights, 
duties, and roles of kings had been transferred to the nations they ruled. Popular politics 
inflamed the conduct of Great Power politics by publicizing it, promoting the 
concretization of its status, expanding its ability to reach the average citizen through 
elections and conscript armies, and making formerly dynastic roles into national ones. 





raised the stakes of Great Power competition by making the expression of a role 
important to the self-understanding not only of a dynastic elite, but of entire nations. 
Rights and duties thus embodied not only the policy of broad political communities, but 
their respective senses of ontological security: the routines, cognitive patterns, and 
assumptions by which they situated themselves in the world. Thus, conflicts over issues 
and regions that might seem at first glance peripheral to a Power’s physical existence 
could easily become serious tests of rights and duties essential to a Great Power role and, 
thus, to a nation’s sense of existential purpose and social position. These conditions 
gravely strained the ability of a common discourse of rights and duties to provide a 
mediating mechanism for disputes; increasingly, the reconciliation of tensions was 
replaced with their simple sublimation. This endangered peace because it brought the 
system closer to the sort of zero-sum competition that would encourage a Power that felt 
threatened to abandon the relational, semi-archical ordering of international politics 
provided by norms and relationships and instead resort to a purely-material program of 
violence to make itself ontologically and physically secure. This linkage of Great Power 
role to the ontological security of national states provided the conditions necessary for a 
crisis that could rapidly engulf the system, shatter the complex, and threaten the many 
compromises—moral and material, anarchical and hierarchical—held together beneath 
the umbrella of an imperfect semi-archy. 
In the event, this mechanism was triggered by a situation in the Balkans brought 
to a head by a plethora of historical, cultural, and material contingencies. The ontological 
self-understanding of Europe’s most contingent Great Power polity was put under threat; 





declaring war on Serbia. This threatened the role of Russia, which threatened Russia’s 
ontological security. Russia was thus given a choice: sublimate these tensions as it had 
done in the past and risk (as it saw it) permanent ontological insecurity, or abandon the 
relational, semi-archical arrangements that had guided Europe for a century in favor of a 
decisive resolution through a contest of material capacity—a general war of the type not 
seen since Vienna. In selecting the latter, it was prioritizing its understanding of its own 
essential purposes—rendered, of course, as rights and duties within a role—over the 
shared rights and duties that kept the Great Powers collectively at peace. The point had 
finally been reached at which relationships and norms could no longer satisfy the status 
and authority needs of all the Powers at once. Someone would have to finally and 
definitively lose; something had to be shaken up in either the moral and material 
distributions of international politics or in how the international system coped with 
disparities within them. Thus, the units of the system finally abandoned the uncertainties 
and anxieties of semi-archy for the clarities of an international politics based on a 
combination of force and moral absolutism. 
From medieval Francian peasants seeking security by obligating themselves to 
men with horses to Great Powers agreeing to normalize and bound their behaviors 
through a shared identity built around a discourse of rights and duties, the story of how 
Great Power politics acquired its normative standards traversed a millennium of 
European history. Established in its highest, most institutionalized form to date in the 19th 
century, it ultimately contributed to the upheaval that would be its undoing. The First 
World War, a conflict born of right- and duty-claims correlated to the states with the 





together. All that remains is to examine how this post-war development decoupled rights, 
duties, and material capacity in international politics, and to discuss the influence of this 
movement on contemporary affairs. 
II. Great Power Rights and Responsibilities in Contemporary International Politics 
 In the centuries leading up to the First World War, European international order 
had been an informal affair. The Great Powers shared a political culture built around 
certain common and differentiated rights and duties that, on the whole, tended to mediate 
anarchy and bound competition. This resulted in norms-based relationships that held 
together a relational, semi-archical ordering that stood somewhere between both a formal 
anarchy in which the system had no discernible patterns of order or governance and a 
clear, command-based hierarchical ordering of the states. This worked, in that Europe’s 
states and peoples prospered over the long arc of the 2nd millennium; but its imprecision, 
its contradictions, and its propensity for unjust outcomes often frustrated legists and other 
parties searching for some form of order that was less contingent than the society of the 
Great Powers. In their view, the horrors of the Western Front stemmed directly from this 
strange intermixture of premodern normative concepts with the existential anxieties and 
tremendous violence capacity of the modern Great Power and states-system. The notion 
that the rights and duties of Great Power politics-as-usual boiled down to “might makes 
right” was linked directly to the narrative of Germany militarism and Austrian atavism 
that won the day when the guns fell silent in 1918.524 Spurred on by the entry of the 
United States into the war as an ‘associate’ of the allies, the enthusiasm for a peace that 
would abandon the old ways for something new reached a fever pitch. What Kennan later 
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called “this dread plague of ununderstanding [sic] Americans” first descended upon 
European shores with the arrival of Woodrow Wilson bearing a message of progress and 
reform—the elimination of “the method of the Congress of Vienna [to which] we cannot 
and will not return” and of “the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of 
power.”525 The ship that bore the “young, scholarly, sanguine and idealistic” American 
negotiating party carried solutions to Europe’s ancient problems; it was an “argosy of 
peace . . . whole libraries, in heavy oak packing cases, crammed the hold: the bulkheads 
groaned, the stanchions strained under the collective weight of their erudition.”526 The 
crowds that greeted its presidential passenger “regard[ed] him as something akin to the 
Prince of Peace, without inquiring too precisely into the meaning of peace.”527 George 
Bernard Shaw, inquiring somewhat more closely, proclaimed Wilson “the man of 
principle,” a “living engine [bringing] the entirely mystic force of evolution” to a 
benighted Europe of “Opportunists.”528 Change—forestalled, sublimated, and redirected 
for a century—had finally arrived; the last casualty of the war would be the complex of 
Great Power rights and duties that had created it. 
The story of the Versailles treaties and their international system is well-known 
and needs no detailed recounting here, but it is worthwhile to consider the particular 
consequences of the changes they wrought in how states internalized concepts such as 
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status and authority, identity and role, and right and duty. If the governance of 
international violence through an informal complex of norms had led Europe to four 
years of slaughter, then it was a logical response to shatter this complex, redistributing its 
components and reconfiguring international relations into a cooperative regime based on 
formal law. This was the idealistic program the Americans brought with them, but though 
the traditional complex linking rights, duties, and material capacity was successfully 
broken apart, its constituent components were not destroyed. Rights, duties, and material 
capacity continued to drive state behavior, but in patterns that differed from what had 
come before—only their traditional patterns of linkage were suppressed. The tragically 
imperfect formalization of right and duty at Versailles coincided with a turning-away of 
the materially-preeminent states from the norms-based mediation provided in the past by 
a close-knit peer group of Great Powers. Because of these two movements, right, duty, 
and capacity would be less coherently bound up in a complex of purposive norms and 
behaviors than they had been in the past. 
The international ordering that emerged from Versailles exchanged the dynamism 
and informality that had animated the right- and responsibility-complex before its gradual 
decay for a rigid collective security system based on a significant reconfiguration of 
normative principles.529 The League of Nations regime treated international responsibility 
as a quality independent of compensatory right, and international right as a quality 
possessed independently of duties and abilities. New states were formed based on 
nationalist right claims; that these states could not possibly hope to muster the material 
capacity to defend themselves from their larger neighbors did not matter. A regime of 
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shared responsibility for world peace was put into place, but excluded some of the former 
Great Powers most likely to endanger it; Germany and Russia, despite their continuing 
possession of tremendous reserves of human and material resources, were essentially 
exiled from international society and left bereft of legitimate roles. Conversely, other 
materially-capable states, such as Britain and France, were assigned specific duties and 
rights outside of Europe through the mandate system; though the regime under which 
they were exercised changed, their traditional Great Power roles remained the same save 
that they were formally charged with a duty to uplift those territories they had forcibly 
seized and colonized. Of course, the new order had little to do with the United States, 
whose citizenry’s “hostility to the idea of yet greater responsibilities” eschewed any 
institutionalized involvement in Great Power politics writ large—this even as it 
maintained both a newfound global material preeminence as well as a role based around a 
civilizing mission in its own hemisphere.530 Its lack of commitment to the League and its 
systems matched its earlier reluctance to engage with the right- and responsibility-
complex of the past. And, of course, Japan’s claim to status of Great Power was actually 
debased under this regime as the codification of international practice through League 
documents and armaments treaties ultimately introduced an avenue for racial difference 
to mark Japan out as separate from the club; this led to its withdrawal from the 
international normative system in favor of a program of naked conquest in Asia. The 
deficiencies of the League in many areas helped pave the way to the Second World War, 
but its inability to facilitate a level of Great Power ‘buy-in’ at least equivalent to the 
earlier right- and responsibility-complex it replaced must rank near the top of this list. 
                                                             





Another war was the short-term consequence of these reforms, which collectively 
amounted to the wide-ranging revision of a very old arrangement of norms and behaviors 
correlated to a select group of states called the Great Powers. In the long run, however, it 
would become clear that the concept of Great Power itself had been muddled by this 
intrusion of conscious planning into what had hitherto been a largely organic 
developmental process. The most striking example is of course the creation of the United 
Nations Security Council as the directing organ of the League’s successor. At first, this 
might seem a newfound institutionalization of Great Power rights and duties. In reality, 
however, the institution of the Security Council—a formal-legal, command-based 
directorate—broke sharply with the traditions of previous centuries by making the 
preeminence of a small group of states an irrevocable, unchanging position of privilege 
endowed with special legal rights binding on other states but lacking any equally binding 
duties. As a result, it became a forum for the adjudication of superpower—a term whose 
very existence points to the debasement of the traditional Great Power status—disputes 
rather than a true expression of a dynamic complex of Great Power rights and duties; the 
paucity of change in its permanent membership despite changing moral and material 
distributions strongly indicates that it is a modern innovation rather than a new 
expression of a traditional complex. Indeed, the Great Power status and identity of the 
past actually required more, behaviorally and conceptually, from those that claimed it 
than does Security Council permanent membership today if for no other reason than that 
the Great Power status of the past could be lost due to bad behavior or material weakness. 
As a result, Security Council permanent members are just as likely to undermine 





their militaries and international aid programs than some second-tier states. Tenure can 
be a useful tool in some fields, but it has not traditionally been a privilege of Great 
Powers for precisely this reason. 
Beyond the innovation of the Security Council, however, two particular areas 
reveal how conceptual dissonance came to characterize the traditional concept of Great 
Power after Versailles. The first is the notion of ‘civilian powers’ pairing rights and 
duties with capacity that is not violent but rather economic or cultural. ‘Civilian powers’ 
are those claiming international rights and duties—often managerial in nature—similar to 
those claimed by the traditional Great Powers. However, these states contrastingly 
formulate their roles in light of “a moralistic aversion against the traditional ways of 
carrying out power politics, frequently combined with pacifist or near-pacifist 
inclinations [and] sophisticated soft power skills.”531 Germany and Japan are the most 
frequently-cited examples of civilian powers. Both are former Great Powers with great 
wealth but with weak or underequipped militaries and constitutional and cultural 
prohibitions against the use of international force; both are likewise noted for their roles 
in international institutions, the promotion of trade, and the funding of humanitarian and 
other aid missions to troubled parts of the world. However, their label is in many ways 
oxymoronic. The ‘Power’ in Great Power has traditionally stemmed from material 
capacity—the resources needed to assert and maintain some claim—translated into the 
capacity to inflict violence; this translation was not the only way capacity could be 
expressed, but it was the final and therefore the ultimate test of status. This has been true 
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since the earliest resort to a normative complex of rights and duties in the Middle Ages 
and was true as recently as the early 20th century, where the ontological anxieties of 
Austria-Hungary and other Powers over the need to hold and express their material 
capacity through armed action vividly illustrated the fear that a lack of ‘power’ (violent 
material capacity) would correlate inevitably to a loss of ‘Power’ (the status). In contrast, 
the attribution of ‘power’ in ‘civilian power’ reflects a belief that “the term ‘power’ no 
longer means what it used to: ‘hard’ power, the ability to command others, is increasingly 
being replaced by ‘soft’ (persuasive) power.”532  
This begs questions about the relationship of international obligation and right to 
the varieties of international capacity. The first question has to do with practical necessity 
and whether a state’s material capacity to carry out an ordering role can be efficaciously 
expressed in exclusively non-violent ways. The natural tools of civilian powers—
embargoes, discursive protests, and social ostracism—can certainly be employed to exert 
international pressure, but their record of accomplishment is mixed at best and their 
ability to coerce without perverse consequences is likewise uncertain. This is perhaps 
why a state’s material capacity has traditionally been expressed through its maintenance 
and deployment of military force. In the past, Powers frequently looked to force as an 
invaluable tool for the resolution of the very sort of managerial obligations civilian 
powers aim to express; when the Vienna settlement anointed the British crusade to 
suppress the international slave trade—perhaps the most unambiguously morally-upright 
thing the Concert of Europe ever directed—it was to frigates and cannon that they 
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resorted. Recognizing this, contemporary civilian powers have pioneered a sort of hybrid 
expression of material capacity through peacekeeping missions in which their shell 
militaries are deployed to geographic regions they desire to influence. Sometimes armed 
and sometimes unarmed, these peacekeeping missions are often symbolic assertions of 
‘Great Power-esque’ roles on the part of the civilian powers that lack the means or the 
will to assert their claims more forcefully. Indeed, sometimes these peacekeeping forces 
must be transported by the militaries of more traditional Powers because the civilian 
powers lack the capacity to move and supply them. Of course, this raises a subsidiary 
question of whether or not civilian power can be a genuine alternative to Great Power if it 
must resort to some measure of military force and lean on the military forces of others to 
operate; this is not to discount the place of civilian powers in international order, but 
rather to ask if civilian power can be fairly considered a higher or more evolved (or 
devolved, for that matter) form of Great Power or whether it is a different phenomenon 
related only rhetorically to the older form. However one answers this question, it is clear 
that the post-Versailles decoupling of rights and duties from material capacity as it was 
traditionally expressed made possible the notion of pacifist ‘powers’, and perhaps even 
pacifist ‘Powers’. 
A second, related issue has to do with the distribution of international 
responsibility absent the traditional ‘club’ structure of states possessing the Great Power 
status. In past centuries, the members of this club individually expressed a selection of 
roles that, when put together, formed a sort of mosaic reflecting semi-archical order and 
international governance. There is no longer a true ‘club’ of Great Powers, both because 





legal club with very different norms and a radically different understanding of what 
constitutes worthy membership and, perhaps more importantly, because the principles of 
international right and duty have gone through a profound transformation since 1914. 
Universalized, de-localized, and widely-publicized, these new principles 
counterintuitively make it much more difficult to apportion burdens and prerogatives 
effectively—or, as James Mayall put it, to clearly answer the question “Who is to pay the 
bill, and who ultimately must carry the can?”—than they were under the old right- and 
responsibility-complex.533  
In the past, international duties that were particularly burdensome (as opposed to 
those that required a Power to do something it wished to do anyway) necessarily 
correlated not only to the absolute military or economic ability of a Power to fulfill them, 
but also to a number of contingent factors such as culture or geographic location. For 
example, Austria-Hungary’s role as Balkan manager made sense owing to both its 
geographic placement near the Balkans as well as its relative level of material capacity 
(strong enough to manage, but not strong enough to conquer and hold). Powers worthy of 
the status were expected to take some measure of responsibility for their local geographic 
regions as well as those in which their colonies, trade, and strategic interests encouraged 
their close interest; e.g., Japan did not join in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in 
spite of the fact that it took place in a neighboring Asian country, but because of it. 
Contrastingly, in a contemporary international politics of transnational human rights and 
a theorized responsibility to protect (R2P), the exact distribution of the duties and 
prerogatives is far less historically and geographically contingent since these rights and 
                                                             





duties are universal and thus widely-spread and non-localized; all international actors can 
claim them, not just a select group of Great Power sharing a coherent status and 
expressing managerial roles.534 At same time, since any state can assert these right and 
duty claims, the social and material incentives for Great Powers to uniquely internalize 
them are greatly lessened; the universality of contemporary notions of international rights 
and duties thus provides a convenient mechanism for the shirking of burden.  
In this tragedy of the global commons, those states best equipped militarily, 
economically, and culturally to exert global influence—states that would have been Great 
Powers in previous eras—can more easily avoid the consequences of global disorder than 
in centuries past. This has gone hand-in-glove with the post-Cold War emphasis on 
coalitions and supra-national mandates in executing processes of international 
managerialism. Vivid examples are provided by coalition interventions in the Balkans 
and Libya. These have proven difficult to organize and successfully achieve precisely 
because the traditional European Great Powers—still rich, populous, and technologically-
sophisticated states—have expressed equivocal and often conflicting attitudes toward 
their responsibility for the maintenance of order even in their own backyards; it has been 
much simpler to pass this burden along by assigning responsibility to collective, supra-
national organizations—groups that have no sovereign material capacity of their own to 
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call upon—while allowing European military capacity to stagnate.535 As US Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates chided American’s European allies,  
while every alliance member voted for [the] Libya mission, less than half have 
participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the 
strike mission. Frankly, many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not 
because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can’t. The 
military capabilities simply aren’t there.536  
 
Thus, the cover provided by large organizations such as the United Nations and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization has further obscured the normative tethers connecting states 
possessing the material capacity—active and militarized or latent and ‘soft’—necessary 
to promote order with the special ownership of right- and duty-claims encouraging the 
actual commitment of those resources to obtain productive international outcomes. 
Accountability for ‘responsible’ behavior is much harder to determine without consensus 
on the meaning of responsibility; this is exacerbated by the lack of a ‘club’ of widely-
recognized social peers that can exert pressure for isomorphic, cooperative solutions to 
problems of international disorder. 
Finally, there is the inverse of the problem of global responsibility shirking, which 
is the problem of global right and responsibility assertion. Versailles did not destroy the 
notion of national roles expressing parochial prerogatives and missions, it only disrupted 
the club of peers that normatively bounded and productively directed them. Indeed, 
national roles still exist, but where they once expressed apportioned managerial missions 
in the service of both a collective social class and parochial national interests, 
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contemporary roles are more likely to express simply the latter. Russia in the Crimea, the 
United States in the Middle East, France in Africa—all these states have justified 
interventions by reference to national roles. What differentiates them from the past, 
however, is that these interventionist roles are carried out absent the mediation and 
legitimation provided by a collectively-constituted and shared status uniting an elite, 
managerial peer group. The rights and duties claimed in reference to them are less likely 
to evidence a deep commitment to a habitus constructing international politics as a series 
of overlapping normative relationships. Though international politics is in many ways 
more conscious of norms today than in the past—as the ‘thickening’ of international 
institutions and the growth of a transnational understanding of law and ethics proceeds 
apace in many areas—those norms are less intimately bound-up with the material ability 
of great states than they were in the recent past. 
The consequences of these developments for the future are unclear. The original 
Great Power right- and responsibility-complex was born out of a shared security problem, 
and in the post-Cold War era it is uncertain what security problems are sufficiently 
universal, pressing, and agreed-upon to unite a group of preeminent, materially-capable 
states that has never been more diverse behind a shared, norms-based identity. Indeed, 
were such a problem to convincingly present itself, it is not unlikely that the formal-legal 
mechanisms of the United Nations and the informal coordination provided by the various 
‘Groups’ of industrialized nations might prove to be more direct and convenient paths to 
solving it. And that may be where the story ends—it is possible that the informal, semi-





an historical anomaly contingent on a Eurocentric culture and very particular set of moral 
and material distributions that will never be replicated. 
Yet, there are hints of cyclicality in contemporary events that might point to a 
renewed relevance for an order of normative spheres of right and responsibility shared 
among a select group of materially-capable states. Russia’s recent burst of international 
assertiveness has been read by some as an attempt to prove itself once more a traditional 
Great Power expressing a traditional Great Power role.537 Indeed, the claims it has 
asserted in Crimea since its intervention there bear a striking resemblance to the mix of 
regional responsibility claims and nationalistic rights and duties the German 
Confederation employed in the duchies of Slesvig and Holstein long ago. What remains 
to be seen is if historical patterns will be repeated and a Russia “returned to power” will 
once again “rejoin the European family” by conforming to some of its prevailing norms 
and productively directing its assertiveness toward the productive, cooperative, and 
collective management of a common security problem, such as the disorder in the Middle 
East.538 Similarly, the United States finds itself again at a crossroads between visions of 
its role in the world not dissimilar to those it confronted in the early 20th century. Even 
among policymakers and citizens favorably inclined to an active American Great Power 
role adapted to an era of universal human rights and transnational international duties, 
there is a sense of disorientation and dissatisfaction with how these rights and duties have 
been apportioned and actualized; to once more quote Gates’s 2011 Brussels speech: 
President Obama and I believe that despite the budget pressures, it would be a 
grave mistake for the U.S. to withdraw from its global responsibilities. . . . With 
respect to Europe, for the better part of six decades there has been relatively little 
                                                             
537 Henri Froment-Meurice, “Poutine: politique et économie,” Commentaire 39, no. 153 (2016): 
75-79. 





doubt or debate in the United States about the value and necessity of the 
transatlantic alliance. . . . [But] the U.S. share of NATO defense spending has 
now risen to more than 75 percent—at a time when politically painful budget and 
benefit cuts are being considered at home. The blunt reality is that there will be 
dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the American body 
politic writ large—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that 
are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary 
changes to be serious and capable partners. . . . Indeed, if current trends in the 
decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. 
political leaders . . . may not consider the return on America’s investment in 
NATO worth the cost.539 
 
Should skepticism along these lines for established international institutions become 
sufficiently deep and widespread—and indications of such a movement are visible in the 
United States, Europe, and in many potential rising Powers—it could ultimately 
undermine them, forcing a return to less formal forms of international violence-
management and problem-solving. And there is always the possibility of new shifts in 
moral and material distributions that could change the present configuration of 
materially-capable states. There is simply no telling whether or not a Great Power club 
with a center of gravity outside of Europe would naturally adopt the mechanisms of the 
past, the mechanisms of the present, or establish a new order entirely. 
Whatever the desirability of any of these potentialities, it is worthwhile to reflect 
on the more than one thousand year history of rights and responsibilities in Great Power 
politics. The linkage between these normative concepts and the capacity for international 
action has been and shall remain an important determinant of how the moral, purposive 
communities of states materially interact in an international system of both anarchy and 
order. 
 
                                                             







authority a claim of legitimate governance expressed through the 
rights and duties of a Great Power role; instrumental in the 
post-Vienna arrangement of international order, within 
which the missions of the several Powers came to 
collectively divide and manage global politics 
 
Great Power states that possess significant shares of the systemic 
distribution of material capacity and share common 
customs, practices, and normative attitudes; they are 
distinguished by their superior capacities for organized 
violence as well as by their collective understanding of one 
another as social and power-political analogs. 
 
Great Power identity a set of understandings shared by a system’s leading states 
defining their characteristic norms and behaviors and 
deriving from three key material and social elements: the 
formally anarchic status of the international system and the 
consequent necessity of calculation and vigilance; a 
system’s particular distribution of material capacity; and a 
system’s distribution of ideas about social and political 
order.  
 
Great Power role discrete, routinized collections of normative claims and 
international behaviors through which the systemic Great 
Power identity is reconciled with the material and 
ideological idiosyncrasies of an individual unit; the point at 
which the geopolitical and social circumstances peculiar to 
the individual key actors—their unique ‘national interests’ 
as they are locally understood—make themselves known 
 
habitus (following Bourdieu) a self-reproducing complex of 
regulative and purposive understandings conditioning how 
actors understand their field (paraphrase from p. 34fn72) 
 
ontological security (following Mitzen) “security not of the body but of the self, 
the subjective sense of who one is, which enables and motivates 
action and choice” (p. 12fn32) 
 
innovative balancing track a developmental pathway of international rights and duties 
based on prescriptive innovations intuited from empirical 
behavioral patterns and rationally-derived from the 






responsibility a normative expectation of international behavior 
internalized within a state’s policymaking  
 
revisionist Power a state that has seen an increase in its relative material 
standing but refuses to accede to the existing normative 
understandings and expectations of the other Great Powers; 
examples include Revolutionary France and Nazi Germany 
 
right a normative assertion of the appropriateness of certain 
international behaviors  
 
rising Power a state that has seen an increase in its relative material 
standing; its adherence to the normative behavioral 
standards of traditional Great Power is uncertain; if it 
adheres, it becomes simply a Great Power; if not, it 
becomes a revisionist Power 
 
security dilemma a situation in which the pursuit of security by one unit 
threatens the security of another 
 
state any political community effectively asserting a monopoly 
on violence within its own territory; includes Powers and 
non-Powers 
 
states-system (following Bull) “A system of states (or international 
system) is formed when two or more states have sufficient 
contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one 
another’s decisions, to cause them to behave—at least in 
some measure—as parts of a whole” (9) 
 
status a publicly-recognized, quasi-legal concretization of the 
shared Great Power identity 
 
adaptive dynastic track a developmental pathway of international rights and duties 
derived from a medieval creedal inheritance; an adaptation 
of the habitus to the material context of early modernity 
through the construction of large dynastic conglomerates 
 
schismatic confessional a developmental pathway of international rights and duties 
 track animated by a hyper-creedal realignment of international 
allegiances in light of the splintering of the universal 
Church and the onset of radical reformation and revision of 









c. 800  Vassalage and the Production of Feudal Order 
 
  
 877 Emperor Charles II makes vassalage relationships heritable 
 
 911 Rollo the Norseman accepts French vassalization 
 
 
 1000 Stephen I of Hungary accepts papal vassalization 
 
 
 1066 Norman Conquest bounded and normalized by feudal norms 
 
 
 1154 England, Normandy, and Aquitaine dynastically united 
 
 
c. 1200 Reagglomeration of Rights and Duties to the Crown 
 




 1273 Rudolph of Habsburg elected King of Germany, beginning a six- 
  century period of Habsburg consolidation of central Europe 
 
 c. 1300 England absorbs Wales 
 
 




c. 1440 Systemic Politics in Italy, Dynastic Unions in Europe 
 
 1469 Castile-Aragon united through marriage 
  
 1494 French invasion of Italy ends systemic Italian politics, begins 
  period of intense dynastic competition across Europe 
 
 c. 1520 Empire of Charles V unites Austria, Burgundy, and Spain 
  
 c. 1545 The Rough Wooing begins English efforts to absorb Scotland 
 
  
In this period, anarchy 
and violence are 
mediated by resort to 
overlapping feudal 
relationships as 
raiders and nomads 
gradually settle and 
accept feudal norms. 
Importantly, vassalage 
is linked directly to 
violence capacity. 
Here, dynasticism and 
plural relationships 
create new high 
political combinations, 
leading to the 
flourishing of 
conglomerates like the 
Angevin Empire. 
Bolstered by these 
contradictions, feudal 
monarchy develops as 
the royal office the 
rights, duties, and 
relationships necessary 
to exert material 








monarchs use the 
norms of feudalism to 
build large, powerful 
dynastic proto-states. 
In Italy, this period is 
characterized by the 
innovative balancing 







c. 1550 Dynastic Upheaval and Wars of Religion 
 
 1553 Succession of the Catholic Mary I to the English throne 
 
 1554 Marriage of Mary I of England to Philip of Spain   
 
 1556 Abdication of Charles V separates Spain and the Empire 
 
 1562 French Wars of Religion begin 
 
 1569 Rising of the North attempts to overthrow Elizabeth I and replace 
  her with the Catholic Mary, Queen of Scots  
 
 1570 Excommunication of Elizabeth I of England 
 
 1572 St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre intensifies French religious war 
 
 1587 ‘War of the Three Henrys’ divides France between royalist,  
  Protestant, and international Catholic-backed factions  
 
 1588 Spanish Armada attempts regime change in England 
 
 1598 Accession of Henry IV marks religious settlement in France  
 
 1603 Accession of James VI and I unites England and Scotland, cools 
  religious passions  
 
 1615 The ‘Spanish marriages’ mark a return to dynastic diplomacy 
 
 1618 Beginning of what becomes the Thirty Years’ War 
 
 1624 Elevation of Cardinal Richelieu, proponent of raison d’Etat,  




    1648 The Classical States-system 
 
 
 1661 Louis XIV proclaims a policy aimed at preeminent prestige 
  
 1667 The War of Devolution extends French territory eastward  
 
 1672 The Franco-Dutch War continues France’s expansion 
 
 1683 The War of the Reunions continues France’s expansion 
   
 1688 The Nine Years’ War begins 
 
 1697 The Nine Years’ War concludes with a pan-European coalition  
  Having checking Louis XIV’s territorial ambitions 
  
 1701 The War of the Spanish Succession begins 
 
Religious conflict and 
dynastic upheaval 
follow from the 
changes wrought by 
feudal monarchy. 





and duties lead to 
violent competition 
bound by few norms.  
Exhausted by political, 
religious, and cultural 
conflict, Europe turns 
to a combination of 
dynastic tradition and 
rational, systemic 
politics. 
The Thirty Years War 
upsets this peace, but 
the Westphalia 
settlement 
institutionalizes a mix 
of dynastic and 
rational international 
politics. 
The wars of Louis XIV 
reveal the primary 
elements of Great 
Power identity in this 
period: dynasty, 
prestige, the assertion 
of wide-ranging state 
interests, and the 





 1713 Emperor Charles VI issues the Pragmatic Sanction allowing a  
  daughter to inherit the archduchy of Austria and other Habsburg 
  possessions  
 
 1714 The Congress of Utretch ends the war 
 
 1718 The War of the Quadruple Alliance checks renewed Spanish  
  dynastic ambitions  
 
 
 1733 The War of the Polish Succession, fought over dynastic and  
  prestige claims by two competing coalitions, begins 
 
 1738 The war ends through a peace built on compensation and 
  conciliation  
 
 1740 Maria Theresa accedes to the office of Archduchess; the War  
  of the Austrian Succession (also encompassing several  
  subsidiary conflicts) begins when Prussia contests her claim 
 
 1748 The war concludes with Austrian territorial losses but also with 
  international recognition of Maria Theresa’s rights to her titles 
 
 1756 The Seven Years’ War begins as colonial contests spill over 
  into continental affairs 
 
 1763 The war ends with Britain’s maritime and colonial role dominant 
 
 1773 First partition of Poland 
 
 1775 The American Revolutionary War begins 
 
 1778 France intervenes on the side of the United States 
  
 1779 Spain intervenes on the side of the United States 
 
 1780 Russia creates the League of Armed Neutrality to balance against  
  Britain’s claims to special maritime rights during the war 
 
  The Fourth Anglo-Dutch War breaks out over Britain’s claims to  
  special maritime rights 
 
 1783 The American Revolutionary War ends with American  
  independence, but with only minor territorial changes for its  
  French ally 
 
 1787 The Dutch Patriot Revolt breaks out and is crushed by Prussia;  
  France threatens to intervene but is materially incapable  
 
  The War of the Bavarian Succession fought over Joseph II’s plans 
  to extend Habsburg influence in Germany 
 
 1789 Onset of revolution in France  
  
 1792 War of the First Coalition against the Revolution  
 
This period is 
characterized by the 
textbook balance of 
power system 
Britain’s role as 
explicit balancer is 







prevailing among the 
Powers. 
A period of exhaustion 
and missteps results 




with its special 
maritime claims, 
alienating the other 
Powers. 
France gradually 
impoverishes itself and 
finds its status 
disintegrating suddenly 







     1793 Years of Revolution and Reaction 
 
 
 1804 Coronation of Napoleon as Emperor of the French 
 
 
     1815 A World Restored 
 
  Quadruple Alliance treaty signed to united Powers against 
  any future disorder in France 
 
 1818 Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle normalizes relations with France 
 
  France joins the Quadruple Alliance, now directed against 
  revolution generally 
  
 1820 Congress of Troppau legitimizes Great Power intervention to  
  support legitimate governments 
 
 1821 Congress of Laibach legitimates Austrian intervention in Naples, 
  but estranges Britain and opens a rift among the Powers 
  
 1822 Congress of Verona legitimates French intervention in Spain,  
  but leads Britain to adopt a policy of non-interventionism 
   





      1848 Rising Nations and Rising Powers 
 
  Revolutions motivated by liberalism and nationalism sweep 
  both Europe and Latin America  
 
  Establishment of the Second French Republic 
   
  The king of Prussia is offered the crown of a united Germany, 
  but rejects it despite his support of the nationalist cause 
 
  Russia intervenes to suppress the Hungarian uprising against the 
  Austrian Emperor, but recognizes the French republic 
 
  First Italian War of Independence, fought between Sardinia and  
  Austria, ends with Austria victory; the French republic does not 
  intervene, signaling its willingness to conform 
 
 1852 Proclamation of the Second French Empire (Napoleon III) 
 
 1853 The Crimean War begins 
 
 1856 The Congress of Paris concludes the war, revealing France to 
  be an essentially conservative Power 
The many wars of the 
French Revolution and 
the Napoleonic empire 
radically reshape not 
only the map of 
Europe, but the 
patterns of 
international politics 
and domestic society. 
 
The implications of the 
Vienna settlement are 
operationally 
established by a series 
of Great Power 
Congresses. The 
principles articulated 
within it form the basis 
for this century’s Great 
Power managerialism, 
but also reveal the 
limits of the ability of 
condominiums among 
the Powers to address 
the questions of 
liberalism and 
nationalism with only 
conservative answers. 
 
The forces of 
nationalism and 
liberalism foster a 
number of 
revolutionary regimes, 
and hint at the 
potential for German 
and Italian unification. 
France successfully 
tempers its revisionism 
and is accepted as a 
member of the Great 
Power club. It then 
transitions into an 
empire and pursues a 
traditional program 
based on prestige, 
dynasticism, and 







 1859 France and Sardinian eject Austria from Italy 
 
 1861 Proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy 
 
 1864 The German Confederation, led by Prussia and Austria, occupies  
  the duchies of Slesvig an Holstein based on nationalist and  
  formal-legal right claims 
 
 1866 Austria and Prussia go to war over the question of the duchies; 
  Austria is ejected from Germany 
 
  Formation of the North German Confederation 
 
 1867 Reeling from its defeats, Austrian faces the prospect of a  
  rebellion in Hungary; the Ausgleich, a compromise with 
  Hungarian nationalists, reconstitutes the Austrian Empire as two  
  separate states united by a common monarch and foreign policy 
 
 1870 Franco-Prussian War breaks out over issues of French prestige  
  after a Hohenzollern was almost placed on the throne of Spain 
 
  Emperor Napoleon III is captured; his regime collapses at home  
  and the Third Republic is established 
 
  The North German Confederation becomes the German Empire 
 
 1871 The Treaty of Frankfurt ends the war, transferring two French 
  provinces to Germany 
 
 1873 Bismarck establishes the League of the Three Emperors with the 
  goal of maintaining peaceful Great Power relations on the 
  continent; it would last, with one interruption, until 1887 
 
 1877 The Russo-Turkish war breaks out as Russia reaches for the Straits 
  and fosters Balkan nationalism 
 
 1878 The Congress of Berlin rolls back Russian and Balkan nationalist 
  gains; Austria-Hungary is awarded Bosnia-Herzegovina and  
  positioned with a new Balkan role designed to manage the 
  disorder caused there by the decline of the Ottoman Empire and 
  to bar further Russian gains 
 
 1879 A brief lapse in the League leads to the Dual Alliance between  
  Germany and Austria-Hungary 
 
 1882 Italy joins the Dual Alliance, inaugurating the Triple Alliance 
 
 1884 The Berlin Conference touches off the scramble for Africa by  
  delineating normative procedures for the managed, peaceful 
  division of territory amongst the Powers 
 
 1885 In the Serbo-Bulgarian War, Bulgaria successfully absorbs the 
  former Ottoman territory of Eastern Rumelia; Austria-Hungary 
  steps in to protect the defeated Serbs from Bulgarian reprisals 
 
New national states 
are created: Germany 
around an existing 
Great Power role and 
Italy around a national 
mission that lacked an 
immediate outlet for 
the expression of Great 
Power but did nothing 
to conceal the hunger 
of its leaders for that 
status. 
Austria’s German and 
Italian missions are 
forcibly ended, and it 
suffers domestic 
revolution and 
reorganization as a 
result. 
 





Austria role dyad takes 
shape as Bismarck 
determines to preserve 
Austria-Hungary as an 
eastern-focused Great 
Power. Austria-
Hungary’s role in the 
Balkans is encouraged 
and formalized by the 
Congress of Berlin, 
itself a reaction to 
Russia’s refocused 
Great Power role 
aimed at the Straits 
and the turbulent 
Balkan principalities 
emerging from the 







    1890 Accelerating Tensions and Contradictions 
 
 Bismarck’s guidance of German policy comes to an end; the  
  German Great Power role begins to transition toward a focus on 
  ‘world policy’  
 
 1894 Russia—in need of support for its Balkan ambitions—concludes an 
  alliance with France, ending that Power’s isolation and providing a 
  basis for its security against Germany; this locks in a cooperative  
  France-Russia role dyad  
 
 1895 The Sino-Japanese War earns Japan an imperial zone in China and 
  cements its status as a rising Power 
 
  
 1900 A joint force of all the Powers, several secondary states, and the  
  United States intervenes in the Boxer Rebellion in China; the force 
  operates under a single allied command structure 
 
 1902 An Anglo-Japanese alliance designed to contain Russia in Asia is 
  concluded 
 
 1904 The Russo-Japanese War breaks out over conflicting spheres of 
  interest in Manchuria; Russia suffers immediate setbacks 
 
  The Entente Cordiale agreements between Britain and France 
 
 1905 Revolution breaks out in St. Petersburg 
 
  The Russian fleet is annihilated at the Battle of Tsushima 
 
  The Portsmouth Peace Conference ends the war and announces 
  the United States’s increased involvement in world politics 
 
  The First Moroccan Crisis sparked by German interest in North 
  Africa 
 
 1906 The Algeciras Conference resolves the Moroccan Crisis, but  
  demonstrates Germany’s increasing international isolation in its 
  question for colonies  
 
  The Tsar grants the Constitution of 1906 establishing the Duma 
 
  Britain launched HMS Dreadnought, revolutionizing naval warfare 
  and, by rendering existing navies obsolete, opening the door to  
  a naval building challenge from Germany 
 
 1907 President Roosevelt dispatches an American fleet on an around 
  the world journey as a demonstration of naval power 
 
  Britain and Russia agree to spheres of influence where their 
  colonial roles overlapped, thus transitioning a competitive dyad 
  to a one of cooperation 
 
Great Power roles 
begin to ossify as 
geographic territory 
for expansion becomes 
scarce and 
increasingly-active 
world policies among 
Powers such as 
Germany, Japan, and 
the United States leave 
less room for the non-
zero-sum expression of 
authority claims. 
Several dyads are 











from one of normative 







    1908 Toward Decisive Change 
 
  On the advice of the Russian foreign minister, Austria-Hungary 
  annexes Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
  The Russian government condemns this action, and mobilizes 
  its forces in conjunction with Serbia 
 
 1909 German armed mediation forces the Russians and Serbs to back 
  down and recognize the Austro-Hungarian annexation 
 
 1911 The Second Moroccan Crisis; Germany makes small territorial 
  gains in Africa, but only at the cost of international esteem and 
  the acknowledgement of a French protectorate over Morocco 
 
  The Italo-Turkish War reveals the weakness of Ottoman authority 
 
 1912 The First Balkan War; a coalition of Balkan nation-states  
  partition much of European Turkey 
 
 1913 The Second Balkan War; the Balkan states join forces against  
  their erstwhile Bulgarian ally, paring back its gains and 
  aggrandizing themselves 
 
 1914 The Third Balkan War; Austria-Hungary intervenes in Serbia 
  after a state-sponsored terrorist plot assassinates the heir 
  to its throne 
 
  Russia intervenes in the Third Balkan War, trigging a series of 
  alliances and dyadic role relationships that expand the conflict 






relationships are now 
in full force, shaping 
how Powers react to 
circumstances. 
The fundamental 
weakness of Ottoman 
authority and the 
growing power of 
nationalist, revisionist 
Balkan states leads to 
multiple crises, 
ultimately creating a 
cascade of ontological 
security dilemmas as 
the self-understandings 
of multiple Great 
Powers become 
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